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# FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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1975

# TURKEY.

## PART VII.

JANUARY TO JUNE 1924.

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# Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

## Part VII.

[E 174/32/44] No. 1.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 7, 1924.)

(No. 891.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 30, 1923.

I ENCLOSED in a private letter to Mr. Oliphant of the 26th instant copy of a personal communication which I addressed to Adnan Bey on that day in regard to certain entirely unjustifiable and highly improper references to British intrigues in the public prosecutor's indictment of the 25th December against the journalists accused of high treason before the Court of Independence.

2. In the first of these references the public prosecutor, when examining the motives for the publication of the Aga Khan–Ameer Ali letter and the sources whence it originated, alluded to a "power" which instigated its authors. The second reference, which occurred much later in the indictment but was less ambiguous, was to the effect that "the English had always been accustomed to use the force of the Caliphate for their own purposes, and that they imagined they would achieve their aims by the troubles which they would create around the Caliphate and by the disorders which they would engender."

3. When I visited Adnan Bey on the 29th December in order to make a communication to him on the subject of the Mosul negotiations, I expressed surprise at not having received an immediate explanation from him on the subject of these intolerable insinuations on the part of a Government official. Adnan Bey was excessively embarrassed. He said that he had at once forwarded my letter to Angora, and then proceeded to attempt to prove that I had exaggerated the importance of the public prosecutor's statements. He denied that the latter, in the exceptional circumstances of this unusual trial, could be regarded as having spoken in the capacity of a Government official, or that, in any case, the Turkish Government could be held responsible for the views which he had expressed in the Court of Independence. He endeavoured even to make out that the press version of the indictment might not correspond with the official text, which he said he had not seen but was endeavouring to obtain. He explained that the Turkish word for "power" ("kuvvet"), used in the first reference above mentioned, should be translated by the French word "force" rather than "puissance," as in the expression "force motrice." (Mr. Ryan informs me that this argument is technically well founded, although its speciousness is apparent when the public prosecutor's language is read in the light of the constant suggestions previously made in less authoritative quarters that the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali were inspired by His Majesty's Government). Finally, he maintained that the use of the words "the English" in the second reference showed that not the "British Government," but particular individuals—"Mr. Lloyd George, for instance"—were meant, and that therefore neither His Majesty's Government nor myself had cause to be offended thereby.

4. I told Adnan exactly what I thought of such calumnies, and laid great emphasis on the impression they would produce on your Lordship. I concluded by stating that I had not telegraphed to you, but had written privately by courier, that my letter would reach you on the 31st and that I awaited some more satisfactory statement from

him by that date. Adnan replied that he would report my observations by telegraph to Ismet Pasha that evening.

5. On the morning of the 31st I received a message from him by telephone that he wished to come and see me at the, for him, unusual hour of 11·30. He came and remained for fully an hour trying to explain away the public prosecutor's allusions. He was extremely perturbed, and, though he did not say so, had obviously received instructions from Angora to make the best he could of a bad business. The Turkish press had published in the morning a statement that Yussuf Kemal Bey was leaving Angora the following day for London, and, though Adnan, while admitting its probable truth, denied that he had any official confirmation of this report, I have little doubt that his instructions had been to remove by any means that he could, short of formal official action, an impression which might react on Yussuf Kemal's reception in London. Ultimately he begged me to regard the incident as closed and to accept his explanations, which did no differ sensibly from those reported earlier in this despatch, and which he supported by a leading article in the "Times" of the 18th December commenting on the Aga Khan's letter, and stating that its publication in the Constantinople press was an indiscretion open to obvious misinterpretation.

6. I told Adnan that I doubted greatly whether your Lordship would regard these explanations as satisfactory, and that I could scarcely recommend that you should, unless I was assured that these utterly false allegations would at least not be repeated. I said that my Government had given several proofs recently of their willingness to return to more friendly relations with Turkey; that the latter had so far evinced very few signs of being actuated by a spirit of reciprocity in this respect, and that baseless imputations of this nature, particularly when made by Turkish officials in the position of a public prosecutor, would go far to convince my Government that, if such were the attitude of the Turkish Government, it was useless to attempt to cultivate better relations or even to return to normal ones. In this respect I mentioned that I had even contemplated suggesting to your Lordship that, if the Turkish Government did not publicly dissociate itself from these calumnies, it might be as well to suggest to Ismet Pasha that it was scarcely a suitable moment for a representative of Yussuf Kemal Bey's rank to proceed to London, and that it would be preferable to despatch a counsellor only, who would not expect to be received by your Lordship, and ultimately, after the ratification of the treaty, by His Majesty the King.

7. Adnan Bey said that he would at once report all my observations to Ismet Pasha with the exception of the last, which he would not dare to mention. He added that, though he could give me no formal assurance that such statements would not be repeated by official personages, he did not think that they would. I said that, for my part, I would inform your Lordship of his explanations.

8. For the reasons given in my telegram No. 548 of to-day's date, I think the matter might well be left as it is for the present. I do not believe that any further official action would materially magnify the impression which has been created. It would need considerable pressure and possibly threats of specific action to induce the Turkish Government to publish an official disavowal. If such pressure were applied it might lead to a serious controversy entailing a delay in Yussuf Kemal Bey's departure for London and possibly thus prejudice an early commencement of the Mosul discussions.

9. I venture, however, to express the opinion that a very useful purpose might be served if your Lordship, when you receive Yussuf Kemal's first visit, were to allude to these unjustifiable calumnies, which, by no stretch of imagination, can be explained away, and which are merely calculated, by producing a painful impression, to check any inclination His Majesty's Government may feel to revert to friendly relations with Turkey.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 202/202/44] No. 2.

*Sir Odo Russell to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7, 1924.)*

(No. 182.)

My Lord, *Vatican Mission, Rome, December 30, 1923.*

WITH regard to my telegram No. 36 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that I took an opportunity this morning, when visiting the Cardinal Secretary of State after my audience with the Pope, to enquire when I might expect a definite



reply to my communication with regard to the desire expressed by His Majesty's Government that no foreign representative should be accorded a privileged position or liturgical honours in Palestine now that they had definitely assumed the mandate. Cardinal Gasparri said that the delay in transmitting the written comments of the Vatican was due in a large measure to a request made by the French Ambassador to be allowed to consult his Government before expressing a definite opinion; and that, once in possession of that, he hoped to be in a position to send a more complete reply. His Eminence did not, however, anticipate that his note would be in any way modified by the attitude of the French Government on this subject. The French Ambassador, he continued, had acquiesced in his contention that the French Government had renounced their right to a privileged position in Palestine; but he, the Ambassador, personally seemed to cling to the retention of special honours within the precincts of the church while abandoning them in processions, &c., outside. It was when the Cardinal pointed out that it was inside the church that liturgical honours were rendered, and not outside, that M. Doulcet sought refuge in the request to consult his Government. Cardinal Gasparri then went on to tell me that the original instructions sent to Jerusalem from the Vatican were to the effect that liturgical honours to the French representative were to cease after the signature of peace. He had not heard yet what had happened during the Christmas services in Jerusalem; but he had no reason to suspect that these instructions had not been followed.

I have, &c.
ODO RUSSELL.

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[E 176/109/44] No. 3.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 7.)*

(No. 4.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds, Smyrna, regarding the exchange of populations.

*Constantinople, January 1, 1924.*

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Enclosure in No. 3.

*Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.*

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Smyrna, December 29, 1923.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that two shiploads of Greeks have recently been despatched from here. About 2,500 left in the "Archipelagos" on the 6th December. On the 22nd December 1,100 were despatched. The first shipload were surprisingly fit; the second batch were rather less so. Some fifty women and children who had been detained here in Turkish houses were sent away largely, I believe, through the instrumentality of the American Near East Relief, and more Greek women and children are likely to be sent away before long.

2. The "Archipelagos" had on board Mr. Jacquith of the Near East Relief and two representatives of the Greek Red Cross. These, together with Turkish delegates, form a sub-commission as provided by the Convention for the Exchange of Populations.

3. A few thousand Moslems have already arrived from Greece. Some 2,000 from Crete disembarked from the "Archipelagos" at Aivaly at the beginning of the month. It is hoped that their experience of olives in Crete will enable them to maintain the olive groves at Aivaly. On the 10th December 120 Moslems from the Cavalla and Drama district arrived here, and on the 18th December 160 arrived from Salonica and are to be sent on to Sokia. The arrangements made for the housing and maintenance of the refugees seem to have been sadly defective, and are subjected to

considerable public criticism. The authorities have announced that land will be transferred to Moslem immigrants through the agricultural bank on the security of lands which they own in Greece, and that money for tools, animals and seed will be advanced. It remains to be seen how far it will be possible to carry out this measure.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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[E 183/32/44] No. 4.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January 7.*)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 2, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 878 of the 26th December, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 27th December the Court of Independence by a majority found Lutfi Fikri Bey guilty of an offence under article 1 of the Law on Treason, but decided to sentence him to five years' penal servitude under article 3, rather than to death under article 2, on the ground that his opposition to the decision of the 1st November, 1922, regarding the Sultanate and the Caliphate had been manifested not by acts, but by writing only The court held that Lutfi Fikri's offence was aggravated by the fact that he, a man of such intellectual capacity as to be able to appreciate what the country had gone through, had lent himself to efforts to destroy the peace and tranquillity of the nation and had urged the Caliph to subversive action, "with the simple object of promoting ideas designed continuously to poison the conscience of the people with the evil intention of again destroying and upsetting our country from without." The sentence was therefore fixed at five years, being two years in excess of the minimum penalty.

2. Lutfi Fikri Bey received his sentence with sang-froid, and he and his lawyers announced later that they would contest it in the Court of Cassation under another article of the law. It is, however, more than doubtful whether his contention that that article applies will be admitted, as it is generally held, and is indeed laid down in the Law on Courts of Independence, that the decisions of those courts are final, subject only to the necessity of sanction by the Grand National Assembly for the execution of death sentences.

3. The trial of the journalists was resumed on the 29th December and occupied three lengthy sittings of the court on that and the two following days. Certain witnesses, one of whom was Dr. Riza Nour Bey, were heard for the defence of Velid Bey. Riza Nour testified to Velid Bey's patriotism, especially during the Lausanne Conference, when he was the only journalist who fully supported the Turkish delegation. Incidentally, he took the opportunity in this connection to have a fling at Jahid Bey, who, as your Lordship may remember, violently attacked Riza Nour for his conduct at the conference. He attributed any lapses on Velid Bey's part to neurasthenia. Another witness, who was heard *in camerâ*, appears to have testified to Velid's activity in forwarding war material from Constantinople to Anatolia during the Allied occupation, and capital was made later by the defence of his services in this direction. Otherwise there is little worth reporting in the long speeches by the lawyers and the accused themselves, except that the advocates attempted to curry favour with the court by various onslaughts on the conduct of the Allies during the armistice period, and one of them, speaking on behalf of Jahid Bey, referred to alleged intrigues of Mr. Fitzmaurice, chief dragoman of this Embassy, at an earlier period. Towards the end of the trial Jahid himself, provoked by certain allusions in the public prosecutor's final speech, passionately defended his honour and said, among other things, that a time would come when he would sit in the public prosecutor's place and bring to account those responsible for blunders committed and rights sacrificed at Lausanne.

4. The trial ended late on the 31st December, but the court reserved its sentence. From various remarks let fall by the president and the public prosecutor during the last sittings, it seems possible that it had already been decided, even before hearing the case for the defence, to acquit the accused. The issue is nevertheless very doubtful, for the hostility to Jahid and Velid Beys in Angora is extremely strong.

5. Ismet Pasha scored a success in the Grand National Assembly in the final decision of the 26th December on the question whether all sentences of the Court of



Independence should be subject to review by the Assembly. The report of the Committee on Drafts, recommending that the opposition proposal in this sense should not be entertained, was accepted by 112 votes to 44, with four abstentions. It was generally felt that Ismet had strengthened his position, although there were a fair number of Deputies, perhaps as many as thirty, who did not attend the sitting and who must be reckoned in the potential strength of the opposition. Within the last couple of days, however, a critical situation seems again to have arisen. The Minister of Finance, Hassan Fehmi Bey, resigned on the 31st December, and rumours of a reconstruction of the Cabinet, or even its resignation, are again current. Angora is greatly preoccupied with internal, and to some extent with foreign, affairs. It is an open secret that great difficulty is being experienced in forming the budget for the coming year without admitting an estimated deficit of over £T. 50,000,000. A report that official salaries will have to be reduced has provoked much criticism, all the more bitter because of the increase in army pay a couple of months ago. The question of the Anatolian Railway is again on the tapis, and various other matters tend to increase the difficulties of Ismet Pasha and his Government in the Assembly. These difficulties may possibly be increased by the absence of Mustafa Kemal, who left for Smyrna on 31st December. It has apparently been decided not to appoint an Acting President of the Republic, but to refer important matters to Mustafa Kemal during his absence, which is expected to last two or three months.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

P.S.—The verdict on the journalists was pronounced this afternoon. All were acquitted, amid general applause in court. According to a report which has just reached me, the court held that the letter of the Aga Khan and Ameer Ali contained passages contrary to the Law on Treason, but acquitted the accused on the ground that there had been no connivance between them and the authors of the letter.

N. H.

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[E 185/185/44] No. 5.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January 7.*)

(No. 14.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 2, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 851 of the 19th December, 1923, relative to Greek patriarchal affairs, I have the honour to state that on the 27th December the Anatolian Telegraph Agency published a telegram from Angora contradicting a report in a Salonica newspaper to the effect that the Patriarch Gregorius and four other Metropolitans were to be tried for treason.

2. In view of the semi-official character of the Anatolian Agency, this *démenti* is significant, having regard more particularly to the widely advertised efforts of Papa Eftim a couple of weeks ago to induce the Court of Independence to purge the Greek patriarchate of what he considers to be pro-Hellenic elements. It is a further indication that the Turks are for the moment on their best behaviour as regards the patriarchate.

3. On the other hand, the Turkish Government have not yet committed themselves to official recognition of the new Patriarch. Announcements have appeared from time to time that inquiries are being held as to the manner in which the election was held. Mustafa Kemal Pasha returned a correct reply to the telegram addressed to him by Mgr. Gregorius after his enthronement, but the text of the reply given in the local newspapers does not show whether the President addressed him by the style of Patriarch. I have not thought it advisable to inquire regarding this point, as I prefer in present circumstances, in the interest of the partriarchate itself, to avoid any appearance of concerning myself with the affairs of that institution.

4. I may mention in this connection that I have refrained from sending any message of congratulation to the new Patriarch on his election or enthronement. It will be for consideration later whether the visits which it is customary for a member of my staff to pay to the Greek Patriarch and other heads of communities at Easter, a purely religious festival, should be continued.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 249/249/44] No. 6.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 8.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 7, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 353.

Two principal delegates, Rassih Effendi and Kemal Eumer Bey, accompanied by Adnan Bey, called on me to-day. They expressed grateful thanks for facilities afforded to Red Crescent delegation, and gave formal assurances that it would concern itself solely with humanitarian object of mission. I spoke to them in the sense of telegram of Government of India of 3rd December enclosed in India Office letter to you of 7th December last, and laid stress on necessity in their own interests as well of abstaining from all political discussion.

The two delegates above mentioned will be accompanied by chief accountant of Red Crescent, Bedri Bey, and one interpreter not yet finally selected. They propose to leave in about ten days' time viâ Egypt. I shall report exact date later. Present idea is to wait till they reach Bombay before making plans as to itinerary, which they will submit to authorities there.

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[E 212/145/44] No. 7.

*Mr. Phipps to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 8.)

(No. 9.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January* 7, 1924.

I HEAR on good authority that M. Poincaré has requested the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies to select a reporter for the Treaty of Lausanne, with a view to speedy ratification. This selection will probably be made on the 9th instant.

This evening's "Temps," in a leading article, of which text goes to your Lordship by bag, attacks what it describes as England's "policy of conquest" in the East. Article concludes by declaring that France cannot imitate that policy, for she seeks neither to divide nor to dominate. She will give Mussulmans proof of her friendship by ratifying Treaty of Lausanne, which re-established Turkish independence.

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[E 297/210/44] No. 8.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January* 8, 1924.

YOUR despatch No. 1602.

I have repeatedly pressed Ministry for Foreign Affairs for answer, and they now inform me that they are awaiting return of M. Montagna to obtain his views before answering. M. Montagna, who is destined for post of Italian representative in Turkey, is ill, but may be back at the end of this week. As I learn privately that when offered post he said that he would sooner stay where he was than proceed to Angora, I take it as assured that Italian Government will be in agreement with your Lordship at least on this point.

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[E 367/186/44] No. 9.

*Lord D'Abernon to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 12.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to state, with reference to various statements which have appeared in the press regarding the intention of the



German Government to appoint a diplomatic representative at Angora, that the following notice has been published to-day :—

> "This report in its present form is incorrect. Possibly it arose from the following facts : After the Turkish Government had entered into negotiations for the conclusion of treaties of friendship with various Powers which did not take part in the Lausanne Conference, a provisional exchange of views took place between the Turkish and German Governments in regard to a treaty which might form a basis for the eventual resumption of diplomatic relations. With a view to simplifying matters, the German Government would probably entrust the conduct of negotiations for a treaty of this nature to one of the German representatives in the Balkans."

In conversation with Herr von Schubert on this subject to-day, he stated that negotiations for the moment will be limited to the endeavour to agree upon a skeleton treaty of peace. It was proposed to negotiate this before going into details regarding consular jurisdiction, Capitulations, &c.

As regards the appointment of a German representative either at Constantinople or Angora, the idea of the German Government was still to await action by England and France, and to follow whatever example they might set (see Berlin despatch No. 802 of the 6th November, 1923). Meantime, a German consul might be sent to Smyrna.

*Berlin, January* 5, 1924.

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[E 419/32/44] No. 10.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 14.)

(No. 30.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 9, 1924.

I HAVE endeavoured during the past year to keep your Lordship very fully informed of internal developments in Turkey, feeling as I have done that the geographical situation of this country, its international position and its importance as a factor in the evolution of relations between East and West gave those developments an interest out of proportion to the size of the new Turkish State or the numbers of the population directly affected by them. My despatches having necessarily abounded in detail, I think it may be useful if I indicate in a broader fashion some of the general features which strike me as I look back over the fourteen months which have elapsed since the decision taken by the Grand National Assembly on the 1st November, 1922, to abolish the Sultanate.

2. When that decision was taken the Angora Government were at pains to attenuate its effect on Turkish and Moslem opinion by representing the Caliphate as a great institution which the Turks held, as it were, in trust for the whole of Islam and the authority of which rested on the support of the Turkish State. Their efforts in this direction were aided by their avoidance of any positive definition of the new form of the State, and by the fact that it was possible without political inconvenience to "elect" to the Caliphate the Prince, who under the old rule of succession would have come to the throne on the disappearance of the late Sultan. Even so, they were taking a considerable risk, for many had felt that one of the few things which might outrage the much-tried and hitherto docile Anatolian peasant would be a direct attack on the throne. The event justified their boldness. The peasant accepted the change, as he had accepted every other innovation. He was doubtless ignorant of its significance, but his ignorance was itself due to that patient indifference to all but immediate personal concerns which is one of his chief characteristics.

3. It is as true as ever that there is no public opinion in Turkey in the European sense of the expression. Yet this statement must be qualified by an admission that during the last four years there has been a great increase in the number of people who take a lively interest in public affairs, people who from one point of view may, for want of a better term, be described as patriots, although the standard of patriotism is low, and who, from another, may be described as constituting the *intelligentsia* of the country. They are a small minority relatively to the bulk of the population, but

they are now numerous as a class, and it is among them that one must look for the various trends of opinion which influence the course of events, so far as it is influenced at all by moral forces. They belong to every class possessing any sort of education or stake in the country—officials, khojas, army officers, professional men, journalists, schoolmasters, students and local notables. To them the controversies of the day mean something real, and, while they include large numbers of more or less conservative persons and large numbers of subservient opportunists, they include also a strong and rather more homogeneous element of radicals. All, except the opportunists, have one thing in common, namely, a violent doctrinairism, which finds its completest expression in the political debates at Angora and the columns of the press in all the more important centres. The sheep-like people look up and are fed only with words, but the words have come to have a real meaning for the doctrinaires who deal in them.

4. The ideas of the advanced members of this class have crystallised about such expressions as "national sovereignty," "republic," "liberal" and—a notable addition to the vocabulary of the Turkish revolution—"laic." Older systems of ideas have disintegrated to a large extent. To be a constitutional monarchist of the 1908 type is now to be a reactionary. To go further back and to wish to see any real power restored to the throne is to be a traitor. Once this position had been created, it was not hard for Mustafa Kemal, within less than a year of the *coup* of the 1st November, 1922, to elicit an express definition of Turkey as a republic and to engineer a campaign to discredit not so much the Caliph as the institution of the Caliphate. He is a great man, and a man, according to his lights, of genuine patriotism, as are many of his supporters, but it is not unfair to say that ambition and fear have driven him and them to extreme courses.

5. The fear to which I refer is partly fear of the Western Powers. The Turks, with all their arrogance and sense of triumph, realise that those Powers could crush them if they chose to exert their strength, and they imagine that some at least of the Powers still look at the newly won liberty of Turkey with jealous eyes, at her undeveloped resources with covetousness and at her territory with a desire to carve out of it new dependencies. And it is partly fear of the Caliphate, as the possessor of a tradition of personal sovereignty and the possible rallying-point of the incoherent and partly latent, but potentially strong, forces of Conservatism in the country. It is now not so much the present Caliph, who has learnt caution, as the whole House of Osman which is mistrusted. To Mustafa Kemal, the ambitious creature of fortune, that house is a rival. To Mustafa Kemal, the doctrinaire patriot, and to the doctrinaire patriots who are the best of his followers, it is the incarnation of the evils of the past. They have got to the point of being prepared, by reducing the Caliphate to a simulacrum, perhaps even by destroying it, to sacrifice the prestige which the possession of the Caliphate gives Turkey in a large part of the Moslem world rather than see it retain enough of its own prestige at home to make the restoration of the temporal power and of the old régime possible.

6. This is the most striking development of a general kind during the last year. It has been facilitated by the rapid growth of what, again for want of a better term, may be called irreligion in the educated class. Here I am not speaking of new phenomenon. What is new is the open enunciation by certain publicists of principles inconsistent with Islamic conceptions, the efforts of others less courageous, to read new and subversive meanings into old Islamic formulæ and the facility with which it is recognised that the applicability of those conceptions and formulæ to life under a republican régime is a suitable subject for public discussion. In using the word irreligious, I am conscious of using a rather misleading expression, for it covers not merely agnostic or sensual indifference to the claim of Islam to regulate every concern of human life, but a whole series of phenomena, such as, for instance, the growing emancipation of women, the frequentation by Turks of both sexes of European balls and other social functions, the Caliph's son dancing with the rest; the tendency to make monogamy, with only a little relaxation, the law of the land; the frank handling of the prohibition question as merely an economic and administrative problem, in which Turkish liquor merchants no less than others have vested interests at stake; the suggestion that religious law courts should be done away with; and the recognition that, if Turkish law is to be adapted to the needs of modern life, it must be divorced much more completely than was done in the middle of the 19th century from the law of Islam.

7. If Turkey is to be reorganised on the lines of an European State, and that is the ambition of those Nationalists who are now beginning to be called Liberals, many



of these things are necessary to that end. The trouble is that those who have abandoned Islam in all but name have found no new basis of real principle; that they still retain of Islam its intolerance doubled by the intolerance of infant Nationalism; that they lose themselves in wrangling with each other and with the Conservatives; and, most of all, that they have no real sense of how the problems which they ventilate so lightly are to be dealt with in a practical and constructive manner. Constitutional questions are solved by sewing Republican patches in a more or less haphazard fashion on to the fabric of the now unrecognisable, but not wholly abolished, Constitution of 1876. Economically, the country is going to rack and ruin, while politicians and fortune-hunters play with schemes for building railways and reconstructing devastated areas. The financial situation is so bad that for the coming year a deficit of over £T. 50,000,000 is spoken of as probable in a budget of not more than three times that amount, and, although this will certainly be reduced on paper to a very much smaller sum, it is much more likely to represent the true state of the case than the actual estimates which will be submitted to the Assembly. In the administrative services there is a general indiscipline, and in the lower branches, at any rate in Constantinople, a formidable aggravation of the time-honoured system of bakhshish. In Anatolia the scourge of brigandage, the product of misery and imperfect control, has once more assumed such proportions that the Minister of the Interior had recently to admit in the Assembly that after the arrest of over 1,000 brigands there were some 3,000 to 4,000 still at large.

8. To cope with these varied evils, so largely economic in their nature or origin, a cautious, but really constructive, policy is needed. Such a policy cannot be conceived without a broadness of view, which the present Grand National Assembly entirely lacks, nor can it be put into execution without a powerful driving force, which for the moment no party and no individual is capable of providing. After the reconquest of Smyrna in the autumn of 1922 it looked as though Mustafa Kemal himself might supply the driving force for an economic revival. His speeches at that time showed an apparently sincere conviction that only by such a revival could Turkey hope to retain her newly won independence. Had he thrown his full strength into the realisation of what he then preached he might have imposed on the country the bases of a sound economic policy and seen it through by the force of his personality, notwithstanding his ignornce of the details of economic questions. Hampered by political difficulties, however, and broken in health, he has dropped, at least for the time being, into a background of watchful detachment. Nor could even Mustafa Kemal have triumphed easily over the obstacles which the Nationalists have themselves placed in the way of economic development by encouraging rampant xenophobia, by ignoring the principle that fresh foreign capital can only be attracted to Turkey by showing some serious sense of the sanctity of existing obligations, and by their attitude to the non-Moslem minorities, whose practical elimination from Anatolia has largely upset the old balance of commercial life and whom it is the settled policy of Angora to eliminate still further.

9. There are not lacking Turks who realise the situation, but such of them as have influence are too disunited to effect a cure. The political antagonism between Constantinople and Angora has its counterpart in a growing recognition in the old capital that its whole economic life is menaced. This, as much as anything, is responsible for the fact that nearly every Turkish paper in Constantinople is either definitely in opposition to, or at least critical of, Angora. But the opposition elements, though it is becoming the fashion to call them Conservatives, are for the most part as chauvinistic regarding foreigners, existing obligations and non-Moslems as are the pure Nationalists, Republicans or Liberals, whatever name be applied to them. This it is that makes it unwise to expect that the advent of any other party to power would mean an early improvement in the situation from a British or general European point of view. Whatever Turks assume power, they will continue to wrangle at the cost of the true interests of their country, to squeeze or frighten away the foreigners and non-Moslems, of whose collaboration they have need, and to discuss great schemes instead of effecting slow and gradual reconstruction. They will only learn in the hard school of experience that, if Turkey is to achieve stability as a really independent State, there must be a change in her present mentality. Unfortunately for her, the lesson may be learned too late to retrieve the damage which is now being done. Meanwhile the extreme Nationalists are probably no worse than any other element which is at all likely to come into power. They have among them one great personality, namely, Mustafa Kemal, who, if he recovers, may yet succeed in pulling the country together. They have, moreover, one advantage from a British point of

view, namely, that they have become so mad on nationalism that pan-Islamism is rather at a discount among them, and for some time to come they are likely to put aside dreams of Imperialist expansion or any serious hegemony in the Islamic world, and to confine themselves to cultivating the idea of Turkish *irredentas* in Northern Irak and Northern Syria.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[**E 573/448/44**] No. 11.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).*

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1924.

YUSSUF KEMAL BEY, the new Turkish representative in London, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to present his Letter of Appointment.

I had already met him two years ago when he was in London, and was glad to renew our friendly relations, even although my official connection with him was likely to be short.

Perhaps from his inability to speak or to read English, he was so little aware of the political situation that he had not realised that in a very short time he would be dealing with somebody else in my place, and evidently expected from me assurances which he could only obtain from my successor.

He brought me messages of a very warm and friendly character from Ismet Pasha, but did not discuss, any more than did I, any political questions. The only point upon which he expressed anxiety, and about which I had the right within certain limits to reassure him, was as regards the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.

He appeared to share to some extent the Turkish apprehension, which had been reported from Constantinople, that His Majesty's Government desired to evade or to postpone this issue.

I assured him that, so far as I was entitled to speak, he need entertain no such alarm. Had the Conservative Government remained in power, I should have asked Parliament to ratify the treaty in December last. The accident of events had rendered this impossible, and there will probably be a still further delay owing to the interval that must elapse between the retirement of the present Government and the resumption of the parliamentary session after the appointment of its successor. It might therefore be that a period of five or six weeks at least would elapse before the matter could be taken in hand. Unless, which I thought unlikely, the next Ministry held different views from our own, I thought that they would be as anxious as we to conclude the matter, and would introduce the necessary Bill in Parliament to that effect. For my part, I undertook to exercise any pressure that I could, either in the House of Lords or elsewhere, to induce them to take this action, and I thought therefore that no long time ought to elapse before the ratification, which we equally with the Turks desired, came about.

The Turkish Minister semeed very much pleased at receiving this assurance, which, he said, he would communicate to his Government.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

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[**C 1046/401/96**] No. 12.

*Sir C. Eliot to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January* 19.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tokyo, January* 19, 1924.

[GROUP undecypherable.]

Japanese Government have made arrangements to proceed with ratification as soon as France and Italy have completed formalities.

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[**E 611/249/44**] No. 13.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January* 20.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 19, 1924.

MY telegram No. 6.

I have given diplomatic visa to Red Crescent Mission, which is probably leaving 23rd January viâ Egypt. Interpreter is a certain Tewfik Bey, who was in India before the war and whose activities there were, I understand, viewed at that time with suspicion by Indian Government. Since the armistice he has lived in Constantinople, and was a major-domo in ex-Shah's household. He is well known to Mr. Ryan, and during occupation period nothing is known to his detriment at this High Commission. He is a native of Basra.

I thought it as well, however, as soon as I learnt of his appointment to see Adnan and to draw his attention to undesirability of attaching to the mission anyone whose past record in India was unsatisfactory, and whom Government of India might consequently decline to allow to land. Adnan pleaded difficulties experienced in finding anyone so qualified as Tewfik owing to his knowledge of Persian as well as English and Turkish. All the others with similar qualifications had either been unwilling to go or were even less suitable, such as the Malta deportee whom he mentioned as having been a candidate. He promised between now and the 23rd to do his utmost to find someone else. If not, I have agreed that Tewfik may leave with the others, since I appreciate real difficulty of replacing him.

I earnestly trust that, if another with equally good qualifications cannot be found, Government of India, unless his past activities render it patently impossible, will not refuse to admit him. No exception can be taken to his record during the past four years here; his position in the mission is most subordinate, and Adnan gave me most specific assurances with regard to him and instructions which he would receive.

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[**E 632/632/44**] No. 14.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January* 21.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the question of Turkish Government finances has recently been the subject of much discussion in the press, which appears to view with misgiving the situation at the close of the present financial year ending February 1924, and which, notwithstanding official declarations to the contrary, estimates the budget deficit as ranging from 15 million to 50 million Turkish liras. These conjectures, however, are not based on any solid foundation, as complete details of Government expenditure and revenues have not been made public. I have, however, obtained a copy of the official report of the Ministry of Finance covering the period in question, which contains an exhaustive analysis of the Government finances.

2. I accordingly transmit herewith—

(*a.*) A forecast of the revenues (total, 94,537,874 Turkish liras) estimated by the Ministry of Finance at the commencement of the current year as compared with the total of 60,619,150 Turkish liras for the year 1922–23.

(*b.*) A table showing the credits demanded by the various Government Departments for 1923–24, and the credits, namely, 118,449,904 Turkish liras finally allowed by the Ministry of Finance.

The considerable increase in the estimate of Government revenues is, of course, attributed in great measure to the restoration of Constantinople to national administration.

3. I am indebted to the economic report of the Ottoman Public Debt covering the period September to November (inclusive) 1923 for the following additional information :—

The credits passed by the Ministry of Finance were not voted by the Assembly in their entirety. A preliminary credit of 75,160,655 Turkish liras was voted to cover the first six months of the financial year, and at the end of this period an additional credit of 45,059,324 Turkish liras was voted to cover the remainder of the year, thus making a total of 120,219,979 Turkish liras as compared with 118,449,904 Turkish liras, the total sum allocated by the Ministry of Finance, as shown in table (B).

No connected statement of actual expenditure has been issued, nor has any precise information regarding the accuracy, or otherwise, of the Government estimates of revenue been published.

4. In addition to these two votes, the following supplementary credits were also passed by the Assembly :—

| | £ T. |
|---|---|
| In addition to the above sum of ... ... ... | 120,219,979 |
| Payments on account of military requisitions ... | 3,000,000 |
| Construction of various Government buildings ... | 400,000 |
| A provisional credit on account of the exchange of populations ... ... ... ... | 3,000,000 |
| Grand total of estimated expenditure ... | 126,619,979 |

5. According to a re-estimate made by the Minister of Finance, based on actual receipts for the first five months of the current financial year, it was expected that the total receipts over the whole period would amount to 110,537,000 Turkish liras. Under this re-estimate customs receipts, together with consumption taxes, were calculated at 37 million to 38 million Turkish liras, whereas the budget estimate under these headings amounted to approximately 26 million Turkish liras only.

The total Government receipts were estimated as follows :—

| | £ T. |
|---|---|
| Re-estimate by Ministry of Finance ... ... | 110,537,000 |
| Funds available at commencement of financial year ... | 5,736,000 |
| Reduction of 5 per cent. on credits voted, approximately ... ... ... ... ... | 6,000,000 |
| Total, approximately ... ... ... | 122,730,000 |

According to the official estimates, the final budget deficit was therefore expected to amount to not more than 4 million Turkish liras. This proved, however, to be a too optimistic anticipation, as the following additional expenditure subsequently became necessary :—

| | £ T. |
|---|---|
| Exchange and reconstruction (in addition to £ T. 3,000,000 previously voted) ... ... | 3,097,260 |
| Grant to Seiri Sefaine Administration ... ... | 372,850 |
| Advance to agriculturists (seed, agricultural instruments, &c.) ... ... ... ... | 2,000,000 |
| Increase in military pay ... ... ... | 2,000,000 |
| Increase in salaries of juridical functionaries ... | 425,000 |
| Salary and allowances of the President of the Republic and his establishment .. ... ... | 82,000 |

An increased expenditure of approximately £ T. 8,000,000 is thereby involved, and with the deficit already provided for of 4 million Turkish liras, the total deficit is increased to 12 million Turkish liras. In the opinion of the Ottoman Public Debt, further expenditure not specified will, moreover, increase that deficit to 15 million Turkish liras, exclusive of sums necessary to meet the National Debt, the meagre sum of 3,178,673 Turkish liras at present allocated to the Ottoman Public Debt being no doubt the estimate of expenditure necessary for purely administrative purposes.



6. In regard to the budget for the financial year beginning the 1st March, 1924, a preliminary statement has already been made by the Minister of Finance, in which the—

| | £ T. |
|---|---|
| Total Government revenue is estimated at ... ... | 107,589,810 |
| and expenditure, exclusive of the sums to be allocated to the National Debt and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration at ... ... ... ... | 105,259,927 |
| thus showing a surplus of approximately ... ... | 2,500,000 |
| The inclusion of the credits to be assigned to the National Debt and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, however, will in all probability increase expenditure to approximately ... | 120,000,000 |
| thus creating a budget deficit of approximately ... | 12,500,000 |

It was estimated, however, that the following economies would be realised :—

| | £ T. |
|---|---|
| Reduction of 5 per cent. in expenditure by all Departments, approximately ... ... ... | 6,000,000 |
| Reduction of pensions list by the grant of land and property instead of money, approximately ... | 4,000,000 |
| Sale of vessels, war stocks, &c., approximately ... | 1,000,000 |
| Profits arising from the administration of national factories ... ... ... ... ... | 2,000,000 |
| This total of ... ... ... ... ... | 13,000,000 |

was expected, therefore, to balance the deficit foreseen of 12,500,000 Turkish liras.

Since this estimate was made, however, increased expenditure in regard to reconstruction, army pay, pay of juridical authorities, &c., will in all probability create a deficit of 18 million Turkish liras, which will be increased to 32 million Turkish liras if, as foreseen by Ferid Bey, the Minister of Interior, an expenditure of at least 20 million Turkish liras is necessary for reconstruction instead of the 6 million Turkish liras allocated to this Department in the budget.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 14.

(A.)—*Revenues of Turkey.*

BUDGET Estimates for the Financial Year March 1923–February 1924.

| Chapter. | —— | Mar. 1923–Feb. 1924. | Preceding Year. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | I.—*Direct Taxes.* | £ T. | £ T. |
| 1 | Land taxes and taxes on house property .. .. | 5,000,000 | 2,200,000 |
| 2 | Income tax (temettu) .. .. .. .. | 2,500,000 | 1,200,000 |
| 2 (a) | War profits tax .. .. .. .. | 1,000,000 | 600,000 |
| 3 | War tax (25 per cent. of tax on landed property) .. | 700,000 | 300,000 |
| 4 | Tax for postponement from military service .. | 400,000 | 2,000,000 |
| | Tax on military transport .. .. .. | 500,000 | 800,000 |
| 5 | Tax on exoneration from military service .. | 350,000 | 200,000 |
| 7 | Tax on animals (aghnam) .. .. .. | 4,002,300 | 3,501,500 |
| 8 | Tithe .. .. .. .. | 25,000,000 | 15,200,000 |
| | „ on tobacco .. .. .. | 600,000 / 900,000* | 950,000 |
| | „ on silk .. .. .. .. .. | 140,000 | 50,000 |
| 9 | Death duties .. .. .. .. .. | .. | 2,000,000 |
| 10 and 11 | Revenues from private forests and mines.. .. | 88,000 | 55,000 |
| 12 | Stamp duty on assessments regarding income tax, &c. | 39,000 | 5,000 |
| 13 | Stamp duties, registration, tax and fines .. . | 1,300,000 | 360,000 |
| 14 | Treasury stamps .. .. .. | 800,000 | 250,000 |
| 15 | Revenues derived from issue of passports, attestations, certificates of residence, &c. .. .. | 522,000 | 230,000 |
| 16 | Trade-marks and patents .. .. .. | 10,000 | .. |
| 17 | Registration and transfer of property .. .. | 685,000 | 250,000 |
| 18 | Fines .. .. .. .. .. | 700,000 | 300,000 |
| | II.—*Indirect Taxes.* | | |
| 19 | Duty on alcohol .. .. .. .. | 100,000 | 115,000 |
| 20 | Duty on "tombak" .. .. .. .. | 100,000 | 2,500 |
| 21 | Customs .. .. .. . .. | 16,600,000 | 8,500,000 |
| 23 | Maritime taxes .. .. .. .. | 520,000 | 44,000 |
| 24 | Sanitary taxes .. .. .. .. | 100,000 | 30,000 |
| 25 | Game and fishing licences .. .. .. | 1,100,000 | 172,500 |
| 26 | Salt duty .. .. .. .. .. | 5,000,000 | 3,500,000 |
| 27 | Tobacco .. .. .. .. . | 4,202,500 | 600,300 |
| 28 | Sale of output of military factories .. .. | 1,500,000 | 1,300,000 |
| 29 | Mint .. .. .. .. .. | 200,000 | .. |
| 31 | Post and telegraph .. .. .. .. | 2,175,000 | 1,165,000 |
| 32 | Schools, agricultural colleges, &c. .. .. | 20,000 | 10,000 |
| 33 | Sanitary institutions .. .. .. .. | 1,500 | 450 |
| 34 | Public Health Department .. .. .. | 1,500 | 400 |
| 35 | Government sale of quinine . .. .. | 50,000 | 50,000 |
| 36 | Marine printing office .. .. .. .. | 18,000 | .. |
| 38 | Mines .. .. .. .. .. | 400,000 | 175,000 |
| 39 | Railway administrations (share of Government) .. | 157,720 | .. |
| 40 | Revenues from State lands .. .. .. | 665,000 | 1,670,000 |
| 41 | Revenues from State forests .. .. .. | 1,000,000 | 470,000 |
| 42 | Sale of various goods (old war stocks, &c.) .. | 700,000 | 200,000 |
| 43 | Irrigation of Konia plain .. .. .. | 30,000 | 30,000 |
| 46 | Financial operations of Treasury .. .. | 75,000 | 40,000 |
| 47 | Control of concessionary companies .. .. | 25,000 | .. |
| 48 | Various receipts .. .. .. .. | 1,200,000 | 400,000 |
| 49 | Pension fund deducted from official salaries .. | 2,670,000 | 865,000 |
| 50 | Voluntary contributions to Government .. .. | 30,000 | 2,500,000 |
| 52 | Returns from various companies .. .. | 773,354 | .. |
| 53 | Receipts overdue from agriculturists .. .. | 35,000 | 34,000 |
| 54 | Preventive service contributions of various administrations—dette, Régie, &c. .. .. .. | 100,000 | .. |
| 56 | Consumption tax on cigarette papers .. . | 600,000 | 1,200,000 |
| 57 | Consumption tax on cards .. .. .. | 5,000 | 3,000 |
| 57 (a) | Consumption tax on billiards, chess, &c. .. .. | 7,000 | 500 |
| 58 | Consumption tax on matches .. . .. | 500,000 | 300,000 |
| 59 | Other consumption taxes (sugar, tea, &c.) .. | 8,500,000 | 3,300,000 |
| 60 | Tax on places of amusement and entertainment .. | 140,000 | .. |
| | Extraordinary receipts .. .. .. | .. | 3,250,000 |
| | Total .. .. .. .. | 94,537,874 | 60,619,150 |

* Added later.

N.B.—The total general for 1922–23 does not correspond with individual items, which give a total of £ T. 60,379,150, *i.e.*, an error of £ T. 240,000.



(B.)—*Expenditure.*

| —— | Credits demanded by Departments. (A.)—1923–24. | Credits passed by Ministry of Finance. (B.)—1923–24. |
|---|---|---|
| | £ T. | £ T. |
| Khalifate .. .. .. .. | 436,695 | 436,695 |
| Grand National Assembly .. .. | 1,203,872 | 1,203,872 |
| Ottoman Public Debt .. .. .. | 3,570,895 | 3,178,673 |
| Pensions .. .. .. .. | 10,400,000 | 10,400,000 |
| Ministry of Finance .. .. .. | 5,174,700 | 5,174,700 |
| Coms. de Comptes .. .. .. | 158,380 | 158,380 |
| Customs administration .. .. | 2,143,307 | 2,153,307 |
| Posts and telegraphs .. .. .. | 4,801,120 | 2,978,114 |
| Council of Ministers .. .. .. | 54,562 | 44,562 |
| Ministry of Interior .. .. .. | 5,066,826 | 3,896,432 |
| Public security .. .. .. | 3,845,700 | 3,300,140 |
| Assistance sociale .. .. .. | 3,356,103 | 1,998,767 |
| Ministry of Health .. .. .. | 1,741,607 | 1,438,936 |
| Gendarmerie .. .. .. .. | 11,457,602 | 11,249,923 |
| Ministry for Foreign Affairs .. .. | 1,911,551 | 1,485,945 |
| Sheikh-ul-Islam .. .. .. | 1,539,779 | 1,180,572 |
| Ministry of Justice .. .. .. | 6,616,970 | 4,201,875 |
| Ministry of Education .. .. | 3,859,121 | 3,300,000 |
| Ministry of Public Works .. .. | 4,570,366 | 3,552,568 |
| Ministry of Economy .. .. .. | 2,478,577 | 2,478,577 |
| Press and information.. .. .. | 159,996 | 110,705 |
| Total of Civil Services .. | 74,747,729 | 63,932,743 |
| Marine .. .. .. .. | 6,079,339 | 2,266,138 |
| National defence .. .. . | 90,515,100 | 50,000,000 |
| Military factories .. .. .. | 7,694,110 | 2,251,023 |
| Total of all services .. .. | 179,036,278 | 118,449,904 |

N.B.—The totals general (A) and (B) do not correspond with individual items, which amount to £ T. 178,836,278 and £ T. 118,439,904 respectively.

[E 633/32/44] No. 15.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1924.

IN my despatch No. 30 of the 9th January I mentioned "rampant xenophobia" as one of the obstacles to the economic revival of Turkey. As, in another aspect, it is a factor which, if it persists, will specially menace British and other foreign interests in this country, it may be useful to deal with it separately at greater length than would have been appropriate to the general review which I attempted in that despatch.

2. Xenophobia is, of course, a phenomenon which ordinarily accompanies the rapid development of a strong national consciousness, and its violence is apt to be in direct proportion to the extent to which, previously to that development, the country concerned has been subject to foreign political or economic influence. It is natural that in Turkey, or rather in the class of Turks whose tendencies I analysed in my despatch under reference, it should be specially acute, owing to the fact that Turkey has been in the past peculiarly subject to such influence. It is accentuated by a number of other factors, notably the suspicion with which foreign Powers and foreign capitalists are still regarded, their identification in the Turkish mind with an aggressive Christianity, and the recent memory of the privileged status enjoyed by foreigners under the Capitulations. While these factors are obviously interconnected, it will be convenient to consider them separately.

3. The suspicions of the Turks are for obvious reasons specially directed against the Great Powers, with the exception of Japan and, so far as fear of actual encroachment is concerned, the United States of America. They are directed most of all against Great Britain, then France, and then Italy. For this particular purpose Russia and Germany have dropped into the background of Turkish thought, though many Turks have at the back of their minds an uneasy feeling that Russia in its new guise is still the traditional enemy. Great Britain is most mistrusted, because it is

thought that, as the Power with the largest number of Moslem subjects in the world, she must have views regarding the Caliphate; because she was mainly responsible for the Treaty of Sèvres, the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, and the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies; but, above all, because she is most feared and no Turk can believe that her present attitude of comparative benevolence denotes a real change of policy on the part of a country so interested in the Straits and in other matters of immediate concern to Turkey. She is credited at present with wishing to regain by economic penetration what she has lost in political and military influence since the Treaty of Lausanne; hence, for instance, a great part of the hostility which is being shown at Angora to the proposed agreement with the now British-controlled Anatolian Railway Company. A more ludicrous example of the suspicion with which Great Britain is regarded is afforded by the stories which have been put in circulation to the effect that the works undertaken by the Imperial War Graves Commission at Gallipoli consist really of gun emplacements and other structures of an essentially military character.

4. France is less feared, but almost equally mistrusted, because of the variations in her general policy during the last three years, because of her obvious desire to maintain an economic position based on what the Turks consider oppressive concessions, because of the severity with which she has recently insisted, as Turkey's principal creditor, on the sanctity of financial obligations, and, to a less extent, because of her very definite policy of cultural penetration. The campaign against the Tobacco Régie and the disregard shown for the rights of the Public Debt Administration—though this has to do also with the prevalent passion for complete independence of control—are greatly due to this mistrust of the French.

5. Italy seems to the Turk infinitely less important than either Great Britain and France, but her known desire for new fields of economic enterprise and her territorial aspirations in South-Western Asia Minor render her suspect. In all three cases the suspicions of the Turks are just now aggravated by soreness over the delay in ratifying the Treaty of Lausanne—a soreness all the greater because the other signatories, except Greece, present the appearance of waiting on Great Britain and France, and because the United States Government are showing equal delay and American opinion is known to be much divided regarding the ratification of the United States treaty with Turkey. Angora has in fact got into a state of nerves over this question. Responsible men may know that, in the case of Great Britain at any rate, the delay is due to a political crisis in London, but this does not mitigate their natural impatience to see Ismet Pasha's success at Lausanne consolidated, nor are even they immune from an uneasy feeling that Great Britain has repented of the treaty, while they know that to a certain extent France has really done so. Their state of nervous tension is illustrated by the wholly disproportionate perturbation caused by the return of Mr. Ryan to Constantinople and the publication of the Agha Khan-Ameer Ali letter.

6. The idea that Western Europe stands for a Christendom eager to destroy Turkey, because she on her side stands for Islam, rests on a number of specific considerations, such as the sympathy of the Western Powers, especially Great Britain and the United States, and to a lesser extent France and some of the neutral countries, with the sufferings of the non-Moslem minorities; the extent to which non-Moslems have hitherto been employed in foreign enterprises; and the dissemination of foreign institutions of a more or less missionary character. Turks who five years ago would have themselves condemned the Armenian deportations and massacres of 1915–16 now condone if they do not discreetly applaud them. Such Europeans as still remember them, and such as would like to see the minorities rehabilitated instead of being still more completely ruined, merely seem to the Turks to be politically hostile to their natural aspirations or fanatically anti-Moslem. The European employer, who has habitually employed Armenians, Greeks and Jews because of their superior intelligence and general capacity, is regarded as having deliberately set himself to keep the Turk under. Foreign schools are held to be centres of anti-Islamic feeling, designed to cater for the educated class of Armenians, Greeks and Jews—as a matter of fact the bulk of their pupils have always belonged to those races—and, less reasonably, to be foci of disaffection to the Turkish Government. These feelings explain (to a large extent, though not wholly, for there is a large class of Turkish unemployed) the disastrous endeavours which are now being made to compel concessionary companies and institutions like the Public Debt to employ none but Turks. They also explain the undisguised hostility to foreign schools and to a less extent to foreign missionary or quasi-missionary establishments generally. One of the minor questions of the day is



the attempt to impose on foreign, and indeed on all non-Moslem, schools Turkish teachers for certain subjects without giving the management of the schools any voice in their selection.

7. The memory of the Capitulations operates in various ways, of which I need only cite two: Firstly, many Turks have difficulty in believing that they are really dead. On every occasion on which a foreign mission has to defend the interests of its nationals they scent a wish to revive the Capitulations. They are apt to emphasise their sovereign rights over foreigners in order to prove them by repeated tests or for the mere joy of showing the foreigner that he is an equal if not the under-dog. Secondly, they have been accustomed to see foreigners enjoying a privileged position and flourishing in business. They too easily attribute their prosperity to privilege alone, giving none of the credit to superior knowledge and business capacity. They think that their own turn has now come not only to dispense with, but to oust, the foreign merchant. Hence it is that they are more hostile to the settled foreign element, of whose position they are envious, than to the foreigner in his own country with whom they know they must do business and think they can do it direct. This is not in itself an unreasonable ideal. The unreasonableness lies in thinking that Turks, with their inherited incapacity and inadequate equipment, can achieve it at a moment's notice. Reasonable or unreasonable, they are prepared to destroy faster than they can build, rather than let the foreigner keep or regain his ascendancy. Thus they are at the moment insisting on the letter of the Lausanne settlement regarding cabotage, although Turkish tonnage is quite insufficient for the requirements of the cabotage trade; they have thrown out of action the two foreign salvage companies, one British and one Scandinavian, although they themselves possess no craft at all suitable for salving large steamers; and the sudden exclusion of foreign tugs, pilots, &c., from the work of the port has, for the time being at any rate, disorganised the port of Constantinople.

8. In thus analysing the causes of xenophobia, I may have given an exaggerated idea of the practical effects which it has already produced. It is indeed rampant as a habit of mind among the Turks, but the actual situation of foreigners, difficult and precarious as it is, might easily be worse. Foreign merchants are, for the present, contriving to hang on to their business. On the whole, they have shown a reassuring readiness to realise that they must adapt themselves to new conditions. They realise that, except in extreme cases, it would merely prejudice their chances to invoke diplomatic support. The prevalence of *bakhshish*, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 30 of the 9th instant, helps them to overcome their many difficulties. As to the future there are various opinions. Some think that, after the treaty comes into force, the Turks will throw off all restraint and make the position of foreigners intolerable. Some believe that the Turks, now nervous and eager to secure ratification, will then become more tolerant. Others think that xenophobia will die a natural death and that the habitually easy-going Turk will subside into acquiescence in a position not so different from the old, a position in which the foreigner, with his greater wealth, greater knowledge and greater energy, will flourish, notwithstanding the abolition of his capitulatory privileges. Others, again, hope that the Turk will be forced, against his will, into a more reasonable frame of mind on seeing the damage to trade and to the general well-being of the country entailed by his present attitude and the difficulty of getting foreigners to invest new capital in Turkey so long as he persists in it. Among these opinions I do not hazard a view of my own, except that the battle between acute xenophobia and common sense will be a long one, and, if the former dies a natural or enforced death, it will die hard.

9. The troubles of the foreigner, and especially the foreign merchant, are not wholly due to xenophobia. The financial state of the country is so bad that the Turkish authorities clutch at any opportunity of levying taxes and assessing them as high as possible. Some allowance must be made for a Government desperately in need of money, incapable of a really sound financial policy and suspicious of the intentions of those—foreigners, again, of course—who might, in return for economic advantages or by financial operations, place money at their disposal. This, more than any anti-foreign feeling, explains their wholly unjustifiable attitude regarding the bridge tolls pledged to the National Bank of Turkey and the interest on the Public Debt and the attempt to collect large sums for "military transport tax." To this cause also I attribute the unwillingness of the Angora Government to exempt from customs duty tomb-stones, &c., imported from abroad for the Gallipoli cemeteries, a subject on which I am at present in communication with Adnan Bey.

10. It is partly because the Turks have not yet gone to extremes, partly because, as I have said above, foreign merchants are slow, in their own interest, to appeal for

official support, that the majority of the cases which I have to take up with the Turkish authorities at present are comparatively unimportant, however troublesome and unsatisfactory to deal with. I have mentioned some of the really important cases, by way of illustration, in the earlier part of this despatch. I may cite some other examples of minor cases in order to illustrate further the general position. The desecration of the British cemetery at Haidar Pasha in October was an instance of anti-British spite on the part of the actual perpetrators of the outrage, a low class of native labourer, not discouraged, perhaps a little encouraged, by the local police. Except that the court which tried them let the offenders down very lightly, I cannot say that the subsequent attitude of the higher Turkish authorities was different from what I should have expected to be adopted in a European country. A more typical example of xenophobia on the part of the authorities themselves is afforded by their unwillingness to allow the return of Maltese British subjects to Smyrna. There is probably some truth in the suggestion that they are afraid of Greeks slipping back in the guise of foreigners, but they are, I think, really anxious to keep British subjects of the poorer class out, in the hope that Turks will do the work formerly done by the Maltese. Similarly, I had the greatest difficulty in getting permission for Dr. Chasseaud to return to Smyrna, even after I had established his right to practise; and a British dentist left Constantinople some time ago rather than wait for his case to be fought out. As Riza Nour Bey openly stated at Lausanne, the Turks wish to give their own doctors a chance. Mr. Edmonds is experiencing great difficulty in Smyrna in securing the return to British subjects of property which has, in one way or another, found its way into the possession of Turks. Two other matters which illustrate the mistrust of foreigners are the refusal of the Turkish authorities to allow the transfer of real property to or from foreign ownership, pending the entry into force of the treaty, and their unwillingness to recognise the British nationality of native Christian women married to British subjects without reference to the Grand National Assembly. I might multiply instances in which I am having difficulty over comparatively small matters, but I have chosen those which best illustrate the subject of the present despatch.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 637/32/44] No. 16.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 53.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds regarding Mustafa Kemal's visit to Smyrna.

*Constantinople, January* 16, 1924.

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Enclosure in No. 16.

*Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.*

(No. 4.)

Sir, *Smyrna, January* 11, 1924.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram of the 2nd instant, the President of the Turkish Republic arrived here on that date. The local authorities had got ready for him, with the owner's consent, the house, at Boudja, of Mr. David Forbes, a British subject, who is absent. The house has been very badly looted by Turkish marauders after the destruction of the town, and, owing partly to the present dearth of skilled labour and of materials, the efforts of the municipality to make good the ravages were not very successful. Jewish carpet merchants in the bazaar were forced to lend carpets for the occasion, but not more than the first floor could be made habitable. Mustafa Kemal and his wife moved suddenly the next day to the house of Latifa Hanem's father, Muammer Bey, at the suburb of Karantina.

2. As Muammer Bey's house is near the water, this unexpected move produced reports that Mustafa Kemal had a yacht waiting to take him off if the political



situation should develop against him. There is, so far as I can make out, no such yacht in the whole gulf. Latifa Hanem is in a delicate state of health, and that seems a sufficient reason for Mustafa Kemal Bey moving his quarters.

3. The Italian consul-general, who is the senior consular officer here, enquired through the Vali whether the President wished to receive the consuls. The reply was that, as his visit was a private one, he did not; but the Vali hinted to me that Mustafa Kemal Pasha might change his mind later on. My colleagues and I, therefore, merely left cards.

4. The Ghazi Pasha has received the visits of Turkish notables. His public appearances have been few and unostentatious. On the 8th instant he visited the barracks and the municipal building. On the 9th, he drove through Bournabat to visit Cordelio. His movements have been watched with interest rather than enthusiasm. There has been a little bunting displayed to order, but, so far as I can learn, no acclamation. It is true, though, that he does not court ovations, for he ordered that there should be no special preparations for his welcome, and, on the few occasions when he has appeared, his car has been driven so quickly that he could scarcely be recognised.

5. The Pasha has only a small escort of soldiers, but a number of police and detectives guard his movements. These measures seem not to be without reason, for, according to information which I believe true, a man in the crowd drew a revolver on Mustafa Kemal's first arrival at the station and was instantly shot down by police, while another man, who got out a revolver, was bayoneted by soldiers.

6. Mustafa Kemal Pasha cannot be said to be a popular hero in Smyrna. Public opinion here seems to be against the present Government. It has been noticeable that during the trial of the journalists at Constantinople there has been a keen demand for the "Tanin." The Turkish population seems to be hoping for the Committee of Union and Progress to come out into the open again, but the old Committee of Union and Progress leaders here, whatever they may do in secret, show no open activity. I understand that they expect Mustafa Kemal Pasha to be carried off before long by an incurable disease from which he is believed to suffer. He certainly looks ill.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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[E 639/32/44] No. 17.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 16, 1924.

THE acquittal of Jahid Bey and his fellow-journalists, which I reported in the postscript to my despatch No. 12 of the 2nd January, was received with universal relief in Constantinople, and Angora has put a good face on it. On all sides the result was acclaimed as a triumph of justice appropriate to a republic. The young ladies of the university—one of the strongest centres of Nationalism in Constantinople—presented bouquets to the accused as they left the court. The flow of soul reached its climax a few days later when the Turkish Press Association invited them and the members of the Court of Independence to a tea-party.

2. The court has since been dealing with minor cases, but its proceedings have ceased to excite much interest. On the 7th January the Khoja, Ibrahim Edhem, was sentenced to a year's imprisonment, under an article in the ordinary Penal Code, for writing and preaching in a sense hostile to the new order of things. On the 12th January the court began the trial of Ali Osman and Hassan of the Lightermen's Guild and three other persons for being concerned in a plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the republic and for inciting other persons to treason. The trial has made little progress and the details of the alleged plot have not been disclosed.

3. On the 8th January Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp of the Caliph, who was arrested within a day or two of the arrival of the court in Constantinople, was suddenly released. No explanation either of his arrest or of his release has ever been vouchsafed. The decision not to proceed against him is a further indication of the extent to which Angora realises that the sending of the court to Constantinople was a political blunder. Yet another proof of the unpopularity of the whole business is that there is already a strong movement on foot for the pardon of Lutfi Fikri Bey, whose condemnation

to five years' penal servitude for treason I reported in my despatch No. 12 of the 2nd instant.

4. Altogether there has been a very distinct lull in Constantinople during the past fortnight. The Opposition newspapers are naturally displaying great caution. Jahid Bey once more writes leading articles in the "Tanin," but confines himself for the most part to generalities. Velid, of the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," has desisted from writing anything over his own name.

5. During the same period the attention of Angora has been concentrated on two subjects, namely, the budget for the coming financial year and the future of the Anatolian Railway. The new Minister of Finance, Abdul Halik Bey, a former Malta deportee, whose experience at home has principally been in civil administration, and the budget committee of the Assembly have managed to produce a budget showing an estimated expenditure of £T. 128,900,000 and estimated receipts of approximately £T. 121,000,000. It is asserted that the former estimate provides for all services (except that of the Public Debt), without reduction of civil salaries. The lie has thus been given—on paper—to the prophecy of the "Watan" correspondent that there would be a deficit of £T. 53,000,000. The final estimates have gratified, without altogether convincing, the public, but the budget has still to pass the Assembly.

6. The controversy regarding the Anatolian Railway came to a head at a meeting of the People's party on the 10th January. Zekiai Bey, who, as your Lordship will remember, served in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne as a economic expert, attacked at great length the proposed agreement between the Government and the existing company, and advocated the repurchase of the concession by the State. Mukhtar Bey, the Minister of Public Works, who negotiated the draft agreement with M. Huguenin, the former managing director of the railway, defended his proposals. The sense of the meeting was reported to be strongly favourable to Zekiai Bey. The debate was to have been resumed on the 13th January, but a further postponement was arranged probably in order to enable Ismet Pasha to shape his course of action. It was realised that the rejection of the Huguenin Agreement might precipate the fall of his rather shaky Government, although it had been put about that he could not make the question one of confidence, and he had avoided any final expression of his personal views. In the meantime, the situation was complicated by the publicity given to a telegram from M. Huguenin to the effect that, as a result of the recent meeting of the foreign interests concerned at Venice, those interests would themselves require certain modifications of the draft agreement. On the 14th January the Minister of Public Works tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and rumours of the impending resignation of Seid Bey, the Minister of Justice, again became current.

7. On the same day on which Mukhtar Bey resigned, Ismet Pasha issued to the People's party a statement of his general policy for the coming year. He outlined in somewhat conventional terms the aims of the Government regarding economic development and progress in other directions, with a special mention of the need for railways, but without any reference to the burning question of the Anatolian Railway. He went on to say that his programme differed from those to which the country had been accustomed, inasmuch as no attempt would be made to run the Administration on the basis of a considerable deficit in the budget. The country must take stock every January of its progress in matters relating to railways, finance, economic affairs, public health and education. The estimates included a proposal to vote 8,000,000*l.* during the coming year in order to start work on the Sivas Railway. He then quoted the totals of the estimates as already announced, and said it was hoped to cover the deficit by revenue in excess of the estimates and by economies. No provision had been made for the service of the foreign debt, but Turkey was quite ready to meet her obligations in this respect, and the only reason for the omission was that amount of the debt still had to be determined in accordance with the peace treaty. He invited the views of the party on the general lines of his programme. In framing the budget, recourse had not been had to measures like the suppression of vilayets and kazas. Increases of pay granted by the Assembly had not been interfered with. The utmost economy would be exercised in the Ministries, but provision had been made in the budget for the employment of experts to reform and reorganise public departments. The publication of this statement was apparently a manœuvre to divert the attention of the party from the Anatolian Railway to the budget. The party met next day, the 15th January, and engaged for six hours in a stormy debate. The telegraphic accounts of it differ considerably, but it is clear that the party, a good deal influenced by Reouf Bey, refused to be put off the discussion of the Anatolian Railway business. Ismet



had to agree that this should be dealt with before the budget or anything else. Fethi Bey, the President of the Assembly, created some sensation by taking a strong line against the Government, and insisting that the principle of repurchase should be admitted. After a good deal of tactical manœuvring, Ismet was driven to accept a middle solution regarding the railway question, by which it was decided that the whole matter should be again reviewed by a new commission specially constituted, and that this commission, after going into all the accounts, should recommend for or against the repurchase of the concession. Ismet linked up with his adhesion to this proposal the question of confidence in the Government. On a division, ninety-eight members of the party voted for the motion and confidence in the Government and forty-eight against, three members abstaining.

8. So the matter stands at present. The debate of the 15th January has revealed even greater disunion in the People's party than was already known to exist, and Ismet Pasha's position is clearly becoming very difficult. The open opposition of Fethi Bey to the Huguenin Agreement will not make that position any easier. One of the most interesting features of the situation is that, while the draft agreement is much criticised in detail by its opponents, the gravamen of their hostility is well-known to be mistrust of proposals which, it is thought, would give Great Britain control of an important strategic and economic artery, owing to the controlling interest acquired by a British group in the existing Anatolian Railway Company.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[**E 694/210/44**] No. 18.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January* 21, 1924.

MY telegram No. 3.

Reply of Italian Government (translation by bag), received to-day, states that they consider Allied representatives should remain at Constantinople and have rank of Ambassador, and that to cut short discussion with Turkish Government it would be desirable to send representatives to Constantinople with rank of Ambassador, informing Turkish Government that they will be retained in Turkey so long as Turkish Government maintain at Constantinople a delegate of their Ministry for Foreign Affairs for relations with diplomatic representatives. It would thus be at once determined that, were Turkish Government not to continue their present procedure in this respect, Ambassadors at Constantinople would be *ipso facto* withdrawn and replaced by representatives at Angora of lower rank. Question of best means of maintaining liaison with Angora should be considered by Ambassadors at Constantinople in collaboration. Delegates or secretaries sent thither should not be nominated by Allied Governments, and should not directly represent those Governments, but should act solely as delegates of Ambassadors.

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[**E 693/249/44**] No. 19.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinpole, January* 21, 1924.

MY telegram No. 16.

Mission leaves for Egypt on 22nd January by "Khedive Famaka."

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 3, who are also being informed of names and object of mission.)

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[E 706/249/44] No. 20.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 22.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 22, 1924.

MY telegram No. 16.

Adnan called on me to-day to inform me that, in spite of every effort, it had proved impossible to find suitable substitute for Tewfik, who would consequently leave with mission to-day.

Though I told Adnan that I could not guarantee Tewfik's admittance to India, I think refusal would be unfortunate, and I should be grateful to be informed, if possible, that no objection will be raised. Effect of my representations respecting Tewfik will in any case have been salutary.

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[E 847/847/44] No. 21.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 67.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds respecting the Vali of Smyrna.

*Constantinople, January* 22, 1924.

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Enclosure in No. 21.

*Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.*

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January* 17, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Vali of Smyrna, Aziz Bey, resigned last week and has been replaced by the Vali of Angora, Murad Bey.

2. For the last two months Aziz Bey's friends at Adrianople have been urging him to accept the governorship of that vilayet. The arrival of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his dissatisfaction with the arrangements made by the Vali for his accommodation in Mr. Forbes's house may, however, have hastened Aziz Bey's resignation. It is said that words passed between the two.

3. Aziz Bey is about 40 and a native of Rumelia. He was a junior in the Political Department at Adrianople during the Balkan wars and has a grateful recollection of Colonel Samson, then His Majesty's consul at Adrianople, who obtained his release from the Bulgarian forces of occupation. In 1918 Aziz Bey was secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, and I believe that it was he who escaped with the archives and cash of the Committee of Union and Progress when the Allies were upon the point of entering Constantinople. He is probably identified with the Committee of Union and Progress rather than with the Kemalist party, and it may be that he finds it opportune to sever his connection with the present régime. He is a man of some intelligence, energy, experience and ability. His administration here has been weak, but I believe that that has been due in some measure, firstly, to his lack of sympathy with the Angora policy; and, secondly, to the personnel appointed by Angora, which seems more than usually inefficient or corrupt. Aziz Bey has been in Germany and, among other things, has studied the rise of Protestantism. A crank of his is the Turkification of Islam in Turkey. He regards the Arabic element in Islam as an obstacle to national development and, with a view to greater freedom of thought, he would like to see the Koran translated into Turkish.

4. Murad Bey is a native of Aidin and between 30 and 40. In 1908 he was a judicial official in Monastir. Later he came to Constantinople, and in 1914 he was an



Assistant Director of Public Security in Constantinople. He is a man of very little education. His appointment here seems a bad one, for the economic life of the place is paralysed by excessive policing and is pining for more enlightened administration.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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[E 848/32/44] No. 22.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 69.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 23, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 16th January, I have the honour to state that on the 19th January the Grand National Assembly accepted by a practically unanimous vote the nomination of Suleiman Sirri Bey as Minister of Public Works in succession to Mukhtar Bey, who resigned over the question of the Anatolian Railway.

2. Suleiman Sirri is one of the Deputies for Constantinople. This is his first Ministerial post, and I have not heard that he has any strongly pronounced political antecedents. He is by profession an engineer, and has, I understand, held various administrative posts in the former Ministry of Public Works in Constantinople.

3. From various pronouncements by the new Minister and others, it is evident that the Government are doing everything in their power to disarm the opposition to the late Minister's proposals to provide for the future of the Anatolian Railway by a new agreement with the present company, represented by M. Huguenin. They are attempting, not without success, to delay a settlement of the question, while creating the impression that they are in no way averse from the opposition proposal to repurchase the concession, provided it can be shown that this is financially feasible. I am dealing at greater length with this subject in my reply to the Foreign Office despatch No. 57 of the 14th January.

4. Ismet Pasha's tactical handling of the Anatolian Railway question appears for the moment to have strengthened his general position. There have been no political excitements during the past week.

5. The question of proposed modifications of the Constitution continues to be discussed at Angora, but the committee in charge of it seems to be proceeding in a very desultory fashion. In this matter also it is pretty evident that the Government are playing for time.

6. In Constantinople also the lull continues. The trial of the lightermen and others implicated in the alleged plot against Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the republic continues to occupy the Court of Independence at longish intervals, but so far it has excited little interest. Ekrem Bey, the aide-de-camp to the Caliph, whose release I reported in my despatch under reference, has resigned his appointment at the Palace.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 851/632/44] No. 23.

*Mr. Henderson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 23, 1924.

WITH reference to the concluding portion of my despatch No. 47 of the 15th January, I have the honour to state that the Angora newspapers of that day, which were not available when my despatch was drafted, gave the actual estimates for the year beginning the 1st March, 1924, which Ismet Pasha finally decided to circulate to the People's party. I enclose a translation of these estimates. The version printed in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" paper shows in some detail how they compare with the earlier estimates mentioned in my despatch under reference. According to this version the final figures for expenditure were arrived at by various increases and decreases in certain votes, resulting in a net increase of £T. 23,641,073, while the figures for revenue

are increased by the smaller amount of £T. 13,500,000, resulting from new or modified taxation and an anticipated increase in the return from posts and telegraphs.

2. Ismet Pasha thus confesses to a prospective deficit of £T. 7,810,190, which, however, he hopes to cover by revenue in excess of estimates and economies on expenditure. He admitted in his statement to the People's party that no provision had been made for interest on the foreign debt. It is true that an item "Public Debt" figures on the expenditure side of the proposed budget, but this, I understand, is merely for the upkeep of the Public Debt Administration.

3. Sir Adam Block tells me that the service of the Debt would probably require further expenditure of about £T. 32,000,000 on a sterling basis, or about £T. 10,500,000 on a franc basis, at 75 fr. to the pound sterling. If the latter figure were included in Ismet Pasha's estimates, the prospective deficit would be over £T. 18,000,000, without allowing for supplementary credits which may well have to be voted during the year. This, moreover, is on the large assumption that the estimate of prospective revenue will be realised. Whether this is likely to be the case or not I cannot say, but in Sir Adam Block's opinion the revenue estimates are unduly optimistic, and, on general principles, I am disposed to concur in this view.

4. The most notable increases in Ismet Pasha's final estimates as compared with those previously drawn up are under the heads of public health and social assistance, public works, economic affairs, and service of the internal debt, for the last of which no provision at all has previously been made. He has partially balanced the increases by reductions in the estimates for services dependent on the Ministry of the Interior (including gendarmerie) and for national defence. The final figure for national defence is now only £T. 32,400,000, or about 25 per cent. of the total expenditure of the State. This is a very moderate figure compared with previous expenditure on national defence, and it will be to the credit of the Government if they avoid adding to it by supplementary votes during the year.

5. In his statement to the party, Ismet Pasha drew special attention to the provision for securing the services of foreign experts, who, he said, would be employed on a large scale. It is odd that in the actual estimates, as published, this provision is lumped in with that for the service of the internal debt. Some indication of the amount which will be actually available for the payment of foreign experts out of the total sum of £T. 2,000,000 is afforded by a statement given by the Minister of Finance to the Anatolian Agency on the 14th January, in which he said that a sum of £T. 1,524,093 had been affected to the payment of current interest, 10 per cent. of arrears of interest and amortisation of the internal loan.

6. The budget has still, of course, to pass the Grand National Assembly. Even if it be adopted in substantially the form in which it has been drawn up by Ismet Pasha and his advisers, I need hardly say that no Turkish estimates must be taken too seriously. As I have already intimated, the situation at the beginning of the year may be considerably affected by the voting of supplementary credits and by inability to raise the amount of revenue shown in the estimates. It is gratifying to observe that the Government take the matter seriously, but the levity of the Deputies is strikingly and amazingly illustrated by the fact that the People's party at a meeting on the 20th January adopted by 90 to 67 votes, with 14 or 16 abstentions, a motion in favour of increasing the emoluments of the Deputies themselves. It is understood that the increase proposed is from £T. 200 a month to £T. 300. This will make it difficult for the Assembly to resist appeals for an increase in the pay of civil servants. Indeed, a communiqué issued after the meeting seems to indicate that the party expressed itself in favour of an increase in all salaries in consequence of the high cost of living.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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Enclosure in No. 23.

(Translation.)

*Budget Proposals for the Year* 1340 (*March* 1, 1924, *to February* 28, 1925) *as given in Ismet Pasha's Statement to the People's Party, January* 14, 1924.

| *Estimated Expenditure*— | £T. |
|---|---|
| Caliphate... ... ... ... ... | 331,695 |
| Public Debt ... ... ... ... | 6,388,070 |
| Personal allowances (pensions, &c.) ... ... | 10,900,000 |
| Grand National Assembly ... ... ... | 1,605,415 |
| Ministry of Finance ... ... ... | 5,600,000 |
| Real Property Department ... ... ... | 680,000 |
| Audit Department ... ... ... ... | 77,500 |
| Customs ... ... ... ... ... | 3,200,000 |
| Posts and Telegraphs ... ... ... | 4,980,000 |
| Ministers (Prime Minister's Department) ... | 40,000 |
| Minister of Interior ... ... | 15,000,000 |
| Public Security ... ... ... | |
| Gendarmerie Command ... ... | |
| Public Health and Social Assistance ... ... | 4,000,000 |
| Foreign Affairs ... ... ... ... | 1,300,000 |
| Religious affairs ... ... ... ... | 1,200,000 |
| Justice ... ... ... ... ... | 5,000,000 |
| Public instruction ... ... ... ... | 5,050,000 |
| Public works ... ... ... ... | 13,000,000 |
| Economic affairs ... ... ... ... | 8,150,000 |
| Press and Intelligence ... ... ... | 200,000 |
| Marine ... ... ... ... | 32,400,000 |
| National defence ... ... ... | |
| ,, ,, (extraordinary budget) | |
| Military factories ... ... ... | |
| Ministry for Exchange of Populations, Reconstruction and Settlement ... ... | 7,000,000 |
| Presidency of the Republic ... ... ... | 247,320 |
| Internal debt and specialists... ... ... | 2,000,000 |
| Assistance to city of Angora... ... ... | 500,000 |
| Encouragement of sport ... ... ... | 50,000 |
| Total ... ... ... ... | 128,900,000 |

| *Estimated Revenue*— | £T. |
|---|---|
| Total of estimated receipts previously submitted to Assembly ... ... ... ... | 107,589,810 |
| New additions which must be made as follows:— | |
| Additional tax on salt ... ... ... | 1,000,000 |
| Surtax on tithe of 2½ per cent. ... ... | 4,000,000 |
| Liquor ... ... ... ... | 5,000,000 |
| Transport tax ... ... ... ... | 1,000,000 |
| Military exemption (commutation) ... | 1,500,000 |
| Posts and telegraphs ... ... ... | 1,000,000 |
| Total ... ... ... ... | 121,089,810 |

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[E 8/8/44] No. 24.

*Mr. MacDonald to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, January* 28, 1924.

YOUR Excellency's note of the 21st September last, on the subject of the Anatolian Railway Company, has been carefully considered by His Majesty's Government. I cannot help feeling that the note in question is based on a certain misapprehension of the present situation, and the attitude of His Majesty's Government, which it would be

well to remove, but I wish to assure your Excellency that I have no desire to discuss this question in any spirit of controversy.

2. Up till a comparatively recent date the policy of the Governments of France, Italy and Great Britain in relation to the Turkish railways, in which German interest was preponderant, was based on the supposition that, as a result of the peace settlement with Turkey, the three Governments would be in a position themselves to decide to whom the property in such railways should be transferred, and in what conditions they should be operated. An express provision to that effect was inserted in the Treaty of Sèvres (article 294), and that provision was the basis of all the arrangements made at the time.

3. It was in these circumstances that the principle of equal participation in the railways in question was adopted by the three Powers, and provided for in article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. It is important to note that this principle was to be applied to the whole system of the Anatolian, Bagdad and Mersina Railways within Turkey. Your Excellency's note states that that article was a necessary complement of article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and His Majesty's Government agree, but they would point out that article 294 was a necessary preliminary to article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, for it was only the former provision which placed the Allied Powers in a position to carry out the provisions of the latter. It was because the Powers were in a position to decide to what body the railways in question should be transferred that they were also in a position to decide the composition of that body.

4. It is clear that at the present moment the circumstances are radically different. Article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres has disappeared, and there is no provision in the peace settlement with Turkey, which gives the three Governments any power to take a decision as to the future ownership or operation of the Turkish railways. It has already been explained in my predecessor's note of the 25th August last that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles gives those Governments no such power. Your Excellency's note suggests that, because three years ago His Majesty's Government signed an agreement which provided for the collaboration of the Allied groups and the exploitation of the Turkish railways, and had notified the constitution of the English group which was to take part in such exploitation, it must still be in a position to impose upon that group the original conditions laid down three years ago; my preceding observations show that such a suggestion is devoid of any foundation.

5. As regards the interests in the railways in question of the Orient Railways Bank of Zurich, the result of the disappearance of the provisions by which it was intended to secur Allied control of certain Turkish railways has been to leave that bank free either to retain its interests or to dispose of them as it thought fit. The French Government are doubtless aware that attempts were made by the bank to dispose of its interests in various capitals, and the point which I wish to emphasise is that it was not in the power of any of the Allied Governments to prevent those interests being disposed of in a manner which would result in the railways being in the future under non-Allied, or even German, control. Any group possessing the necessary financial resources was in a position to acquire those interests, and to make their own arrangements for their future exploitation, and in the result these interests were acquired by a British group. That group acquired these interests without any assistance or interference from His Majesty's Government, and His Majesty's Government have no power to impose on that group any conditions as to the composition of such body as may be formed for the future exploitation of the railways in question. I cannot believe that if these interests had been acquired by a French or an Italian group, the French or Italian Government would have had more power in this respect than His Majesty's Government; and I observe that your Excellency's note, while claiming an equal participation for French interests in the railways acquired by the British group, does not suggest any corresponding British participation in the system dealt with in the Angora Agreement of the 20th October, 1921.

6. Your Excellency seems to suggest that the Tripartite Agreement and "Accord particulier" of the 25th March, 1922, must be regarded as to some extent still operative, notwithstanding the complete change in the circumstances which has occurred since those arrangements were made, and it is suggested that they could not disappear without being formally denounced. My preceding observations will have indicated the reasons for which His Majesty's Government are unable to accept this view, and I only desire to add that neither of these agreements has come into force, and that in existing circumstances it is not apparent how effect could in practice be given to their provisions. The principle, however, underlying these agreements, in so far as they relate to the



exploitation of railways in which German interests were formerly preponderant, was that of co-operation rather than competition between French, Italian and British interests. This principle His Majesty's Government are anxious to maintain. For the reasons explained above, it is not in their power to impose conditions on the British group which has acquired control of the interests of the Zurich Bank, but they are, and always have been, willing to use their influence with that group in order to secure equitable participation for French and Italian interests. Your Excellency's note maintains that the propositions which have already been made in this respect are not satisfactory. I do not, however, propose to discuss these somewhat technical questions, because, in my opinion, these can only be usefully considered between the interests concerned. I understand that the Italian group is prepared to enter into combination with the British group, and that fresh negotiations will shortly be opened, and that the British group is perfectly willing to enter into negotiations with the French interests concerned. It is my earnest hope that these negotiations may produce a satisfactory result, but, as I have endeavoured to demonstrate to your Excellency, the question has passed out of the political sphere and beyond the control of the Governments interested, and the solution is only to be found in a spontaneous agreement between the French, Italian and British groups.

7. In conclusion, I desire to reply to your Excellency's enquiry as to whether His Majesty's Government are satisfied as to the elimination of German influence under the arrangements made by the British group with the Zurich Bank. As a result of a careful examination of the information in their possession as to these arrangements, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that when the various agreements entered into with regard to this matter are fully carried out, German control will have been satisfactorily eliminated. Under these agreements it appears that there will be a certain continuance in the undertaking of an interest which is probably German, but is of minor importance, and does not, and cannot, amount to anything in the nature of control. While His Majesty's Government would have preferred that no such interest should continue to exist, it must be realised that the acquisition of the interests of the Zurich Bank could, in the circumstances as they now exist, only have been effected with the consent of that bank, which was in a position to insist on a certain amount of participation in the future undertaking as a condition of its assent. His Majesty's Government do not consider that in the circumstances a more complete elimination of German interests than has been secured under the arrangements made would have been possible.

I have, &c.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

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[E 1097/32/44] No. 25.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Recei*- *February* 4.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 29, 1924.

WHEN the British general election was in progress, and even after the result was first announced, the dominant feeling in the Turkish mind was one of anxiety lest somehow or other the upshot should be the return to power of Mr. Lloyd George, a statesman whom all Turks in any way concerned with politics have since the armistice regarded as the deadly enemy of their country, and who, they thought, might easily refuse to ratify the Treaty of Lausanne. Fuller information from European sources caused the Turks to realise soon after the election that there was no ground for this anxiety, and the advent of a Labour Government was discounted in Turkey almost as confidently as in Great Britain.

2. The actual formation of the British Government has nevertheless excited great interest in Constantinople and in Angora. All the principal Turkish papers published in Constantinople have devoted considerable attention to the matter. They have little knowledge of or interest in the domestic concerns of Great Britain, and their comments are mainly directed to the possible effect of the change of Government at home on British policy towards Turkey. Looking at it from this point of view, they unanimously, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm, welcome the assumption of power by a Labour Government, which, they believe, will be more benevolent than its predecessor in its general attitude towards Turkey, and more particularly in its handling of the negotiations regarding the Irak frontier. Their satisfaction is, however, tempered in many cases by the reflection that British foreign policy has not been accustomed to change suddenly or spectacularly with changes of Government.

3. On the negative side the gratification inspired by the change of Government in Great Britain is a good deal due to relief at the departure from the Foreign Office of Lord Curzon, who, in spite of the impression which he made on the Turks at Lausanne, and though not so severely criticised as Mr. Lloyd George, is regarded as tainted by his association with the foreign policy of the latter during the first years of the armistice and as having held views very disagreeable to the Turks regarding the attitude to be taken up by Great Britain in the forthcoming Mosul negotiations. A fillip was given to the last-named grievance a few days ago by allegations that Lord Curzon had spoken somewhat brusquely to Yussuf Kemal Bey about the Mosul question when the Turkish representative paid his first visit to the Foreign Office. The "Ileri" newspaper of the 23rd January represented his Lordship as having asked Yussuf Kemal whether he was authorised to discuss the question of Mosul, and as having said, on receiving the reply that the text of the treaty did not admit of such a discussion at present, "Then what have you come for?"

4. Although the "Ileri" was responsible for this misrepresentation, it has been one of the more reserved of the Constantinople papers in its attitude towards the new Government. Some importance attaches to this paper, because it is now the only Turkish paper in Constantinople which is wholehearted in its allegiance to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In its issue of the 24th January it dealt in a single leading article with the death of Lenin and the formation of a Labour Government in England. The writer pays a tribute to Lenin's character and achievements, but condemns the methods and, less emphatically, the principles of Bolshevism. He goes on to point a contrast between the Labour party in England and the Bolsheviks in Russia. The former is, he says, very reasonable, sensible and, in fact, conservative; consequently there will be no great immediate change in England. He supports this last thesis by arguments based on the relative strength of the parties in the House of Commons and anticipates a new general election before long. He then reviews briefly the questions which the present Government is likely to deal with while it lasts, and places in the forefront of foreign policy recognition by His Majesty's Government of the Russian Soviet Government. "Mr. MacDonald will not be able," the writer says, "to modify so easily British colonial and world-conquest policy. At the most he will strive to get on better with the Turks, the Arabs, the Egyptians. As England will be unable to follow a radical line of action regarding the French policy in the Ruhr, neither the Germans nor the French will be pleased. Anyhow, as regards ourselves, as Mr. MacDonald will always prefer the Russians to us, we must not witness a Turco-Russian difference in his time." The article concludes by reaffirming the essential conservatism of British high policy and its slowness to change, but hails the Labour party as differing from the Conservatives and Liberals in that it is not, like them, hostile to Turkey.

5. This is the only article which I have seen in which it is suggested that Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* of the new British Government may be adversely affected by its anticipated leaning in the direction of a more favourable attitude towards Russia. The pan-Islamic and violently anti-British "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," in its issue of the 24th January, contrasts the pacific nature of the success of Labour in Great Britain with the blood-stained triumph of the Bolsheviks. It does not think that the new Government will show the same inconsistency as the Bolsheviks between precept and practice, but it does not anticipate either any immediate or radical departure from the traditional foreign policy of Great Britain. Labour will neither wish nor be able to afford to dissolve the British Empire by giving complete independence to Egypt, India or other dependencies. It will, however, the writer of the article thinks, show greater respect than the Conservatives, and especially the Liberals, for the rights of other nations. As regards Turkey, the whole Labour party being undoubtedly averse from war, the new Government will, in his opinion, ratify the Treaty of Lausanne without fail, and it is only with the Labour party that a suitable settlement of the Mosul question can be arranged. This question can never be settled as the Turks wish with Messrs. Lloyd George and Asquith, grasping and eager for conquest as they are. Consequently the question should be settled with the new Government as soon as possible, lest the Conservatives and Liberals should by uniting on some question produce the fall of the Labour Government, in which case Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues would very probably succeed to office to the detriment of the world.

6. The "Wakt" of the same day, the 24th January, has a long article by Halil Halid, a Turk who resided in England for many years before the war and who has since been actively anti-British. This gentleman forecasts a curtailment of the pomp and authority of Royalty in England, the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Indian frontier, and a cessation of subsidies to Arab chiefs. It is to be hoped, in his



opinion, that there will be a diminution of the influence of the permanent officials, such as those in the Foreign Office and the India Office, who will constitute an obstacle to the decline of imperialistic policy in the East. He hopes to see the removal of certain narrow-minded and intriguing "old stagers" among the subordinate officials employed in Eastern countries. He looks to the Labour Government to repair the harm done in the Near and Middle East by the sacrifice of British prestige and honour for the sake of an imperialistic policy. He is confident that Labour will cultivate good relations with Turkey, though it may await suitable opportunities of doing so. It aims also at the recognition of and re-establishment of relations with Russia. The prospect of a rapprochement between two great countries so closely connected with the East is, he adds, one repugnant only to the mentality of the old diplomacy. To profit by it will be the prerogative of the new.

7. The crypto-Jewish editor of the "Watan," a paper which hedges rather in Turkish domestic politics, expresses his satisfaction with less reserve in his leading article of the 24th January. He sees in the advent to power of the Labour party the collapse of British imperialism, which under Mr. Lloyd George had shaken the position of Great Britain abroad and had lost her the confidence of the whole world. He welcomes the new Government as "the most enlightened, the most progressive and the cleanest" Government which has yet assumed office in any country. It bears no resemblance to that of the Bolsheviks. Its position is weak owing to its dependence on Liberal support and the risk of intrigues by its imperialistic enemies, and there is danger from extremists among its own supporters; but people in Turkey will desire, he says, that it should strengthen its position, because the existence in Great Britain of a Government remote from intrigue and deserving of confidence will facilitate the accomplishment of the task of reform and progress in Turkey.

8. The fact that your own personality is known to Constantinople since your visit last October has naturally stimulated the interest taken in your assumption of the double office of Premier and Foreign Secretary. Several allusions have been made both before and after the formation of the new Government to that visit and to your public utterances here. In the "Tanin" of the 25th January, Jahid Bey, the foremost Turkish journalist and incidentally the keenest critic of the Angora Government, takes as his text a speech which you delivered at a meeting of the Constantinople Labour Union. "Mr. MacDonald," he says, "having explained that a man's protection is not his fist but his head, that he is made clean not by his weight but by his character, and that he must derive his strength from his humane qualities, made us the following promises as though he were announcing a change impending in the near future: 'Should the Labour party form a Government, it will remain loyal to the same principles as a Government which it has upheld while in opposition. We will do evil to no one. However great a country may be, it can follow the path of righteousness in its foreign relations. A nation's greatest support is to be surrounded by the love of small peoples.'"

9. This statement impressed Jahid Bey as novel on the lips of a Briton, one of a nation whose motto has hitherto been "My country right or wrong." He contrasts you with Lord Curzon, whose dictatorial attitude at Lausanne he recalls. He applauds your personal qualities and welcomes your advent to power, for, though not a Socialist, he regards Socialist parties in other countries as being opposed to imperialism and policies of conquest. When he reflects on the unjust aggressions and partitions which his country has suffered at the hands of European Powers, he naturally sides with parties which proclaim their adhesion to principles of justice and nationality in their foreign policy. For that reason he loves Socialism in Western countries and Bolshevism in Russia. Throughout his article, however, there runs a note of scepticism as to whether it will be possible for you to translate your principles into action while in office, and towards the end he says: "Every quality might have been discerned in the century-old, traditional foreign policy of England, but not for a moment could there have been any question of principles of justice and right. Will Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who in home policy in Parliament has been victorious over his opponents, be able to win the victory over the departmental organisation, the century-old traditions, the rooted convictions of the Foreign Office? Will he be able to infuse into it the sentiments of humanity and justice which uplift his heart? Or will the change which has occurred in England be confined to domestic policy, and will the Foreign Office which we know continue in activity on the old lines? If so, the present change has no meaning whatsoever from our point of view."

10. I need not weary you with many further samples of comments in the Turkish press of Constantinople, as they have followed the same general lines. I may mention,

however, that, on the 25th January, the "Ileri" recorded the generally favourable impression created in Turkish circles, but suggested a suspension of judgment until the attitude of the new British Government towards Turkey was put to the proof; emphasised the dependence of the Labour party on Liberal support; pointed out that it was not known what might have passed between yourself and the Lloyd George-Asquith group regarding Turkey, and wondered whether the new Government would maintain the selection for the Mosul negotiations of Sir Percy Cox, a man who had never been in favour of the return of Mosul to Turkey. On the same day the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" once more urged the desirability of pressing on the negotiations in order to obtain a settlement before the end of the short period during which it expects the Labour Government to remain in power and before the advent of Mr. Lloyd George, whom it expects to follow. On the 26th January the "Wakt" also suggested that the question whether the nine months' period for the negotiations had begun or not had lost its importance owing to the change of Government in England, and urged that they should now be pushed forward with all expedition, in the hope that your friendly and benevolent sentiments will enable a rapid solution to be reached by direct discussion between the parties, provided you are not overborne by the Liberal supporters of the Labour party in Parliament.

11. The papers published in Constantinople in languages other than Turkish are of so little importance in themselves and feel so little freer under the present régime to express any really independent opinions on political subjects that I have not troubled to collect their comments.

12. The two principal Angora newspapers deal with the change of Government in Great Britain in their issues of the 25th January. The "Hakimiet-i-Millié" dwells on the fact that the Labour party has come into power notwithstanding its numerical weakness relatively to the other parties in the House of Commons. It refers to the delicacy of the position of the new Government in view of its dependence on Liberal support, and the limitations imposed by the prospect of a combination of Liberals and Conservatives to oppose any application of Socalist principles on a large scale. Presenting for the first time, moreover, a vigorous individuality, Labour has now to submit to a new test, not only in Parliament, but in the whole country. "It must be accepted as fact," the writer says, "that any Government which should cause damage to the prestige abroad of British policy or tolerate currents injurious to order at home is doomed at once to lose the favour of public opinion, no matter what name it may bear, and no matter how attractive or brilliant the policy of which it is the exponent." If the new Government succeeds in arresting, even partially, the international rivalries which have assumed such dangerous proportions during the first quarter of the 20th century, the services thereby rendered to the cause of peace will entitle it to high esteem. It is permissible to hope that it will strive for success on the lines, indicated in your utterances before taking office, of not allowing oppressive domination, of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations, and of promoting the development of international brotherhood. "Nevertheless," the writer adds, "it must not be forgotten that the Labour Government, making its first experiment in existence, is compelled, while proclaiming all those brilliant principles, always to keep in view the prosperity, the security and the interests of England at home and abroad, and never to sacrifice doctrines of internationalism to the high interests of the British fatherland."

13. After again adverting to the dependence of the Labour Government on Liberal support and the prospect of a new general election should that support be withdrawn, the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" writer switches off on to the incipient Labour movement in Turkey and its probable growth. He desires to see this movement develop in a manner consistent with patriotism, so that, just as Turkish Labour has already rendered notable services in the national struggle, it may be possible to see in its rising strength not a danger as in other countries, but a phenomenon similar to that which has been witnessed in England. "We confidently anticipate," he concludes, "that the MacDonald administration, which undoubtedly stands in the first place for British patriotism, will at the same time produce a beneficent and useful effect upon feelings of international peace and concord, and more particularly that it will pursue an Eastern policy clean and free from greed, in accordance with that gentleman's physiognomy as we knew it in Constantinople. On this score the new British Government deserves to be welcomed with satisfaction by us."

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 1302/448/44] No. 26.

*Note on the Economic Aspect of the Lausanne Peace Settlement.—(Communicated by Mr. Payne, Board of Trade, February 8; Received February 11.)*

IN the sphere of commercial relations the Treaty of Lausanne had, of course, both to provide for the liquidation of the past and for the resumption of international trade on a proper footing. As regards the past, provision has been made for the mutual restoration of property belonging to Allied or Turkish owners, and, as in the case of the other treaties of peace, a mixed arbitral tribunal is to be set up to deal with cases of dispute. Further provision has been made for the maintenance in force of certain specified classes of contracts, while a separate convention provides for the restoration of concessions which had been entered into before the outbreak of war and for their modification so as to conform with new economic conditions. This restoration of concessions is applicable particularly to the Turkish railway concessions. No clearing office procedure is set up for the mutual recovery of debts, but it is provided that they shall be paid in the currency agreed upon in the contracts under which they arise.

As regards the future conduct of commerce between Great Britain and Turkey, a separate convention provides for the customs treatment of British goods. The Turkish customs tariff was fixed originally under the Capitulations at 3 per cent. *ad valorem*, and gradually, with the consent of the Powers, was raised to 11 per cent *ad valorem*, at which it stood just before the war. Negotiations were in progress before the war with a view to a further increase to 15 per cent., and during the war the Turks promulgated (September 1916) a tariff which was somewhere in the neighbourhood of this figure. In the Commercial Convention the Allies have succeeded in obtaining an agreement with Turkey that the tariff of September 1916 should be applied to their goods for the period of the convention (five years). The duties are to be regarded practically as gold duties, and coefficients varying with the rate of exchange are to be applied to counterbalance the depreciation of Turkish paper money in relation to the £ sterling.

Generally speaking, Turkey grants to Great Britain and her Allies most-favoured-nation treatment in commercial matters, and in the case of shipping, national treatment as well, subject to the provision that the coasting trade and port services is reserved to the Turkish flag.

The separate convention respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction affords protection for Allied individuals and companies operating in Turkey, which takes the place of that afforded previously by the capitulations. This convention gives British subjects the right to establish themselves in Turkey and to acquire property, and to carry on business; they are further protected from any charge or tax higher than those imposed on Turkish nationals. It is, moreover, provided that in order to ensure that the judicial system in Turkey shall be fully acceptable to non-Turkish litigants, European legal counsellors selected from a list to be drawn up by the Permanent Court of International Justice will be taken into the Turkish service for a period of five years.

*Board of Trade, February 8, 1924.*

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[E 1323/1323/44] No. 27.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 4, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the annual report for 1923 on the heads of missions in Turkey.

2. The portions between asterisks are taken from the report for 1922.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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Enclosure in No. 27.

*Report on Heads of Missions.*

*France.*

GENERAL PELLÉ, after having been somewhat ostentatiously omitted from the first Lausanne Conference, was appointed principal French delegate during the second stage. He has been described in previous reports. His principal characteristics are great industry, extreme lucidity of mind, much personal charm without any great personality. I have always found him a most loyal and helpful colleague. Unfortunately, in spite of his own loyalty, he has not sufficient strength of character to check the disloyalty of some of his subordinates. He is liked by the Turks and his reappointment here, which seems probable, would be well received.

Since April, M. Jessé Curély has been in charge of the French High Commission. M. Jessé Curély's last foreign post was Peking. He served during the war at the Quai d'Orsay, where he was Chef du Bureau du Personnel. He is a friendly though very reserved colleague, and is extraordinarily stolid and phlegmatic for a Frenchman. He professes no great devotion to M. Poincaré, and has never concealed his disgust at the attitude of France during the Chanak crisis. He has no love for the Turk, but spends most of his spare time in the bazaars.

Throughout the year Colonel Mougin has been maintained at Angora, theoretically as representative of the French High Commissioner for Syria, but practically as a representative of the French Government. The French High Commissioner here has a very low opinion of Colonel Mougin's capacity. General Pellé has described him as being entirely lacking in any critical faculty, and as a Frenchman who would like to see minarets on Notre-Dame. His reports are regarded as worthless, owing to their blind pro-Turk bias. He is now on leave, and will probably not return to Angora.

*Italy.*

M. Maissa, the Italian Acting High Commissioner, is the father-in-law of Sir Harry Lamb. His acquaintance with Turkey dates from prior to the Berlin Congress, when he already held a consular post in Constantinople. He was at one time Italian Minister in Tehran, and was High Commissioner here before the arrival of the Marquis Garroni. He was subsequently Governor of Rhodes. Since his return here he has never been more than Acting High Commissioner in order that Marquis Garroni, who has a political pull, may continue to enjoy the emoluments of the post. He is an amiable and likeable colleague, but was a terrible drag in moments of crisis owing to his excessive conciliatoriness and his dislike to joining in any action distasteful to Angora. He is nevertheless sometimes galvanised into activity by M. Mussolini, whom he fears still more than the Turks. His passion for detail and love of minor issues is most distressing at times when the Allied representatives have to consider and take joint action. He is somewhat acquisitive by nature and inclined, at the High Commissioners' meetings at this Embassy, to put in his pocket the pencils and paper placed before him. On one occasion he removed a large sheet of blotting paper, which, on being detected, he frankly admitted he was taking away owing to its superior quality to that supplied to the Italian High Commission.

I imagine that he will retire into private life as soon as M. Montagna is appointed to succeed him.

*United States of America.*

*I think it a pity that the American Government have not long ago sent out a career diplomatist to take charge of the United States High Commission. I cannot bring myself altogether to trust Admiral Bristol.

Admiral Bristol and his wife entertain a great deal in a simple way. They are both devoted to dancing, and I am told are frequently to be seen at Maxim's and other similar places in this town.*

*Japan.*

Mr. Uchida returned to Japan in the summer. He visited Angora before leaving and was received by Mustafa Kemal.

Since his departure Mr. Akio Kasama has been Acting High Commissioner. He talks English reasonably well, and has followed in Mr. Uchida's footsteps in endeavouring to shine in local society. He plays golf with one of his secretaries.



*Persia.*

Prince Isaac Khan Mofakhamod-Devleh.—Isaac Khan was appointed Persian Ambassador in Constantinople in 1922. He is an elderly gentleman of distinguished appearance and pleasant manners. He has had a long career in the Diplomatic Service, and was Ambassador in Rome before coming here. The main object of his appointment was to put an end to the scandals in the Persian Embassy and colony, which for a couple of years had brought the former into general contempt. In this object he succeeded. He was not a little embarrassed in the latter part of 1922 by the antics in Angora of Mumtaz-ed-Dowleh, who was sent there apparently without his knowledge.

Isaac Khan dislikes the Nationalists. His feelings in this respect were aggravated by the fiasco of his mission to Angora in the summer of 1923, when he went there to present his letters of credence. After waiting there for a week he was not allowed to present them owing to their being addressed to the Grand National Assembly instead of to Mustafa Kemal personally. Isaac Khan was very sensitive to the humiliation to which he had been exposed. He has but one desire, to be removed elsewhere; if possible as Persian delegate to the League of Nations.

He is, in my opinion, a genuine supporter of good relations between Great Britain and Persia.

*The Vatican.*

Mgr. Ernesto Philippi has been in charge of the Apostolic delegation since the 13th August last. His arrival ended the interregnum due to the prolonged absence of Mgr. Dolci during which Mgr. Cesarano, an amiable but very minor prelate, carried on the work. Technically, however, Mgr. Philippi is here not as delegate, but as Apostolic Visitor. This distinction is understood to have been made in order to avoid anything which might raise the thorny question of the French protectorate of the Church, if only by having to face the problem of the French representative's precedence at any official ceremony which the newly arrived prelate might hold on taking possession of his post. Mgr. Philippi, who is perhaps about 50 years of age, has had a long career in the Diplomatic Service of the Vatican, his most important previous posts having been those of Apostolic delegate in Canada and Mexico. He was recalled from the latter country some time ago owing to a dispute with the Mexican Government. He is a good example of the typical Vatican diplomatist, intelligent, quiet in demeanour and, I believe, cultured. He speaks French well, and has a fair knowledge of English. Some weeks after his arrival here he presented Mustafa Kemal Pasha with £T.5,000 for the relief of Moslem immigrants and refugees. He recently visited Angora, but staved there only a few days. His principal preoccupation appears to be to know when the Peace Treaty will come into force and how it will affect the interests of his Church in Turkey, especially from the point of view of its effect on the special position still claimed by the French. He is never met in general diplomatic society here. I give my impressions of him at second-hand, as I have not yet made his personal acquaintance.

*Spain.*

*The Spanish Minister, M. Servert y Vest, is the doyen of the Ministers. He has spent most of his career in South America, and finds this climate somewhat trying. Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation in Constantinople itself, he lives rather an isolated life at Buyuk-Dere, where he spends the whole year. He is a quiet man of literary tastes.*

*Belgium.*

*M. Michotte de Welle was Belgian Minister at Belgrade when the war broke out. His personal effects there were plundered, whilst his property in Belgium was likewise stripped, and his wife lost her family possessions in France. These misfortunes have saddened him and, to use his own expression, made him very nervous. He lives at a fine Legation, which until recently was sparsely furnished. He has now commenced to receive. He states that he has a considerable amount of work to do, presumably in connection with the electric light and tramway companies, which are Belgian concerns. He is very bitter about the Italian High Commissioner for insisting that his daughter-in-law should take precedence of Mme. Michotte de Welle.*

*Denmark.*

*M. Wandel plays no part whatever, and is only seen at big parties. He recently married a Levantine lady.*

*Sweden.*

*M. Wallenberg realised on his arrival that he was under suspicion of having been very pro-German during the war. The fact that he is in charge of German interests here made it more difficult for him to get rid of this suspicion, but he works hard to dispel the legend that he is Germanophile. After the conclusion of the Prisoners' Exchange Agreement with the Angora Government some of the returned Turks did not hesitate to state in the Nationalist press that they had been badly treated at Malta and had suffered indignities there. M. Wallenberg procured a report from the Swedish consul at Malta on the treatment of the Turks. This report was very favourable to the British authorities, and M. Wallenberg lost no time in communicating it to the Turkish Government.

M. Wallenberg goes in greatly for Turkish society, and Turks are always to be found at his evening parties. In fact, he rather forces Turks on the notice of his Allied colleagues.

Mme. Wallenberg is a good-natured lady, who pours forth an unending stream of talk in a somewhat strident voice, which makes her a trying neighbour at dinner.*

*Holland.*

Baron Rengers's last post was at Rome. Unlike the majority of one's diplomatic colleagues in Constantinople, he bears the hall-mark of a diplomatist *de carrière*. He does not approve of Constantinople as a post. He is fond of wine, and after dinner can be very diverting. Owing to the Dutch Legation being in charge of Austrian interests he has a certain amount of work to do, otherwise most of his time is spent in frequenting places where he can get the opportunity of a drink or of seeing a pretty woman.

*Roumania.*

M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, was a colleague of mine at Nish during the war. He has been absent a good deal from his post and was employed in 1922 as Roumanian delegate in the negotiations with the Soviet at Warsaw. He is unmarried. He is short and round with a keen sense of his own humour. He conceals much shrewdness beneath a jovial exterior, and his apparent *bonhomie* does not prevent him from being exceedingly caustic at the expense of others.

*Jugoslavia.*

*M. Chaponitch was succeeded by M. Gifkovitch in the course of 1922. M. Gifkovitch is not very attractive and has a thirst for information which he seeks to slack at inappropriate moments. He does not strike me as being very reliable.*

*Bulgaria.*

During the greater part of 1923 a General Markov resided off and on in Constantinople in a sort of unofficial capacity. Towards the end of the year, however, the Bulgarian Government appointed M. Simeon Radev to be its official representative here. He is a man with considerable diplomatic experience, having been Bulgarian Minister in Bucharest from 1913 to 1916 and subsequently at The Hague, whence, I notice from one of Mr. Erskine's despatches, he is stated to have been removed owing to irregularities in his accounts. Though he is of somewhat sly and shifty appearance, this story sounds improbable in view of his subsequent appointment as second Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations. In spite of his appearance, I like the little that I have seen of him. He is a keen student of history, more particularly of the period about the Berlin Congress. He recently read to me extracts from a secret agreement signed by Andrassy and Sir Henry Elliott, which he had unearthed in the archives at Vienna, and which constituted a definite agreement between Great Britain and Austria as to the views which those two Powers would support at the Berlin Congress. He told me with great pride that the existence of this agreement had hitherto been unknown, and that he proposed to have it published in England.



*Czechoslovakia.*

The Czechoslovak representative, M. Svetlik, is married to a Miss Armstrong, of Australian origin. I know him but little, but he gives one the impression of being heavy and uninteresting. Most people describe him as a deadly bore.

*Poland.*

*M. Baronowski is the Polish delegate. He was employed on propaganda work in Switzerland during a part of the war, and was afterwards at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Warsaw. He has quite a number of Polish subjects in and around Constantinople, including the Polish farming colony situated in Anatoiia, several miles from the entrance of the Black Sea. He gives receptions, which are very dull affairs, and is evidently keen on playing a part socially.*

*Greece.*

The Spanish Legation was in charge of Greek interests throughout the year. So far as the Spanish Minister was concerned, the post was a sinecure, and such action as was taken on behalf of the Greeks was generally as the result of unofficial action by this High Commission. On the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by Greece, M. Jean Politis was appointed Greek Chargé d'Affaires to reside at Angora. After stopping for a month in Constantinople, M. Politis left in December with his staff for Angora, where a house was placed at his disposal at a fairly high rental by the Turkish Government. There is a Greek liaison officer in Constantinople. M. Politis served in the Greek delegation at Lausanne and seems as likely a person as anyone to make the best of an exceedingly disagreeable and difficult position.

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The diplomatic missions of the following countries have been permanently in residence at Angora throughout the year and I am not personally acquainted with the heads of them :—

*Russia.*

M. Aralov, whose activities and influence at Angora throughout 1922 had been very great, was recalled in April last probably in great part as the result of the attitude of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne. He was succeeded after a couple of months interregnum by M. Souritch, who had previously been the Soviet trade representative at Christiania and had held several posts in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The chief object of M. Souritch's mission was declared to be the conclusion of a commercial and consular convention, but, though negotiations in that respect have proceeded throughout 1923, no definite agreement was reached. In fact, the Turks have steadfastly refused to recognise the official capacity of M. Salkind, who came to Constantinople last February as a sort of Bolshevik consul to deal with passport matters. M. Salkind was compelled ultimately to close his office and leave.

On the other hand, after much procrastination, the former Russian Embassy in Constantinople, together with the other Russian Government buildings in this city, were handed over to the Soviet authorities in December last. The Embassy itself is now occupied by M. Potemkine, the so-called Soviet delegate for the repatriation of Russians.

There is also in Constantinople a Russian trade delegation of which the head is a M. Zolotariev.

*Afghanistan.*

The Afghan representative is a certain Sultan Ahmed Khan, who appears to play a very minor rôle.

[E 1330/1330/44] No. 28.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 102.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1924.

IN view of the possibility of the early ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by His Britannic Majesty, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum, prepared by Mr. Forbes Adam, in regard to the various commissions which will be constituted on the entry into force of the treaty and the effect which they are likely to have on the work of the British official staff here.

2. This memorandum has been drafted partly with a view to summarise and to bring up to date the information contained in a memorandum prepared in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office on the 6th September last (see Foreign Office print, "Turkey," the 6th September, Section 1), and partly to estimate in a general way, and so far as this is possible in advance, the additional work likely to be thrown on the British official staff here.

3. The Board of Trade will doubtless consider the propriety of issuing some warning in the "Board of Trade Journal" to British firms and claimants to such matters as those affected by the entry into force of articles 65, 66, 69, 70, 75, 77, 78, 80, 87, 89 and 91 of the treaty, with special reference to the time limits set by some of these articles.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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Enclosure in No. 28.

*Note of the Work likely to be thrown on the British Official Staff in Constantinople by the Ratification and Entry into Force of the Treaty of Lausanne.*

THE following are the main points which, on the coming into force of the treaty, seem likely to affect Constantinople and to involve action of some sort on our part:—

*Political.*

(a.) *Boundaries of Demilitarised Zones under Thracian Frontiers Convention* (*Articles* 2 *and* 5).

Establishment of commission within fifteen days of *Bulgarian* ratification (Greece and Turkey having already ratified). Bulgarian ratification will probably *follow* quickly on that of the Great Powers, and therefore on the entry into force of the treaty.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall has already been appointed by His Majesty's Government, and proposals regarding pay and transport of the commission were made on the instructions of the Foreign Office to the French and Italian High Commissioners here, and were brought to the notice of Adnan Bey in November last. The three Allied military attachés subsequently agreed on certain joint proposals regarding the rank and pay of the commissioners, and these proposals have been sent home to the three Governments. They were not referred to the Turkish Government, but in a despatch sent to the Foreign Office it was pointed out that the Turks could hardly be expected to adopt Allied scales of pay, and ought to be left to make their own arrangements for their commissioners.

(b.) *Boundaries of Demilitarised Zones under Straits Convention* (*Articles* 4 (1), 5 *and* 20).

Establishment of commission within fifteen days of the entry into force of the convention (*i.e.*, treaty as a whole). War Office are believed to have made appointment, but it is not known if London has discussed staff and emoluments, &c., with Paris and Rome.

(c.) *Turko-Irak Boundary.*

Turks have held up actual verbal negotiations. Although His Majesty's Government regard discussions as opened by their note of the 5th October, from



which date under the Evacuation Protocol the nine months' period during which an attempt is to be made to fix the frontier by Turco-British Agreement runs. There is every reason to believe that the Turks will be ready to start discussions, however, when Great Britain ratifies the treaty, or at furthest when the treaty enters into force. Unless the new Cabinet change the plans contemplated by Lord Curzon, discussions will then probably begin under Sir P. Cox, who will be assisted by one Irak Arab adviser and one British official from Irak. Colonel Jardine has already been appointed as the latter, while according to press reports General Nouri Pasha has been appointed by the Irak Government as the former.

(d.) *Straits Commission to sit at Constantinople.*

Although no time limit for its constitution is laid down in the treaty, its establishment is certainly intended on the coming into force of the treaty. Its main initial work will be the calculation of Black Sea Fleet units, &c., under the annex to article 2. Commander MacDonald has been appointed British representative.

(e.) *Sanitary* ad hoc *Liquidation Commission* (*Article* 116 *of the Treaty*).

No time limit is set for its constitution, but presumably it will begin work soon after the entry into force of the treaty.

His Majesty's Government have appointed Dr. Clemow their representative.

(f.) *Graves on Gallipoli Peninsula* (*Articles* 130, 133 *and* 134).

On the coming into force of the treaty the Imperial War Graves Commission (representing His Majesty's Government) have to appoint (*a*) a permanent commission, (*b*) a permanent organisation for the maintenance, &c., of the graves, and (*c*) special custodians to work under (*b*). No time limit is set for these appointments. General Sir F. Ware will be able to tell us how the matter stands.

*Financial.*

(g.) *Calculation of Annuities and Capital of Debt as redistributed* (*Articles* 47 *and* 49).

The Ottoman Debt Council will proceed to the calculation of the annuities at Constantinople within three months of the coming into force of the treaty. A representative of the Colonial Office or representatives of Irak, Palestine and Transjordan are entitled to—and presumably will—attend the meetings here to check their allotments.

*N.B.*—The redistribution of the capital debt will take place *at Paris* within one month after the completion of the work here regarding the annuities.

(h.) *Turkish Reparation Commission.*

This will be established on the coming into force of the treaty, but although the original intention of the drafters of the convention was to make Constantinople the seat of the commission, it is now not clear where it will sit. Commander Garle is understood to be the British representative.

*Economic.*

(i.) *Mixed Arbitral Tribunal* (*Articles* 92, 96 *and* 97) *at Constantinople.*

An Anglo-Turkish tribunal will be established here within three months of the coming into force of the treaty, each Government appointing one member and the two Governments choosing a president by agreement. The two Governments must within the above period reach an agreement as to the person to be appointed secretary-general of the tribunal and as to the emoluments of the president and secretary-general (article 97). The possible appointment of sub-sections on similar lines to sit in any other part of Turkey (*e.g.*, Smyrna) may follow in due course. Each Government will appoint agents to appear before it.

We do not know what appointments His Majesty's Government contemplate.

(j.) *Establishment Convention* (*Article* 4). *Separate Professions Convention.*

Within one year from the coming into force of the treaty, His Majesty's Government will have to negotiate a separate convention regulating the question of the

admission of British subjects in Turkey and reciprocally Turkish subjects in the United Kingdom (British Empire possibly) to various professions and industries.

We do not know what procedure or appointment His Majesty's Government contemplate.

(k.) *Establishment Convention* (*Article* 19). *Notification of Non-adhesion of Dominions, &c.*

At the time of the coming into force of the treaty, the Foreign Office will have to instruct us as to the notification (if any) to be made to the Turkish Government regarding the non-application of its provision to any Dominion, colony, &c. We know that the Colonial Office were taking the necessary steps to enable them to do this.

(l.) *Commercial Convention* (*Article* 9) *and Exchange of Letters. Cabotage.*

Within six months of the 1st January, 1924, the three British lines, named in the exchange of letters as entitled to continue in the cabotage trade, will have to open and conclude negotiations with the Turkish Government "if they are to be able to continue their service for a further period of two years." The treaty text does not make it quite clear whether the two years' period runs from the 1st January, 1924, or the end of the six months during which the negotiations are to take place. We do not know by what procedure or whether here or at Angora the Turks intend to conduct the negotiations, but the companies concerned are aware of the position and are understood to have deputed representatives at Constantinople for the negotiations. In the case of the Khedivial Company we notified Adnan Bey officially on the 22nd December of the readiness of the company to negotiate and the appointment of Messrs. Gilchrist, Walker and Co. to represent them, and we asked that the latter should be informed with whom they should negotiate and how the Turkish Government proposed that the negotiations should be conducted.

(m.) *Commercial Convention* (*Article* 8). *Reciprocal Most-Favoured-Nation Customs Treatment.*

There is a possibility on or before ratification of the treaty of our having to make a declaration to the Turkish Government or exchange letters with them as to India's north-west frontier traffic, but we await definite instructions from London.

(n.) *Commercial Convention* (*Article* 16). *Declaration of Non-adhesion of Dominions, &c.* (see above, under (k)).

(o.) *Commercial Convention* (*Article* 15). *Separate Convention regarding Records, Registers and Designs, &c.*

Such convention, negotiable without any time limit after the coming into force of the treaty, may be required by Irak, Palestine and Transjordan, and, if so, they will have to be negotiated here or at Angora presumably during the course of this year, but no immediate action seems likely on this point.

(p.) *Concessions Protocol* (*Article* 2 (1)). *Armstrong-Whitworth–Vickers and Co.'s Concession.*

Negotiations will have to be undertaken, presumably here or at Angora, by this company with the Turkish Government as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty for the modification of their pre-war concessions or for the grant of a new concession of an undertaking of equal importance.

(q.) *Concessions Protocol* (*Articles* 1, 3, 4 *and* 5) *and the Unilateral Turkish Declaration attached to the Protocol.*

Various British concessionary companies and Turkish companies in which before the 1st August, 1914, British capital was preponderant will have to take up with the Turkish Government, presumably at Angora, as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty, the question of the settlement of accounts and the readaptation of their concessions. If no agreement is reached within one year between the companies and the Turkish Government, article 6 provides for settlement by specially selected experts.



Presumably the companies concerned can be left at any rate to take the initial steps of approaching the Turkish Government as to place of negotiations and procedure. The Aidin Railway Company has already made considerable progress with the preliminaries of the negotiations for the settlement of accounts contemplated in their own agreement with the Turkish Government.

(r.) *Anatolian Railway.*

The letter addressed by Ismet Pasha on the 24th July, 1923, to the president of the Third Committee of the Lausanne Conference provides, *inter alia*, for the readaptation of the Anatolian Railway Company's concession within one year of the coming into force of the treaty.

The Anatolian Railway Company can be left to look after their own interests unless and until they approach us.

(s.) *Pre-war Claims.*

Under article 71, all claims the subject of discussion before the war may have to be reopened and their settlement pressed on the Turks.

Lastly, it may be borne in mind that a proposal was discussed during September, October and November for the co-ordination of the settlement of such minor matters as appointments to commissions, salaries, and organisation of commissions, &c., by the diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers concerned here, over which the representatives of the three principal Allies and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs might preside in rotation. The Italians agreed to this proposal. The French have apparently never stated their views, but Ismet Pasha was so opposed to the whole proposal that we suggested to the Foreign Office in November that it should be dropped unless and until experience proved its necessity and the matter could be pressed on the Turks on the basis of such a necessity.

It is difficult to estimate in advance precisely what work or, therefore, how much *extra* work will be thrown on the staff of this High Commission (Chancery and Dragomanate) and on the consul-general's staff by the coming into force of the treaty and the subsequent initiation of the various negotiations referred to above and the establishment of the various commissions. It seems probable, however, that very soon after the entry into force of the treaty the following negotiations will open here and the following commissions, &c., be established :—

1. *Thracian Demilitarised Zones.*

This commission will presumably have its headquarters here, and one or two preliminary meetings in Constantinople, but most of the work will afterwards be done on the spot. Doubtless the Turks could provide accommodation for the preliminary meetings.

Not much extra work should be thrown on us by this.

2. *Straits Demilitarised Zones.*

Same observations as regard Thracian demilitarised zones.

3. *Turco-Irak Boundary.*

Presumably the Turks will provide accommodation here for these negotiations. Unless the present Government have some "compromise" frontier to propose, it is difficult to foresee many meetings or close negotiation. While, therefore, we may have to provide a secretary for the negotiations (this is not certain, as the Colonial Office may send out a man in addition to Colonel Jardine), not much extra work should be thrown on the chancery and cyphering staff.

4. *Straits Commission.*

There seems no real reason why any clerical assistance should be required from the High Commission. The commission will have to make arrangements for its own secretariat after it meets, and there seems no need for representation in the secretariat by every nation represented on the commission itself. Presumably there

will not be much reporting home required either by despatch or telegram. The Turks can and will probably provide the necessary accommodation. Indeed, it has been announced in the press that a building at Tophané is already being prepared.

5. *Sanitary Commission.*

The Sanitary Commission can probably provide their own secretariat without calling on the High Commission's staff, nor should there be much reporting home required.

6. *Graves.*

The Imperial War Graves Commission, as now, will presumably provide their staff for the various commissions and organisations at Gallipoli. Some extra work will be thrown on us, however, as the result of the inevitable discussions with the Turks and the consequent increase in correspondence.

7. *Debt Annuities.*

The Colonial Office or Irak, &c., representatives may require to telegraph through us a certain amount regarding the redistribution of the debt annuities. The clerical work will be done at the Ottoman Public Debt offices.

8. *Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.*

Presumably the Turks will provide accommodation, and no extra work will be thrown on the chancery.

9. *The Turkish Reparation Commission.*

Whether or not it meets here will presumably cause us a certain amount of extra correspondence regarding claims, &c., but it will presumably provide its own secretarial staff. If it meets in Constantinople, the three Allied High Commissions will have to arrange to provide it with the necessary accommodation, and it is not clear at first sight where this can be obtained.

10. *Separate Conventions regarding Professions and the Surrender of Registers, &c., under the Establishment and Commercial Conventions.*

These negotiations may have to take place at Angora. It is too early to foresee whether any, and if so how much, extra work will devolve on the Embassy in consequence.

11. *The Various Concessionary Negotiations.*

Will be direct between the companies concerned and the Turkish Government. They will probably, therefore, take place at Angora.. In any case, apart from extra correspondence, not much increase of work should be caused to the chancery.

12. *Pre-War Claims.*

Will certainly entail an increase of correspondence and therefore a good deal of extra work for the dragomanate.

To sum up, it should be possible for the existing Embassy staff to cope with the increase of clerical work, including cypher work, which seems likely to be thrown on them by the entry into force of the treaty. But this is only on the assumption that the registry remains at its present strength, that no call is made on the dragomanate staff to provide for the needs of the consulate-general, and that separate representation at Angora does not materialise, at any rate until the new negotiations are well under way and the commissions are established and working smoothly. Even then experience (which should be available before the end of March, when Mr. Walton's appointment as cypher officer terminates) may prove that, even in the absence of separate representation at Angora, Mr. Walton's services may be indispensable to us as a second cypher officer or part-time cypher officer and part-time registry clerk.



As stated above, however, it is very difficult to foresee now what actual increase in the volume of our work will be caused by all these new organisations and negotiations.

Incidentally we shall presumably be responsible for finding accommodation for all the officials sent out here to negotiate, but this should be available at Tokatlian's or the Pera Palace.

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[E 1332/32/44] No. 29.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 12.)

(No. 104.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 69 of the 23rd January, I have the honour to acquaint you that there has been little change in the internal political situation in Turkey during the last fortnight, excepting the new move of Ismet Pasha as regards the Anatolian Railway question, which I reported in my despatch No. 86 of the 30th January. There have, however, been certain minor developments which, though for the most part of little individual importance, are sufficiently significant to be worth recording.

2. The Court of Independence has continued at intervals of a few days to hear the case against the lightermen and others accused of plotting against the republic and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. These proceedings have excited little interest. On the 29th January the Public Prosecutor asked for the condemnation of five of the accused, including two who disappeared when the arrests were being made, under an article in the ordinary Penal Code (not the Law on Treason), and for the acquittal of three others. On the 5th February the court sentenced the lighterman Ali Osman to one year's imprisonment, being the minimum penalty for the mildest offence defined in the article invoked by the Public Prosecutor, and acquitted all the other accused, including the two fugitives, who were politically the most important persons implicated, one of them having been a Governor-General and the other a Deputy.

3. Meanwhile the Grand National Assembly had decided, on the 30th January, to terminate the existence of the Constantinople Court of Independence as soon as it had disposed of current business, *i.e.*, the trial of the persons mentioned above. So with the condemnation of Ali Osman the most futile episode in the history of the young Republic of Turkey comes to an end. Except for the condemnation to five years' penal servitude of the unfortunate Lutfi Fikri Bey, who will probably be pardoned, the court has done nothing to justify the panic decision to send it to Constantinople. Even the temporary effect which it produced at first of stifling criticism of the Government in the Constantinople press is rapidly wearing off. The net result has been to aggravate the hostility between the old and the new capital and to diminish the credit of Ismet Pasha's Government.

4. An accidental quarrel in Angora has tended to inflame the hostility between the two capitals so far as Deputies and journalists—the two most vocal elements in the community—are concerned. On the 23rd January a certain Ali Saib, member for Urfa, conceiving his honour to be outraged by some reference in the "Wakt" newspaper to his part in the recent vote of the People's party in favour of an increase in the salary of Deputies, assaulted the Angora correspondent of that paper. Upon this the correspondents of all the Constantinople papers agreed not to send any telegrams to their papers for three days. This demonstration has led to much acrimonious controversy, a decision of the authorities to exclude journalists from the corridors of the Assembly House, an outcry in most of the Constantinople papers that the liberty of the press is threatened, proposals and counter-proposals for modifications in the press law, a demand on the part of certain Deputies for stringent measures against journalists who disparage the principles of Islam, and, to complete the agitation in the teacup, a motion by Ali Saib that duelling should be sanctioned by law. This last proposal is now being solemnly considered in committee.

5. Side by side with this rather artificial storm there is much real alarm in Turkish circles at the deplorable economic situation in the country, and more particularly at the way in which the commercial activity of Constantinople is menaced by short-sighted Government measures, the disorganisation and indiscipline of labour in the

port, and a number of other factors. The press abounds in articles on this subject, and all sorts of bodies, such as the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the group of Deputies representing Constantinople, are occupying themselves with the question of remedies. There is much talk of engaging foreign experts to assist in economic reorganisation, and some writers in the press are bold enough to hint that foreign loans may be necessary to give the country a new start. It is noteworthy that the "Ileri," the one Constantinople paper which is devoted to the person of Mustafa Kemal, blows hot and cold, now defending the Government, now accusing the Ministry of incompetence and dwelling on the economic chaos which prevails.

6. Mustafa Kemal himself remains at Smyrna, but there are signs that he is preparing to resume an active part in public affairs. On the 3rd February the semi-official Anatolian agency published a report by his doctor to the effect that the Pasha's illness had been merely a nervous disorder due to overwork, and that he was now completely restored to health. It almost looks as though Mustafa Kemal may have deliberately allowed his illness to be exaggerated in order to retire into the background while Ismet Pasha tackled thorny questions like the budget and the constitutional changes, realising perhaps, moreover, that the spectacle of growing chaos in the country would incline people generally to accept his eventual assumption of supreme authority as the only solution.

7. However this may be, it is a significant fact that the "Ileri" of the 5th February published an attack on the Caliphal House of a kind more insidious, and at the same time rather more gross than any which has hitherto come to my notice. The article is introduced by successive headlines as follows: "The Liquidation of the Sultinate"; "Shall we still give monthly salaries to the House of the Sultanate?"; "If the members of the House expect money from the National Treasury without doing any work, it is a very strange thing in a Republic." These headings sufficiently indicate the trend of the article. What gives it its special character is that it is illustrated by a caricature representing an elderly gentleman not unlike the Caliph, with a coarse looking female, seated on a sofa of a type familiar to visitors to the Palace, with an aged and disgruntled peasant pouring paper money over the back of it from a cornucopia.

8. Two other incidents of the past week suggest reflections regarding Mustafa Kemal Pasha's outlook on the future. The first of these, trivial in itself, is that the band of the "Ertogrul," the Imperial yacht, has gone to Smyrna to be at the Pasha's disposal. The second, more important, is that the editors of all the Constantinople newspapers, except one, have gone in a body to Smyrna to wait upon the President. This journey, which must obviously have been carefully led up to, was publicly mentioned in the Constantinople press for the first time on the 1st February. On the 2nd February the journalists left, and on the 4th February they were received for four hours by Mustafa Kemal, the editor of the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" alone being excluded because he had stated that it was the Pasha who had taken the initiative in arranging the visit. Up to the time of drafting this despatch no announcement had been made regarding what passed. Whether the President summoned the editors or merely acceded to a wish of theirs, he would appear to be anxious to placate the discontented press of Constantinople, and is probably endeavouring with his usual tactical skill to construct a new basis for future activity.

9. If Mustafa Kemal resumes the active management of affairs, the chances of Angora being maintained as the capital, unless and until some change amounting to a revolution should occur, will be materially increased. The Assembly is reported to have voted on the 2nd February £T. 114,000 for the erection of a new Parliament house there.

10. The Constitutional Committee of the Assembly is now working systematically on what seems to be intended to be a complete new Constitution for the republic. They have elaborated up to date some thirty-four articles, providing, *inter alia*, for a four years' duration of the Assembly, a seven years' tenure of the presidency of the republic, and a right on the part of the President to refer back legislation. As the law will doubtless give rise to much discussion when it is laid before the Assembly, it seems unnecessary to enter into the committee's proposals at greater length at present.

11. The women of the intellectual class in Constantinople share in the general unrest and dissatisfaction with present conditions. At least one meeting has been held to assert the feminine interest in the questions raised by the proposed family law, which is still a subject of discussion at Angora. One of the subjects which has been much ventilated in the press is the question of making polygamy illegal; not that it



is now very commonly practised among Turks properly so-called, but because it is felt by the more advanced sections of the community that it is, in principle, vicious to allow it by law in a modern State.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 1432/634/44] No. 30.

*Note on the Export of Arms and Munitions to Turkey, 1920 to 1924.*

AS a result of the breach between the Allies and Greece which followed the restoration of King Constantine at the end of 1920, it was decided in December of that year to suspend the supply of all war material to Greece. No material was at this time being allowed to reach the Turks, with whom the Allies were still at war. The policy of refusing to allow war material to reach either the Greeks or the Turks was in fact definitely laid down in a telegram to His Majesty's Minister at Athens on the 16th April, 1921. E 4746/143/44 C 7587/20/19. E 4791/143/44.

2. In consequence of the continuance against Allied advice of independent Greek military operations against the Kemalists, the Allies adopted an increasingly neutral attitude in the Græco-Turkish struggle, which was finally defined by their formal declaration of neutrality of the 10th August, 1921. E 9145/143/44.

3. It was decided by the Supreme Council that this neutrality involved sanctioning the supply by private firms, at their own risk, of arms and munitions to either belligerent, and this policy was officially announced in reply to questions in the House of Commons on the 11th August.*

4. The question immediately arose as to the effect of this decision on the arrangements made during the previous year for the provisional execution of certain provisions of the Arms Traffic Convention

5. The Arms Traffic Convention, which was signed on the 10th September, 1919, is not yet in force, since the United States Government have refused to ratify it; but an informal agreement was reached in 1920 between the British, French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese Governments to the effect that its provisions should be immediately applied as regards the export of arms to the "prohibited zone" mentioned in article 6. This zone includes Asiatic Turkey, at any rate until the accession of Turkey to the convention, when the question will come up for reconsideration. Treaty Series, No. 12, 1919. A 5233/and A 5264/1524/95/1920.

6. The question was fully discussed in consultation with the American Department, and it was decided that unless the decision of the Supreme Council, regarding the freedom of private firms to supply arms to either belligerent, were taken as overriding the inter-Allied agreement for the provisional application of the Arms Traffic Convention in so far as Asia Minor was concerned, the effect of the decision would be to vitiate the whole principle of our neutrality, since private firms would be allowed to supply arms to the Greeks but prevented from supplying them to the Turks. The French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese Governments were therefore informed on the 19th August, 1921, that His Majesty's Government had decided that the neutrality resolution of the Supreme Council of the 10th August "must be taken to override the agreement for the application of the terms of the Arms Traffic Convention in so far as the importation of arms into Asia Minor was concerned, and that His Majesty's Government therefore intended to issue licences for the export to Greece or to the Kemalists of all arms, ammunition and similar goods (except poison-gas shells) enumerated in the Prohibition Export List published in the Board of Trade Journal of the 31st March, 1921." E 9422/143/44. E 9489/143/44. E 9489/143/44.

7. The free import of arms and munitions into Turkey and Greece by private firms continued unchecked until the late autumn of 1922, when, after the Greek defeat and the cessation of active hostilities between Greece and Turkey, it became apparent that any arms exported to Turkey could only be used against the Allies. A despatch was therefore addressed to His Majesty's

* By the Orders in Council of the 24th March, 1921, certain arms and munitions can only be exported from this country under licence, but the present decision meant that such licences for the export of arms to Turkey or Greece could no longer be generally refused. It was decided, however, to prohibit the export of poison-gas shells.

E 13115/76/44. Ambassadors in Paris and Rome on the 30th November, 1922, instructing them to point out to the Governments to which they were accredited "that it might fairly be considered that the termination of the Græco-Turkish hostilities had liquidated the neutrality of the Allies; that the situation at the moment was dominated by the danger of hostilities between the Turkish forces and those of the three principal Allies in Turkey; and that it would therefore be in the last degree imprudent if the Allied Governments, which were admittedly unable to reinforce their own troops in Turkey, were to allow the continued supply of arms to the Turkish forces." In view of these considerations the French and Italian Governments were to be urged to take all possible steps to prevent any military supplies from reaching Turkey from French or Italian sources.

E 13781/76/44. 8. The French and Italian Governments agreed to this arrangement, and no permits for the export of arms to Turkey were accordingly allowed until the conclusion of the settlement at Lausanne.

9. On the ratification of the peace settlement by Turkey and Greece last autumn, the danger of hostilities appeared to have come to an end, and, after further consultation with the French and Italian Governments, it was decided, E 8187/15/44. on the 17th October, 1923, that the special embargo on the export of arms to E 10135/15/44. Turkey which had been imposed as the result of our representations in December 1922 should be removed.

A 6178/1252/95. 10. Since that date several British firms have applied to His Majesty's A 7590/1252/95. Government for permission to export arms, &c., to Turkey, and one firm, the A 177/177/95. Nobel Industries (Limited), has asked for assistance in obtaining a concession E 10031/10031/44. from the Turkish Government for the establishment of a munition factory in Turkey. These applications were, in the ordinary course, referred to the American Department, which, being in charge of the Arms Traffic Convention, deals with all questions of export of arms from this country.

11. In considering these applications, the fact was unfortunately overlooked that the informal agreement of 1920 for the partial application of the Arms Traffic Convention had been definitely regarded as overridden by the E 10031/10031/44. decision of the Supreme Council of the 10th August, 1921, in so far as Asia Minor was concerned. It was pointed out that there were strong reasons for not according any exceptional treatment to Turkey in this matter, for the present at least. Turkish territory, it was explained, is contiguous to many of the disturbed areas, the exclusion of arms from which is one of the principal objects of the Arms Traffic Convention. Moreover, any exception in favour of Turkey might lead to similar exceptions being made elsewhere.

12. All applications for permits for the export of arms to Turkey from this country were therefore refused, and the Nobel Industries (Limited) were E 10031/10031/44. informed that His Majesty's Government looked with disfavour on their proposal to obtain a concession for the establishment of a munition factory in Turkey, and would give them no assistance in the matter.

A 6178/1252/95. 13. The French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese Governments were reminded of the informal arrangement of 1920, and asked to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in applying it to Turkey by prohibiting all export of arms and munitions to that country. Further, having reason to believe that American and Czechoslovak firms were competing for some of the A 6178/1252/44. contracts and concessions concerned, we informed the United States and E 10846/10031/44. Czechoslovak Governments of our policy, and asked them to co-operate with us as far as possible in carrying it out.

E 11153/10031/44. 14. The Czechoslovak Government immediately expressed complete agreement with our views and promised to discourage their nationals from attempting to obtain any contracts or concessions of the nature indicated. A 826/98/95. They pointed out, however, that they had no power actually to prevent their nationals from obtaining concessions in Turkey.

A 7370/5/95. 15. The United States Government expressed general agreement with the policy of preventing arms from reaching Turkey, but asked for further information as to the extent to which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the policy was likely to prove effective, and pointed out that the fact that European Turkey was not included in the prohibited zone was likely seriously to interfere with its success. In any case they would not be able to undertake to do more than to discourage the flotation of any foreign



loan in the United States for the purpose of armament, and to *refuse support* to United States citizens in any efforts they might make to promote the manufacture of arms in Turkey or the shipment and sale to Turkey of such supplies. This, of course, as the Board of Trade have pointed out, is much A 675/98/95. less than has been done by His Majesty's Government, who have definitely prohibited the export of all arms and munitions to Turkey from the United Kingdom.

16. The Belgian Government replied that they were willing to co-operate A 7027/5/95. in our policy, but only on condition that the other Powers to whom we had addressed representations on this subject also agreed to do so.

17. The Italian Government pointed out that our present policy of A 262/98/95. preventing arms from reaching Turkey appeared to conflict with our agreement of last autumn to remove the embargo of December 1922 (*cf.* paragraph 8 above, and asked for further explanations on this point before taking any action.

18. The French Government have now replied that they do not regard A 503/98/95. the Arms Traffic Agreement as ever having been in force in regard to Turkey; that it was because it was not regarded as applying to Turkey that the export of arms to Turkey by private firms was definitely sanctioned at the time of the declaration of neutrality of 1921 (*cf.* paragraph 6 above), that the embargo on the export of arms to Turkey of December 1922 (*cf.* paragraph 8 above) was imposed for purely political reasons, and that, having now agreed to the removal of that embargo, they see no reason to reimpose any prohibition. They further significantly add that they do not consider that they can subject French munition firms to any disabilities in this matter.

19. Meanwhile unexpected difficulties have been encountered from the side of the British firms concerned. The Nobel Industries, notwithstanding the expressed disapproval of His Majesty's Government, have continued to negotiate with the Turkish Government for the munition factory concession, E 11510/10031/44. and it seems possible that they will succeed in obtaining it. It has been found that we have no legal means of preventing their doing so, or even of checking the export from this country of any machinery which may eventually E 12031/10031/44. be required for the construction of the factory. Messrs. Webley and Scott have pointed out that the refusal of export permits for certain consignments of revolvers, for which they have received orders from Constantinople, will seriously aggravate unemployment in their works, and will not prevent the A 7590/1252/95. revolvers from reaching Turkey, as foreign firms have already been promised A 804/177/95. these orders if they are not given to them.

20. Moreover, we are on rather weak ground in prohibiting the export of arms to European Turkey, even from the point of view of the Arms Traffic Convention, since European Turkey is not in the "prohibited zone"; but if arms once reach European Turkey we cannot prevent them from being transhipped to Asia Minor.

21. Meanwhile a Turkish aviation mission is on its way to Europe to purchase military aviation material in various countries, and the Air Ministry are apparently ready to welcome it in this country. There is reason to E 824/634/44. believe that the French are prepared to undertake to supply the Turks with any military aviation material they may require, and even, if necessary, to E 12000/15/44. send a military aviation mission to Turkey. Numerous Italian aeroplanes E 11480/15/44. have recently been arriving at Smyrna. These may be intended primarily for E 634/634/44. commercial purposes. It seems clear, however, from all the evidence in our possession, that while British firms are now being refused all permits for this traffic, French, Belgian, Italian, German and other firms are exporting arms and munitions to Turkey without restrictions.

22. If there is any question of our reconsidering our present policy, it would be desirable that a decision should be reached as soon as possible in order to reduce the risk of British firms losing contracts unnecessarily.

G. W. RENDEL.

*Foreign Office, February* 12, 1924.

[**E 1416/145/44**] No. 31.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 105.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February* 14, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 11 of 7th January.

"Œuvre" reports that the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission discussed the Lausanne Treaty on 13th February.

No decisions were of course taken, as the treaty is still under consideration in the Chamber. I learn, however, that M. Henry de Jouvenel and M. Bompard urged its rapid ratification. I am told that the commission was on the whole in favour of this, though M. Victor Berard argued that France had made big concessions to Turkey, and that he was afraid of the results of further concessions, so far as French prestige in the East was concerned. I understand that, in reply to this argument, M. de Jouvenel urged that these concessions might be the starting point of a policy useful for French interests, which could only be satisfied if there were friendly relations between France and Turkey.

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[**E 1512/109/44**] No. 32.

*Mr. Bentinck to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 18.)

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Athens, February* 8, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 809 of the 10th October last, I have the honour to report that, according to the press, the statistics compiled by the Mixed Commission for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in accordance with the Convention of Lausanne of the 30th January, 1923, and which commenced operations on the 22nd November last, show that up to the 5th instant 56,917 Moslems were transported to Turkey after having completed, in the presence of the Mixed Sub-Commission, the necessary formalities for the liquidation of their goods. The above total is reached as follows:—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| From Salonica | 36,402 | have been | transported. |
| „ Candia | 6,659 | „ | „ |
| „ Canea | 3,547 | „ | „ |
| „ Drama | 3,254 | „ | „ |
| „ Cavalla | 7,055 | „ | „ |

The measures taken by the commission give every reason to hope that the transport of these Mussulmans will follow a normal course during the next few weeks.

2. Thanks to the efforts of a Mr. Jacquith, of the American Near East Relief Society, several thousands of males of Greek race and military hostages are at last being transported to Greece to join their families, or to swell the ranks of the halt and maimed beggars who parade the streets of Athens and Salonica.

3. From an Epirote Deputy, considered to be a trustworthy and moderate man, a member of my staff learnt that out of 11,472 Moslem inhabitants of the district of Philiataes-Goumenitsa, 9,560 recently declared themselves as Turks and as hostile to the Albanians, with whom they wished to have nothing to do, whilst 1,912 declared that they were Albanians. These declarations were made to a commission appointed three or four months ago by the Governor-General of Epirus, and were confirmed to a second commission, appointed direct by the Greek Government. This informant stated that the people in question were aware that if they declared themselves to be Turks they would be included in the exchange of populations, but they asserted that they wished to go to Asia Minor. This gentleman, who has many friends among these Moslems, endeavoured to persuade them to declare themselves Albanians and so to remain in Epirus, but they refused. He was not able to state definitely what the 6,000–7,000 Moslems who inhabit the Paramythia District had decided to do, but thought it probable that they would also elect to leave Epirus. He put the total Moslem population of Epirus at 24,000 or less.



4. The same gentleman said that it was universally believed in Epirus that the murderers of the Italian mission were Albanians, and he thought it probable that as soon as the incident had become forgotten the murderers would be discovered in Albania.

(Copy to Constantinople, No. 4.)

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

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[**E 1478/467/44**] No. 33.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 18.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 11 1924.

THE Prime Minister of Australia, accompanied by Major-General Sir Fabian Ware, vice-chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission, arrived at Constantinople on the 6th instant. The Turkish authorities had arranged for all the necessary facilities to be granted to him, and he was, I understand, welcomed at the frontier by a representative of the Vali of Adrianople.

2. Mr. Bruce spent the day sightseeing, and the Old Seraglio was specially thrown open by the Turkish authorities for his benefit I also arranged for Sir Fabian Ware, together with Colonel Hughes, the director of the Imperial War Graves Commission at Kilia, to have an interview with Dr. Adnan Bey, who showed them every civility. In the evening I entertained Mr. Bruce to dinner at His Majesty's Embassy.

3. H.M.S. "Calypso," Captain C. S. Scott, arrived at Constantinople at 8 A.M. on the following morning, and, after exchanging the usual salutes with the Turkish shore batteries, anchored off Haidar Pasha. I took Mr. Bruce and his party off in the Embassy launch "Makook," and accompanied them in the "Calypso" down to Kilia, which we reached about 6 o'clock in the evening.

4. The 8th February was spent in visiting the cemeteries of the Cape Helles area, and the 9th February those of Anzac and Suvla. In the two and a half days that he was down at Kilia, Mr. Bruce managed to inspect every single cemetery throughout the peninsula.

5. Mr. Bruce's pilgrimage and the circumstances which attended it, more particularly the placing at his disposal for the purpose of a British warship, are likely to produce the very best effect. The visit will have brought home to the Turks the imperial aspect of these cemeteries and the very deep and fervent interest taken by Australia and New Zealand in the graves of the members of their first expeditionary forces. The experience which the Turkish army had of the Australian and New Zealand troops during the war is, indeed, not calculated to encourage it to risk a second encounter with them. It was not without significance that the kaïmakam of Gallipoli—who asked for an interview with Mr. Bruce, Sir F. Ware and myself on the Saturday—informed us that he had recently received definite instructions from Angora to facilitate in every way the work of the commission.

6. I trust that this declaration of good intention may prove sincere and lasting, and that Mr. Bruce's observations to the kaïmakam will be faithfully reported to Angora. There is, however, a factor to be reckoned with, namely, a hitherto ineradicable conviction among the Turks, and not only among them, that the cemeteries are a cloak for ulterior and sinister designs. In conversation with me, Adnan Bey has more than once somewhat shamefacedly referred to these suspicions. In rebutting them I have suggested that those who hold them should go down and see for themselves. In speaking to the kaïmakam I expressed the hope that Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself would inspect the cemeteries once the work on them had been finally completed. I am of opinion that an official visit to them by the President, who himself fought on the peninsula, would, if it can be arranged at some later date, be of real value.

7. Mr. Bruce left Kilia on the 10th instant on board H.M.S. "Calypso," for Port Said. I returned myself by the Khedivial steamship "Fezara" on the same day to Constantinople. Sir F. Ware was to remain at Kilia a few days longer, in order to have an opportunity of a more detailed inspection.

8. I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity of a personal visit to Kilia to pay a warm tribute to the excellence of the work which, in spite of climatic and other difficulties, and of Turkish distrust and sometimes open obstructiveness, has been and is being performed by Colonel Hughes and the other members of the commission on

the peninsula. Colonel Hughes is himself a most efficient and capable officer, with great driving power and initiative. He has, moreover, established with the Turks on Gallipoli those excellent personal relations which are indispensable if the work is to be carried on without interruption.

9. I was much impressed by the arrangement of the cemeteries and the simplicity and good taste of the designs. They constitute in this south-eastern highway of Europe a wonderful memorial of the magnitude of the rôle played by the British Empire in the great war.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[**E 1480/640/44**] No. 34.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 18.)

(No. 120.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 13, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 28 of the 7th January last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna regarding the methods employed by the Turks to exclude the foreigner from occupations of different kinds in that town.

2. In connection with the remarks made by Mr. Edmonds, in paragraph 3 of this despatch, on the subject of interference with foreign activities in the port, I have the honour to inform you that my Italian colleague recently told Mr. Henderson that he had received reports from Kerasun, Ordu and Trebizond that the Turkish authorities were trying, by various more or less subterranean methods, to prevent merchants from employing those allied shipping companies which are privileged to continue in the cabotage trade.

3. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce at Trebizond had received a semi-official telegram from Angora, giving instructions that the principal Moslem merchants should be invited to sign a declaration that they would only use ships flying the Turkish flag for the transportation of their goods from one Turkish port to another. Most of the important Turkish local business men, except the cattle-dealers are reported to have signed such a declaration.

4. According to M. Maissa's information, the word had also been passed round unofficially at Kerasun and Ordu that goods destined for other Turkish ports should be transported in Turkish ships.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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Enclosure in No. 34.

*Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.*

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Smyrna, February* 2, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that the movement for preventing foreigners from finding occupation in this district seems to be growing stronger. It is a persistent process of "freezing-out" by legitimate or illegal means, and is prompted, firstly, by a desire to provide work for Turks, and secondly, I think, by anxiety to limit the chances of future European intervention here by limiting European interests.

2. The movement is particularly directed against workmen and small employees of all kinds. Public utility companies (*e.g.*, the Aidin Railway), far from being able to engage foreigners, are having gradually to dismiss those already in their employ. European engine-drivers, for instance, are liable to be threatened by armed men at lonely spots on the line. Turkish workmen employed in a factory will either threaten the life of a European fellow-workman or else go on strike until he leaves. Two Maltese have lately been per force dismissed by the Aidin Railway on this account, and three Maltese, for whom the Anglo-Oriental Romaneasca Petroleum Company had promised employment, were too scared by the company's Turkish workmen to appear. The Public Debt Administration and the Quay company have also had to discharge Maltese employees. The police are trying to prevent a Maltese from landing who has a Turkish visa and wants to take up a post in a factory.



3. The prohibition against foreign stevedores and tally-clerks (mentioned in my despatch No. 1 of the 4th ultimo) is still enforced. A ship agent can still only get a permit for one foreign employee to visit ships however many vessels he may have in harbour at the same. No foreign ship-chandlers are yet allowed to visit ships in port. These unjustifiable measures against ship-agents greatly hamper British shipping, and the equally illegal prohibition against stevedores, tally-clerks and ship-chandlers has thrown many Maltese out of work. I am continuing to press the authorities, but I have very little hope of effecting anything. The Italian consulate-general has been encouraging Italians thus thrown out of work to go to the Dodecanese.

4. No permits for the return of refugees now at Malta has been given since I reported on this matter in my despatch No. 171 of the 20th December last. So far as I can make out, the applications for the return of Maltese, which I now make, are immediately shelved. While this is contrary to the desire of His Majesty's Government for the return here of the refugees at Malta, it is no great misfortune for the Maltese themselves, for, (as reported in my despatch No. 7 of the 17th ultimo), they could not expect to find work here. The Aidin Railway Company has given up hope of getting permits for the return of employees who are in Malta, and has been obliged to discharge them all.

5. So far no very great pressure seems to have been brought on foreign companies to become Turkish. But they are unable to take on foreign workmen, and have some difficulty in employing foreign clerks. Lighter owners here have been forced to sell their lighters, either *bonâ fide*, or fictitiously to Turks, and in one case where the genuineness of a sale was suspected, the lightermen struck. Private firms are less affected. They are able to employ foreigners, and foreign business men do not have difficulty in coming here and, if they want to, settling down.

6. In their policy of keeping out the foreigner, the authorities are supported by the ex-officers' association and by various workmen's guilds which now exist. Although agricultural wages up-country are reported now to have fallen below subsistence level, in Smyrna, while large numbers of Turks are unemployed and half-starving, wages remain very high. The Turks who want work are unable to do it. Those who have work do it indifferently, insist on high wages, and keep the unemployed out. It is perhaps surprising that after the expulsion of the native Christians, and with the present restrictions on foreigners, the economic life of the place is not much feebler than it is. But it is a question whether the present policy is not suicidal. No one here seems to think that the Turks can by themselves bring this rich district back to reasonable prosperity. If they are too frightened to admit the foreigner on reasonable terms to-day, they may only hasten the day when he will come on his own terms.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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[**E 1482/1482/44**] No. 35.

*Colonel Baird to Mr. Henderson.*—(*Enclosure in Constantinople despatch No.* 124 *of February* 13; *Received February* 18.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February* 11, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 4th February I paid a visit to Fevzi Pasha, Chief of the Turkish General Staff. The latter had already been some weeks in Constantinople, but various suggestions made at intervals to Shukri Naili Pasha by myself, as well as by some of my colleagues, that we should like him to arrange for us to go and call on the marshal had met with the usual promises that this would be arranged, and the usual, *i.e.*, negative result. Neither I nor any of my colleagues had as yet succeeded in seeing Fevzi Pasha. On my last visit to Shukri Naili Pasha I had mentioned the matter again, and the latter, after expressing very well simulated, if not genuine, surprise at my not having yet brought off this call, had immediately telephoned to Fevzi Pasha in my presence (forgetting perhaps that he had previously told me that he could not telephone to him direct), and had there and then arranged my present visit.

2. I found Fevzi Pasha at his private residence in Kadikeuy apparently enjoying, as the press had given out that he was doing, some well-earned leave in the bosom of his family.

3. The marshal, who was in mufti, received me in a small and very simply furnished sitting room, next door to which, as was rather painfully obvious throughout my call, one of the younger members of his family was having her music lesson, whilst others seemed to be taking it in turn to gape at their father's visitor through a convenient break in the glass panel of the door.

4. After a few preliminary remarks about the weather, &c., I drew the conversation to the forthcoming visit of some Turkish officers to England, for the purpose of seeing our musketry and artillery schools, and mentioned that the British Government had at once expressed its readiness to receive these officers and give them all facilities, but that in order to facilitate the arrangements for the visit, the War Office had asked for some further details, including the date of the probable arrival of the party in England. A request for these details simultaneously with the announcement that the visit would be acceptable had been forwarded by you through the appropriate channels over a month ago, but no reply had yet been received. The marshal, whilst evidently pleased that the visit was to come off, and apparently anxious that it should do so, seemed to see nothing remarkable, much less discourteous in this delay. He merely remarked in an encouraging tone, "Peut-être vous aurez une réponse bientôt!" I then drew his attention to the difficulty in which I and my colleagues, of whom I was the senior, and I could speak for them all, found ourselves, owing to the absence from Constantinople of any representative of the Turkish Ministry of Defence, to whom we could turn for official information such as was always made readily available to military attachés in other countries—such information for example as the peace organisation, &c., of the Turkish army. The marshal agreed that we ought to have such information, but pointed out, of course, that everything was now centred at Angora, an obvious hint that that was the place in which information should be sought. However, on my remarking that there were difficulties in the way of my going there at present, and on my asking whether the marshal himself could not give me, or let one of his officers give me, such simple items of information as were obviously not of a confidential nature, he readily agreed to do so. I accordingly arranged to pay him a second visit before his departure for Angora, when I would bring him a list of the information I desired.

5. During our further conversation, in the course of which the marshal's manner expanded into almost cordial affability, I gathered the following information:—

(*a.*) Mustafa Kemal is still Commander-in-chief of the army. The law appointing him so had been passed before his election to the Presidency of the Republic, and had never been repealed. It was, however, likely that his dual appointment would in due course be abolished, and another Commander-in-chief appointed.

(*b.*) The appointments held by Kiazim Kara Bekir, Ali Fuad and Djevad Pashas were army inspectorates and not army commands, as frequently but incorrectly stated in the press. Their headquarters were at Angora, Konia and Sivas respectively.

Kiazim Kara Bekir had been specially selected for the western inspectorate, and the others for their respective inspectorates, because they had not previously held commands in those areas, and it was desirable that each of them should be acquinted with the various fronts, so as to be able to take command efficiently on any front on which hostilities might break out.

(*c.*) The army was now on a peace footing, and most units were already in what was intended to be their peace stations. One or two divisions, whose peace stations would be at places like Trebizond, Kars and Erzeroum, had temporarily and exceptionally been kept in the west as the winter was not a suitable time to carry out the moves to their proper stations.

(*d.*) The reason why some divisions with such high numbers as the 41st, 57th and 61st still existed was, that during the great war, when a division became exhausted, instead of filling it up with reserves, a new division was formed, so that by the end of the war a very high number had been reached, without this meaning in the least that divisions up to that number actually existed as fighting formations.

When the campaign against the Greeks took place, certain of the divisions with high numbers still existed in suitable strength. These had therefore been maintained and kept up, and, in the case of the three he had mentioned, they had still been maintained under the present peace organisation, and the regiments comprising them had kept their original numbers. The lower numbered divisions, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., had, however,



been reorganised, and I rather gathered, though this was not expressly stated, that this reorganisation was still going on.

(*e.*) The problem of finding employment for ex-officers now surplus to establishment was, as in every other country, a difficult one. It was hoped to solve it by finding work for them as gymnastic instructors and teachers in various grades of schools and the universities. A great number of them would also be employed in connection with the construction of the many railways, which, as no doubt I knew, the Turkish Government intended to build in Anatolia.

(*f.*) Angora was quite an agreeable place. The lack of accommodation was rapidly being made good. A hundred new houses had already been built, and 200 more would soon be ready. On my remarking that I had heard that it was rather bleak and short of trees, to give shade in summer or shelter in winter, the marshal admitted that this was so, but quite a number had recently been planted.

6. Field-Marshal Fevzi Pasha speaks French fairly fluently, looks about 50 years of age, is of good physique though rather on the stout side and of average height. He looks like a man who has the courage of his opinions and plenty of determination to carry them out.

I have, &c.
A. W. F. BAIRD,
*Military Attaché.*

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[**E 1486/145/44**] No. 36.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 18.)

(No. 129.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 13, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that Colonel Mougin, nominally the representative at Angora of the French High Commissioner for Syria, returned to that capital a few days ago.

2. When Colonel Mougin left Angora at the end of last year it was confidently anticipated that he would be replaced by a representative with a less pronounced pro-Turk bias. Colonel Mougin's activities in Anatolia have, in fact, for long been regarded with great dissatisfaction by the French High Commission, which was not only unable to place any confidence in his reports owing to their infatuated and partisan nature, but was also keenly alive to the prejudice which was being caused to French interests and prestige by Colonel Mougin's excessive and undignified subserviency to the Turks. It was an open secret that on this account General Pellé, as well as the Acting French High Commissioner, had strongly urged upon the French Government the necessity for his recall.

3. It was consequently with no little relief that M. Jessé Curély confirmed last month to Mr. Henderson the report which had appeared here in the press that Colonel Mougin was to be succeeded by a Colonel Catroux. The cancellation of the latter appointment has caused considerable dismay.

4. Mr. Henderson has been informed by a member of the French High Commission that this abrupt modification of its previous decision by the French Government was entirely due to the intervention of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who had apparently insisted, for reasons best known to himself, on Colonel Mougin's return to Angora. It can be taken for granted that these reasons are not unconnected with M. Franklin-Bouillon's financial ventures. But, however that may be, the French High Commissioner undoubtedly resents a decision which must be regarded as a slap in the face for General Pellé and as a sacrifice made by M. Poincaré on the altar of internal politics.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

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[E 1696/448/44] No. 37.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 25.)

(No. 136.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 19, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that, arriving here on the 12th instant, I lost no time in establishing contact with the Turkish Government by paying a visit to Dr. Adnan Bey, and he returned my call shortly afterwards. Our conversations on these two occasions were almost entirely formal and complimentary, the only matter of business touched upon being the ratification by His Majesty's Government of the Treaty of Lausanne, to which the Turkish public are looking forward with much interest. Adnan Bey remarked that all the other Powers, including Italy, who could ratify at any moment by decree, were only waiting in this matter for His Majesty's Government to give them a lead; he therefore hoped that action in the British Parliament would not be long delayed, not merely because Turkey would thereby the sooner obtain a satisfaction, but also because he hoped that Great Britain would earn the prestige that must accrue to the Power who would first act. I told Adnan Bey that but for the chances of domestic policy His Majesty's Government would in all probability have ratified long ago, and I repeated to him what you had said to me—that the necessary Bill would be discussed in the House of Commons as soon as ever the pressure of urgent business would allow of the allotment of a day. Adnan Bey himself is too sensible to be under any real misapprehensions on this subject, but the Turkish public is too suspicious to feel at ease until ratification is an accomplished fact.

2. I was also asked to give interviews to the Constantinople press, and I thought it well to accede. I therefore received successively representatives of the "Tanin," because it is the best edited and most influential journal here; of the "Wakt," because it asked, and of the "Watan," in spite of its violent Anglophobia, because it is sometimes a good thing to hold a candle to the devil. The young journalists I saw put into my mouth many inaccuracies and ineptitudes, but they allowed me to evade awkward questions, and their errors were all on the amiable side. I do not trouble you with the texts either of these interviews or of the few editorial comments that have been made on my somewhat commonplace declarations; but I think that the press is attaching an undue importance to the fact of my arriving here so soon after your own advent to office, and, inspired doubtless by the hope of favours to come, has adopted a tone of reserved friendliness towards Great Britain. I do not imagine that this tendency would survive any disappointment over ratification or Mosul.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 1752/1752/44] No. 38.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 25, 1924.

MY despatch No. 136.

When I first saw Adnan on 14th February I asked him to arrange an interview for me with Caliph. He was obviously embarrassed, rather deprecated suggestion, but finally agreed. I to-day asked what he had done, and he answered quite frankly that according to his confidential instructions from Angora some changes in these matters were contemplated and that in the meanwhile visits to Caliph by political personages would not be favourably regarded. I said that in view of this I would not press my request, but that considering the interest of Mahommedans throughout the Empire in Caliphate and views as to His Majesty's position originally taken by Turkish Government I should like it to be clear that I had wished to pay my respects. Adnan said that there was no objection to my informing you confidentially.

His information was by no means surprising as indications have been multiplying in the last few days that something is about to happen. Old-fashioned methods are practically out of the question, but some form of internment in Anatolia is likely with, at the very least, a diminution of his status. Action may now take place almost at any moment. Of course nothing could be done to help Caliph even if it were desirable.

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[E 1701/32/44] No. 39.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 142.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 20, 1924.

THE fortnight which has elapsed since the date of Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 104 of the 6th February has been marked by the same absence of striking developments in the Turkish political situation as the period reviewed in that despatch. There have again been a certain number of minor portents which are worth recording.

2. The Court of Independence disappeared unostentatiously from Constantinople within a few days of the termination of the abortive conspiracy trial which ended on the 5th February. The whole business was finally liquidated by the Grand National Assembly on the 13th February when it was unanimously decided to pardon the three persons convicted by the court, namely, Lutfi Fikri Bey, the "khoja" Ibrahim Edhem, and the lighterman Ali Osman.

3. Nothing has been disclosed as to what passed between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Constantinople editors at the four hours' interview which he gave them on the 4th February. On the following day the Pasha entertained the journalists at dinner and speeches were delivered. These speeches have been published, but are of no great interest, except that Jahid Bey, the spokesman of the journalists, seems to have hinted pretty plainly that if the President wished for the support of the press, he must treat it with consideration. I enclose a copy of a despatch from Mr. Edmonds giving the gist of the speeches and other particulars of the editors' pilgrimage.

4. Indications subsequent to the return of the journalists to Constantinople make it probable that Mustafa Kemal, whose intention of entering on a definite new phase of his career is increasingly clear, secured on certain terms the support of the leading editors. What those terms may have been is still a matter of surmise, but it seems probable that the support to be accorded is personal to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and does not extend to Ismet Pasha's Government. It is indeed suggested in some quarters that the President has already decided to discard Ismet Pasha and to give the Opposition leaders, including the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress, a place in his next combination.

5. Be that as it may, the note struck by the principal editors in the leading articles in which they recorded their impressions of their journey was one of loyalty to the President and the Republic combined with insistence on the crying need for better Government. "Had the editorial columns of the 'Tanin,'" says Jahid Bey in his leading article in that paper of the 8th February, "contained articles written by his Excellency the Ghazi Pasha, my readers would undoubtedly have found in them writings far more courageous than my own. But what Cabinet is to give effect to these ideas? What a pity it is that I see the Ghazi Pasha so luckless as regards his comrades in idea, resolution and will."

6. It is not difficult to see a connection between the reception of the journalists by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the gathering of military leaders at Smyrna, a report on which, by my military attaché, is enclosed in my despatch No. 146 of the 20th February. It is as natural that in constructing a new basis for his future activity, the Pasha should seek to assure himself of the support of the army as to placate the press. Rumours of disaffection towards him in high military quarters have long been rife and it may safely be assumed that one of the objects, if not the principal object, of collecting round him at this moment practically all the officers holding commands is to arrive at such an understanding with them as will enable him to count upon them and their troops in any contingency. It is noteworthy that at the outset of the proceedings on the 15th February, the President asked Ismet Pasha for a statement on the political situation of the world generally and the foreign situation in Turkey in particular, and that, after Ismet Pasha had spoken for over an hour, the staff officers present were requested to withdraw in order to leave their superiors free to engage in a secret discussion which lasted three hours.

7. I learn indirectly that when the editors visited him at Smyrna, Mustafa Kemal evinced a feeling towards the Caliphate which could only be described as hatred. This, taken in conjunction with the statement published unofficially that he contemplates a tour in the spring which will include Constantinople, suggests the possibility that he may have in mind action designed to diminish still further

the position of the Caliph, as for instance his removal from Constantinople. The situation would certainly be a delicate one if the President of the Republic came here and had to decide what should be his attitude towards a Caliph, in residence, more especially as the attack on His Majesty mentioned in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 104 of the 6th February has been followed up by others of a less offensive, but equally insidious character. It has been suggested that no member of the ex-Imperial family, other than the Caliph himself, should be granted an allowance from the Treasury, that His Majesty should lead a simple life and be content with one palace, and that the titles of honour still given to other members of the family should be discontinued. There was quite a breeze in the Assembly on the 9th February over the use of those titles in the budget estimates.

8. In this connection I would draw attention to an interview with Mustafa Kemal which recently appeared in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" and to which prominence was given in all the important Constantinople papers of the 11th February. In this interview the Pasha held language regarding the Caliphate the trend of which it is difficult to follow, if it be read by itself, but which appears to have been equally intended to discredit the Caliphate at home and to exonerate Turkey from the suspicion of wishing to use it for pan-Islamic purposes abroad. I have not seen the original of the article, but the Turkish papers state definitely that the interview was given before the proclamation of the republic and that it has appeared in Paris.

9. The Constitutional Committee of the Assembly has continued its labours and has produced the draft of a new Fundamental Law, consisting of about 100 articles, which is expected soon to be laid before the Assembly. Some stir has been created by the proposal that all non-foreign inhabitants of Turkey should be called Turks and should enjoy equal rights, irrespective of creed. At least two Constantinople Turkish papers criticise this suggestion adversely. One of them, the ultra-Islamic "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," in its issue of the 16th February, attacks the proposal with characteristic violence, on the ground that it is not fair to assimilate the poisonous non-Moslem elements to the Moslem inhabitants, who are alone entitled to be called Turks. In other circles, it is not thought that the use of a common name for Moslem and non-Moslem citizens will of itself be much more efficacious than similar provisions in previous constitutional measures since 1839. Nevertheless, it must in fairness be said that papers like the "Tanin" advocate a more generous and rational attitude towards non-Moslems than has been observed of late, and the proposed wording of the new law is of some value as indicating that responsible people at Angora are inclined, at least in principle, to subscribe to this moderate view.

10. It is anticipated that Ismet Pasha will return to Angora towards the end of the present week. According to the latest unofficial reports, he and Mustafa Kemal, with various other persons, who have attended the military conference at Smyrna, will probably return together, on the 23rd February. In any case, Mustafa Kemal is expected to return before the 1st March, when he will presumably open in person the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly for the new financial year. Altogether, what with the imminent discussions on the budget and the new Constitution, and the return to activity of Mustafa Kemal, there can hardly fail to be important developments in the near future. It remains to be seen what the attitude of Ismet Pasha's opponents will be. On the 12th February, Ismail Djambolat and Reouf Beys created an incident in the Assembly by alleging that letters addressed to them had been opened in the post. Three days were allowed for an enquiry, at the end of which time the Minister of the Interior seems to have had little difficulty in satisfying the Assembly that there had been no irregularity. The approved explanation of any apparent tampering with letters appears to be that, if opened at all, they are opened in Jugoslavia, and that, for the rest, letters would be less likely to arrive open if the senders used stationery prepared with better gum.

11. An indication that the Opposition, so far as it is an Opposition to Mustafa Kemal, has either been squared or intimidated, is afforded by the fact that Reouf Bey left Angora rather unexpectedly on the 18th February. He is reported to be going to Carlsbad for reasons of health, but there is also some talk of his having been entrusted with a mission which will take him, in due course, to Berlin, Paris, and possibly London. Some little time earlier, a hint was given that discipline was to be maintained in the People's party by the expulsion from it of one Murad Bey, Deputy for Adalia, because he had criticised a decision of the party, apparently the resolution in favour of increasing the salary of Deputies.



12. I have mentioned in a separate despatch the Turkish attitude towards Great Britain, as manifested on the occasion of my own arrival here as the first representative appointed by the new British Government. As regards France, there was a violent, though brief, press campaign on the 6th February and the following days, arising out of the report that the French Government intended to make their ratification of the Peace Treaty dependent on their obtaining satisfaction regarding French schools in Turkey. The "Ileri," of the 10th February, published an interview with the French representative here, in which he sought to attenuate the seriousness of the controversy. This elicited a further protestation in the same paper, on the 12th February, that no privileges could be granted to French schools. Since then little more has been heard of the matter, possibly because of the return of Colonel Mougin to Angora, and an assurance by him, in an interview in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié," of the 12th February, that the treaty will be ratified in March, have encouraged the hope that the French Government will ratify without imposing conditions.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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Enclosure in No. 39.

*Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.*

(No. 19.)
Sir,

*Smyrna, February* 9, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to report that very little is known of the doings of the President of the Republic here. At the middle of last month, the newspapers, for a few days, reported his movements. This was perhaps to give the lie to Greek reports that he had been seriously wounded. On the 14th January, the press stated that "our beloved President, our great deliverer" got into an ordinary tram, then rode through the Turkish quarters on the slopes of Mount Pagus and returned home by car. The language in which this information was conveyed seemed mildly ironical. On the previous day he received members of the municipality; on the 16th January he visited the industrial school, and on the 27th January he drove with Latifa Hanum through the eastern outskirts of the town.

2. The press gave great prominence to the visit of the Constantinople journalists. Some of their local colleagues, and Haidar Bey, Deputy for Denizli, and Shukri Kaya Bey, Deputy for Mentesha, went some way up the Cassaba line to meet them. The Vali of Magnesia and notables at other places seem to have greeted them *en route*. On arrival at Cordelio, Dr. Nazim, the Committee of Union and Progress leader, presented them with a laurel branch, but when they reached Smyrna, the local authorities were conspicuous by their absence. Next day the press published articles by certain of them. The theme of Subhi Nuri Bey, of the "Ileri," was: "We have won the war, but our present position is precarious. Our great Ghazi will give us guidance and inspiration." Ahmed Emin, of the "Vatan," wrote: "We have come to see the President and to get into touch with opinion and to remove understandings." The keynote of Husein Jahid's article was: "We do not hate, but pity, those who restrict the freedom of the press. Moreover, we want to convince them that they are wrong." Mehmet Asim, of the "Vakt," avoided the real issue. The gist of his article was: "Our glorious armies drove out the Greek, but we have to restore devastated Smyrna. Foreign Powers failed us during the armistice. We shall, therefore, employ our own means and only use foreign capital as additional help." Similarly, Ahmet Jevdet, of the "Ikdam," confined himself to saying little more than: "We have to restore our stricken country. Officials, private persons, all of us, must work hard and quickly."

3. Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the Constantinople journalists on the 4th February, the day after their arrival. Velid Bey alone, the papers stated, was not received, and that because he had given out in the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" that anyone could be received for the asking. The President received the journalists again on the evening of the 5th, presented them to Latifa Hanum, and kept them to dinner—a function which was official enough for the band of the guard to perform. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's speech was reported as follows:—

"Gentlemen, I am pleased to see the esteemed leaders of the press of the Turkish Republic together here and to be seated at the same table with them.

A very great revolution has taken place. This revolution has been carried out in the name of the safety of the nation and in the name of right. Our nation, by establishing a democratic Government, has conquered the enemy's armies and has saved the fatherland from invasion. The victories of our glorious armies in the field have borne fruit in the domain of politics. The new Government of Turkey, after showing its quality by deeds and by successes, made its name known to the whole world, thus making clear what its nature it. Contrary to what some people have alleged, it has proved that it is not hesitating and has no intention of going backwards. A republican era has opened in Turkish history.

"Gentlemen, the spirit of the nation, which was thought to be embodied in the Sultan, has been brought to life again, although the Sultan's crown and throne have been smashed to pieces. Relying on the reawakening of the nation and on the nation's desire for progress and development, and fully confident of the nation's determination, we shall fulfil all the functions of a republic.

"Comrades, the Turkish press should form a castle of steel, a castle of thought and intellect, around the republic, which is the real voice of the nation and the manifestation of its will. The republic is entitled to claim this from the leaders of the press.

"It is imperative that the whole nation should be honestly united and equal The safety and happiness of the country depend on this. The struggle is not over. It is the duty, the most important duty, of the press to convey this truth to the ear and the conscience of the nation.

"Gentlemen, we must admit that the world still needs enlightenment about New Turkey, about the Turkish Republic. We must show by irrefutable proofs that our enlightened and progressive compatriots in particular have set themselves this task.

"Those who are working in various ways for the national cause must help one another, and must compose their difficulties in such a way that they will succeed in reaching the common goal. We know that we are faced by many difficulties and questions. We shall examine them all, and with determination, with faith and with the unshakable strength of patriotism we shall settle them all—that patriotism which, in spite of all, is an unquenchable strength and fire within us."

4. To this Jahid Bey is reported to have replied that he found it hard to believe he was not in a dream. Everything they had longed for since the Hamidian régime had come about. And it had all been accomplished by the determination of the people and by the devotion of a national leader and deliverer. Jahid Bey said that he was going to devote himself to remedying the present position of the press. They had, as the Ghazi Pasha said, made a castle round the republic, and it was of something even stronger than steel. But unfortunately there were sometimes misunderstandings. not about their objectives and principles, but about their words. However, in principle there was no difference between them. Freedom was won by violence, but could be kept only by a considerate and generous indulgence, and not by getting angry. He was happy to see this exemplified in the Ghazi Pasha. He then drank to the health of the President and Latifa Hanum.

5. The above is all that is known of the visit of the Constantinople journalists. What its real significance may be is here only a matter of speculation. Yesterday Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his wife went by special train to Aya Soluk, where Mahmud Essad Bey, the former Minister of Public Economy, entertained them at his farm. The President, who wore stockings, patent leather ankle-boots and spurs, took an escort of thirty cavalry with him. The railway bridges and level crossings were guarded. The party included Colonel Tewfik Bey (the delegate for the Mosul negotiations), Harun Alitcheh Bey and Shukri Kaya Bey. They went by car through Scala Nova to Sokia and returned last night. The Pasha looks unhealthy, but those who saw him a year ago notice no difference in him now. He seems to be alert in both body and mind. It is announced that Ismet Pasha will leave Angora on the 11th instant in order to take part in a war game here, and that he will leave Smyrna with Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 20th February.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

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[**E 1633/448/44**] No. 40.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay* (*Constantinople*).

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 27, 1924.

BILL to give His Majesty's Government power to carry out obligations of peace settlement was introduced in Parliament on 20th February.

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[**E 1863/1752/44**] No. 41.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received February* 29.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 29, 1924.

MY telegram No. 33.

Situation is developing rapidly on general lines indicated in my despatch No. 166, which should reach you on 2nd March. It seems to be definitely intended to expel from Turkey Caliph and male members of his family.

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[**E 1713/202/44**] No. 42.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir Odo Russell* (*Vatican*).

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February* 29, 1924.

YOUR despatches Nos. 21 and 24 of 19th and 20th February: French protectorate over Catholics in the East; liturgical honours in Palestine.

Please inform Cardinal Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government do not and cannot recede in any way from point of view repeatedly expressed by them and recently explained by Cardinal Bourne. They attach highest importance to early despatch of instructions to Catholic authorities in Palestine to discontinue liturgical honours hitherto paid to French representatives. French note of August 1922 dealt with entire question of French protectorate in the East, and no reply has hitherto been sent, since His Majesty's Government have been awaiting re-establishment of peace in Near East to reach general settlement of whole question. His Majesty's Government cannot accept French contention that question of liturgical honours in Palestine is still under negotiation between two Governments.

You should also use in conversation with his Eminence every argument you consider suitable to expose preposterous character of French contention that liturgical honours or any similar privileges can continue after protectorate has lapsed. It is important that French claim be definitely disposed of without further delay. Good faith of all parties is involved in holding France to her solemn undertaking and in making final settlement which justice and common sense demand.

Copies of 1922 correspondence will be sent to you in due course.

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[**E 1907/109/44**] No. 43.

*Mr. Bentinck to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 116.)
Sir, *Athens, February* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 89 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that Tewfik Rachid Bey, the head of the Turkish delegation on the Commission for the Exchange of Populations, recently gave an interview to the Greek press, in which he expressed the opinion that good progress was being made. He said that he estimated that there were still some 400,000 Turks to be removed from Greece, 70,000 having already been transported to Turkey. Hardly any remained in the Greek islands, and those would be evacuated before the end of the month. Those who remained were to be found in Epirus and in large numbers in Western Macedonia. Every precaution was being taken to protect these populations from infectious diseases.

2. Some 7,000 males had already been enabled to rejoin their families. There remained some 150,000 Greeks to transport, most of them being concentrated at Constantinople, Chatalja, Trebizond, Samsoun, Koniah and Cesarea. These, he said, would be brought after May, there being, as I understand, no room for them until the

Turks have left the country. Rachid Bey added that he thought the commission would finish their labours this year. I do not think this optimistic view is shared by the other members.

3. In view of the very active propaganda which the Turks have all along made out of the alleged hardships undergone by the Moslems in Greece, it is interesting to record that Tewfik made very mild references to their undoubted and largely inevitable sufferings, and that, whilst blaming the local authorities, he exonerated the Greek Government.

4. He added that the commission had a very painful duty to perform in uprooting all these people. It was, he said, a duty which would go far to make for better relations between the two countries, and the exchange was in fact the only possible basis on which Græco-Turkish friendship could rest. He added: "I am only giving voice to the sentiments inspiring my Government in saying that we attach great importance to the consolidation of the closest and most friendly relations with the Royal Government."

5. In this connection I may observe that certain American philanthropic societies are reported to have notified the Ministry of Relief that at Kechan, in Asia Minor, 600 Greek families are absolutely destitute. At Mersina 200 persons are waiting to be transported to Greece, whilst at Cesarea about 40,000 Greeks are in a precarious condition.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

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[**E 1901/32/44**] No. 44.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 162.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 26, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 142 of the 20th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the draft Turkish Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Committee of the Grand National Assembly.* This translation appeared on the 19th February and the following days in the French edition of the "Tanin," a new journalistic venture of Jahid Bey's.

2. Many of the proposals embodied in the draft will probably be hotly debated in the Assembly, unless, indeed, the yare first submitted to the People's party for consideration. This procedure has been resorted to in more than one recent instance, but there has been no suggestion so far that it will be applied in the case of the draft Constitution. When used, it is a considerable weapon in the hands of the Angora leaders, because practically every Deputy is a member of the party, no one has hitherto been willing to ban it by his own act, and it is a rule that decisions taken by a majority of the party must receive the support of all its members in the Assembly.

3. The following points in the draft Constitution merit special attention:—

There is no mention of the Caliph except in the one article which disqualifies him and all members of his family for membership of the Grand National Assembly. This omission is the more noteworthy as it was laid down in the Constitution of 1876 that the Caliphate was vested in the person of the Sultan of Turkey, and when in 1922 the Sultanate was abolished it was expressly stated that the Caliphate was vested in the House of Osman, that the Caliph was to be elected from among the members of that House by the Grand National Assembly, and that the Turkish State was "the support of the Caliphate."

4. No distinction of sex is made in the articles defining the qualifications for the vote for membership of the Assembly or for Turkish citizenship. It can hardly be assumed that this means the enfranchisement of women, but it is quite probably intended to leave the question open.

5. There is no provision for a Senate or a Council of State. There is, however, a growing feeling in favour of both, especially a Council of State, and the question of instituting such bodies is likely to be broached in the course of the debates.

6. Otherwise the draft shows considerable signs of what may be described as a conservative tendency. The fiction that all power, executive, legislative and judicial, is vested in the Assembly, and is exercised by that body through suitable persons of its own choice, practically disappears. The executive, once brought into existence, is

* Not printed.



invested with considerable powers. They include the right of ordering new elections, the right of referring back legislation, with the important stipulation that a two-thirds majority in the Assembly is necessary for insistence on legislation so referred, and the right of pardon in individual cases. The principles that the President of the Republic chooses the Prime Minister, that the Prime Minister selects his colleagues, and that the Cabinet is collectively responsible are clearly affirmed.

7. The position of the executive, and more especially of the President of the Republic, is still further strengthened by the proposals that the Assembly need not necessarily sit for more than six months in the year, that the President shall hold office for seven years (while the life of the Assembly, though doubled, is still to be only four years), and that the Government may proclaim martial law, if the Assembly be not in session.

8. It will be further observed that the President of the Republic must not be a member of the Assembly, and that his personal immunity is to be very considerable.

9. So long as Mustafa Kemal Pasha retains his personal ascendancy it may be expected that these proposals, if passed, will tend to consolidate his authority, whatever the theoretical effect of some of them may be.

10. The stipulation in article 23 that no public function, except that of Minister, under-secretary or professor in the university, may be combined with the office of Deputy is novel and important. Hitherto not only have many military officers sat in the Assembly, but many various high posts both at home and abroad have been conferred on Deputies.

11. The question of supreme command of the army has been reserved. As you are aware, it is still exercised by Mustafa Kemal, not *ex officio*, but in virtue of a special law.

12. The articles on the rights of Turkish citizens call for little comment. In my despatch under reference I dealt with the proposal that all citizens should be called indiscriminately "Turks." These articles also imply that even Moslems are free to change their faith. Otherwise they assure to the citizen of the future rights similar to those which were conferred by the Constitution of 1876, to go no farther back, and which successive Turkish Governments have always found means to disregard.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 1904/1752/44**] No. 45.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 3.)

(No. 166. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 27, 1924.

I VENTURE to suggest that my telegram No. 33 of the 25th February, relative to the position of the Caliph, should be read in conjunction with paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch No. 142 of the 20th February, and with paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, in which I have drawn attention to the silence of the proposed new Constitution of Turkey regarding the relations between the Caliph and the Turkish Republic.

2. Just before I called on Adnan Bey on the 25th February, Sir Adam Block told me that he had heard from Javid Bey that the Angora leaders had decided to get rid of the Caliph. I had already heard from a very secret source, which I believe to be independent, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had decided that the Caliph and all the members of his family, except a few old ladies, must be banished, and that the Pasha's conferences with journalists and military officers at Smyrna were intended to prepare the way for this. I was therefore not unprepared for the substance of Adnan Bey's statement, but I was astonished at his comparative outspokenness. It was my first business interview with him, and even with persons whom he knows better he is, as a rule, discreet to the point of reserve.

3. The "laic" tendency on which Mr. Henderson laid stress in his despatch No. 30 of the 9th January, manifests itself more and more openly. It renders easy the task of those who feel, like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that the republic must divorce itself entirely from religious conceptions, and that it cannot be secure so long as the House of Osman retains even a vestige of its former authority and prestige. I was much struck at the frankness with which Yussef Kemal Bey elaborated this theme to me in a conversation I had with him before leaving London.

4. The press now abounds in suggestions that not only the Caliphate but other religious institutions bound up with the fabric of the old Turkish State must be dealt with in a radical fashion by the republican régime. It is openly stated that the Caliphate is a useless burden on the finances of Turkey; that it should be maintained in a simpler and less costly style; and that, indeed, there is no reason why Turkey should alone be responsible for the expense entailed. The last of these suggestions is one which has been ventilated during the last few days. It is particulary tendentious, for while it helps to discredit the Caliphate as being a drain on the resources of the country, it is difficult to conceive any practical plan by which a Turkish Caliph could be made to rely on the contributions of the Moslem world without a complete alteration of his status. It is urged at the same time that religious tribunals and religious schools as at present constituted are anomalous and anachronistic in a modern republic, and that it is equally absurd to retain a Minister of Moslem Religious Affairs (corresponding to the former Sheikh-ul-Islam) in the Cabinet.

5. These indications and tendencies make it very probable that when Mustafa Kemal makes his statement of policy in the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March, he will outline some definite scheme for asserting the lay character of the republic. There is a widespread feeling that he will not confine himself to religious tribunals and schools, or to the elimination of the Minister of Religious Affairs from the Government, but will tackle once for all the problem of excluding the Caliph from any possibility of intervention in State affairs. Should this be his intention, it is difficult to see how it can be realised without some sort of *coup*.

6. I may mention, in conclusion, that, according to the secret sources already mentioned, Ismet Pasha told the generals assembled at Smyrna that he hoped that the banishment of the Caliphal family and the nationalisation of the ex-Imperial property (which is also said to be part of the plan) would allay British suspicions of pan-Islamism, and would tend to make His Majesty's Government less intractable on the question of Mosul.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 1991/145/44**] No. 46.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 139.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 4, 1924.

"TEMPS" to-night displays a tendency to defend the action of the Grand National Assembly in suppressing the Caliphate. It affects to understand that this event will be used as propaganda in India "against the friends of Turkey and against the independence of the Asiatic nations," and proceeds to argue that in reality the Caliphate is of no importance and was not so in the past. What *is* of importance is Turkish military power, and Mustafa Kemal's recent words expressing confidence in the courage of the Turkish army, which are likely to create more impression in India than pleadings on behalf of the ex-Caliph. "Temps" concludes with a rather significant citation of French grievances against Turkey, contrasting the recall of Colonel Mougin from Angora with the opening of Turco-German negotiations.

The "Journal des Débats," after explaining that the disappearance of the Caliph is the logical consequence of events since 1908, recommends reserve in judging of its consequences. It, however, remarks that this step means the ruin of French schools and institutions in the Near East, and ends on the same plaintive note as the "Temps."

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[**E 2036/1752/44**] No. 47.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 5.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 4, 1924.

MY telegram No. 36.

Assembly passed yesterday law deposing Caliph and abolishing his office. "function of Caliph being essentially included in meaning and connotation of Government and republic." This formula is the result of a compromise, and its significance cannot be explained by telegram.



All princes and princesses are to leave Turkey within ten days.

Other laicising laws were also passed.

It is expected that Cabinet will resign to-day, and that Ismet will return with modified Cabinet.

Full report follows by despatch.

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[**E 2037/1752/44**] No. 48.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 6.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 5, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Caliph was removed from his palace at dawn yesterday and taken by motor to Chatalja. There he was put on express train last night and sent abroad. His destination is said to be Berne.

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[**E 1249/186/44**] No. 49.

*Sir H. Dering to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, March* 8, 1924.

GERMAN Minister, Herr Freytag, informs me that he is proceeding to Angora to negotiate treaty for renewal of relations.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

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[**E 2107/1752/44**] No. 50.

*Mr. Lindsay (No. 9) to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*—(*Repeated to Foreign Office; Received March* 9.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 8, 1924.

IN view of report of assumption of Caliphate by King Hussein, I am anxious that you should realise exact situation regarding it here.

Material clause in law adopted by Grand National Assembly on 3rd March was: "The Caliph is deposed. Function of Caliph being essentially included in meaning and connotation of Government and republic, office of Caliph is abolished."

This was compromise between Government proposal simply to declare office abolished and counter-proposals to declare it vested either in Assembly or in presidency of Turkish Republic.

Following is substance of explanation which I have suggested to Foreign Office of formula actually adopted:—

> "Parties to discussion were concerned with (1) original conception of office of Caliph in and after time of the Prophet, and (2) modern conception of popular government in extreme democratic form. Faced with two abstract theories involved in real conflict between theocracy and democracy, they resorted to formula which for them means not that the Caliphate is merged or vested in the republic, but that function of Caliph in the abstract as originally conceived merges in popular government in the abstract as conceived to-day. Nevertheless, formula lends itself to more practical subsequent interpretations, and may in future be used to justify revival of Caliphate in some form convenient to Turks as situation in Turkey and Moslem world develops."

Caliph and principal members of family have already been expelled. No serious repercussion is expected here. Apart from suggestion that British were behind King Hussein's candidature would be exploited against us. Turks have destroyed Caliphate as hitherto constituted for reasons of home policy. They would not admit that they have turned it over to Moslems generally, much less to any other section thereof, for disposal.

(Sent to Jerusalem, No. 1; Bagdad, No. 9; and Beirout, No. 2.)

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[E 2120/1100/44] No. 51.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 10.)*

(No. 180.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Austro-Turkish Treaty.

*Constantinople, March* 4, 1924.

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Enclosure in No. 51.

*Traité d'Amitié, Convention d'Établissement et Convention de Commerce conclus entre la Turquie et l'Autriche, le* 28 *janvier* 1924, *à Constantinople.*

(1.)

*Traité d'Amitié entre la Turquie et l'Autriche.*

LA Turquie, d'une part, et l'Autriche, d'autre part, également et sincèrement désireuses d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre la République turque et la République d'Autriche, et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié, et ont, à cet effet, nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr. Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ; et

Le Président de la République d'Autriche : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre la République turque et la République d'Autriche, ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux parties.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens ; elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour conclure à la date de ce jour une convention de commerce et une convention d'établissement.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) DR. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

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(2.)

*Convention d'Établissement entre la Turquie et l'Autriche.*

La Turquie, d'une part, et l'Autriche, d'autre part, animées du désir de fixer les conditions d'établissement des ressortissants turcs en Autriche et des ressortissants autrichiens en Turquie, ont résolu de conclure une convention, et, à cet effet, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr. Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ; et

Le Président de la République d'Autriche : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de s'établir et de séjourner sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et circuler librement, en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention n'ayant pas pour objet la question d'immigration, ne portent pas atteinte au droit de chacune des parties contractantes d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration dans son pays.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sur le territoire de l'autre, à l'égal des nationaux, le droit d'exercer toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et de se vouer à tous métiers et professions quelconques, excepté ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux en vertu des lois et règlements respectifs et, en Turquie, en outre, en vertu d'un long usage (débardeurs, mahoniers, &c.).

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes n'auront à payer pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire de l'autre, ainsi que pour l'exercice, sur ce territoire, de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront soumis sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne, leurs biens, droits et intérêts et quant à l'acquisition, possession et jouissance desdits biens, ainsi qu'à leur transfert par cession, mutation ou héritage, à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui pourront être imposés aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le cas où l'une des parties contractantes, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les lois ou règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la mendicité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l'État, expulserait par mesures individuelles les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, celle-ci s'engage à les recevoir. Le transport, jusqu'à la frontière, des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie qui expulse.

ARTICLE 5.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront, sous condition de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toute espèce de biens mobiliers ou immobiliers, à l'exception des biens ruraux, en se conformant aux lois et règlements du pays. Ils pourront en disposer par acte de vente, échange, donation, testament ou autre acte quelconque, ainsi qu'entrer en possession par voie de succession en vertu de la loi ou par suite des dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires.

Ils ne seront assujettis dans aucun des cas susmentionnés à des charges, taxes ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront établis pour les nationaux.

ARTICLE 6.

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes ne seront astreints, sur le territoire de l'autre, à aucun service militaire, ni à aucune obligation ou charge qui le remplace.

Ils seront exempts de tout emprunt forcé. Ils seront également exempts de toute autre prestation pécuniaire levée pour des buts de guerre et qui ne serait pas imposée légalement aux nationaux.

ARTICLE 7.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales et industrielles, qui ont leur siège sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui y sont constituées en vertu des lois respectives, pourront, en se soumettant aux lois et ordonnances de l'autre pays, ester en justice devant les tribunaux, soit pour intenter une action, soit pour s'y défendre.

L'admission desdites sociétés à l'exercice de leur commerce ou de leur industrie sur le territoire de l'autre partie contractante reste réservée aux lois et prescriptions qui sont ou seront en vigueur sur ce territoire.

Lesdites sociétés, établies conformément à l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, n'auront à payer pour l'exercice d'affaires commerciales ou industrielles dans le territoire de l'autre partie des impôts, droits ou taxes, ni autres ni plus élevés que ceux perçus des sociétés nationales.

Ces dernières sociétés pourront, à condition de réciprocité et en se soumettant aux lois du pays, acquérir toute sorte de biens mobiliers ainsi que les biens immeubles nécessaires au fonctionnement de la société, étant entendu dans ce cas que l'acquisition n'est pas l'objet même de la société.

ARTICLE 8.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront, sur le territoire de l'autre, être expropriés de leurs biens, ni privés, même temporairement, de la jouissance de leurs biens que pour cause légalement reconnue d'utilité publique et moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable.

ARTICLE 9.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront, sur le territoire de l'autre, en tout ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leur personne et de leurs biens du même traitement que les nationaux.

En conséquence, ils auront libre et facile accès auprès des tribunaux et pourront ester en justice aux mêmes conditions que les nationaux, sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la caution *judicatum solvi* et à l'assistance judiciaire gratuite qui seront régies par la législation locale jusqu'au règlement de ces questions par une convention spéciale à conclure entre les deux parties.

ARTICLE 10.

En matière de statut personnel, c'est-à-dire pour toutes les questions concernant le mariage, la communauté conjugale, le divorce, la séparation de corps, la dot, la paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la capacité des personnes, la majorité, la tutelle, la curatelle, l'interdiction : en matières mobilières, le droit de succession testamentaire ou *ab intestat*, partages et liquidations ; et, en général, pour le droit de famille des ressortissants des parties contractantes, seront seuls compétents les tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales siégeant dans le pays dont relèvent lesdits ressortissants.

La présente disposition ne porte pas atteinte aux attributions spéciales des consuls en matière d'état civil d'après le droit international ou les accords particuliers qui pourront intervenir, non plus qu'au droit des tribunaux des pays respectifs de requérir et recevoir les preuves relatives aux questions reconnues ci-dessus comme étant de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales des parties en cause.

ARTICLE 11.

Les deux parties contractantes s'accordent réciproquement le droit de nommer des fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière (consuls généraux, consuls et vice-consuls) dans les places de commerce de leurs pays où sont admis les fonctionnaires similaires d'un autre État.

Sur les territoires respectifs, les fonctionnaires consulaires énumérés ci-dessus recevront, à charge d'une parfaite réciprocité, le traitement consacré par les règles du droit international public général.



ARTICLE 12.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée d'une année. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période d'une année, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

Elle sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) DR. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

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*Procès-verbal.*

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention d'Établissement entre la Turquie et l'Autriche, les plénipotentiaires soussignés sont tombés d'accord pour faire les précisions suivantes :

1. Il est entendu par le terme "emprunt forcé," mentionné à l'article 6, toute imposition pécuniaire exigée à condition d'être remboursée ultérieurement.
2. Les termes de "sociétés anonymes ou autres," mentionnés à l'article 7, comprennent aussi les sociétés financières et d'assurance.
3. Les biens immeubles que les sociétés de chacune des parties contractantes pourront, conformément à l'article 7, alinéa 4, acquérir sur les territoires de l'autre partie, ne devront pas appartenir à la catégorie exceptée en vertu de l'article 5, alinéa 1.
4. L'exception prévue audit article 5, alinéa 1, ne porte pas atteinte au droit de propriété légalement acquis par les ressortissants des parties contractantes avant la conclusion de la convention ci-dessus visée.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) DR. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

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(3.)

*Convention de Commerce entre la Turquie et l'Autriche.*

La Turquie, d'une part, et l'Autriche, d'autre part, animées du désir de régler leurs relations commerciales réciproques, ont résolu de conclure une convention, et, à cet effet, ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République turque : Le Dr. Adnan Bey, délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople et Député de Constantinople à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ; et

Le Président de la République d'Autriche : M. Auguste Kral, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Sofia ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura entre les territoires des parties contractantes liberté réciproque de commerce et de navigation. En conséquence, les parties contractantes s'engagent à n'entraver leurs relations commerciales réciproques par aucune prohibition et restriction d'importation, d'exportation ni de transit.

Toutefois, les parties contractantes se réservent le droit d'établir des prohibitions et restrictions pour les importations et exportations :

1. Pour réserver les ressources indispensables à la vie alimentaire et à sauvegarder l'activité économique de la nation ;
2. Pour des raisons de sécurité de l'État ;

3. Pour des motifs de police sanitaire ou en vue de la protection des animaux et des plantes utiles contre les maladies, les insectes et parasites nuisibles et particulièrement dans l'intérêt de la santé publique, conformément aux principes internationaux adoptés à ce sujet ;
4. Pour les marchandises faisant l'objet des monopoles d'État ;
5. En vue d'application aux marchandises étrangères des prohibitions ou restrictions qui ont été ou seront établies par la législation intérieure en ce qui concerne la production, la vente, le transport ou la consommation à l'intérieur des marchandises indigènes similaires ;
6. Pour empêcher l'exportation de la monnaie or ou du métal or.

Les parties contractantes n'établiront ni ne maintiendront des prohibitions ou restrictions relativement à l'importation ou à l'exportation réciproque qui ne s'appliqueront de la même manière à l'importation ou à l'exportation des mêmes marchandises dans le commerce avec tout autre pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à accorder réciproquement le transit sur les voies les plus appropriées au transit international aux personnes, bagages, marchandises et objets de toute sorte, envois, navires, bateaux, voitures et wagons ou autres instruments de transport, en se garantissant sous ce rapport le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les marchandises de toute nature, traversant le territoire douanier de l'une des parties contractantes, seront réciproquement exemptes de tout droit de douane, à l'exception des droits de statistique et de surveillance.

Aucune des parties contractantes ne sera pourtant tenue d'assurer le transit des voyageurs dont l'entrée sur son territoire serait interdite.

Le transit des marchandises pourra être prohibé :

(*a.*) Pour raisons de sûreté publique et de sécurité de l'État ;
(*b.*) Pour raisons de santé ou comme précaution contre les maladies des animaux et des végétaux ;
(*c.*) Pour les contrefaçons et les marchandises qui, sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, font l'objet d'un monopole d'État.

ARTICLE 3.

Les négociants, fabricants et autres industriels de l'une des parties contractantes qui prouveront par la présentation d'une carte de légitimation industrielle, délivrée par les autorités compétentes de leur pays, qu'ils y sont autorisés à exercer leur commerce et leur industrie et qu'ils y acquittent les taxes et impôts prévus par les lois, auront le droit, soit personnellement, soit par des voyageurs à leur service, de faire les achats dans le territoire de l'autre partie contractante chez les négociants ou producteurs ou dans les locaux de vente publique. Ils pourront également prendre des commandes même sur les échantillons chez les négociants ou autres personnes qui, dans leur commerce et leur industrie, utilisent des marchandises correspondant à ces échantillons.

Les voyageurs de commerce des parties contractantes munis d'une carte de légitimation délivrée par les autorités de leur pays respectif, auront réciproquement le droit d'avoir avec eux des échantillons ou modèles, mais point de marchandises. Cette carte devra être établie conformément au modèle de l'Annexe (A).

Les parties contractantes se donneront réciproquement connaissance des autorités chargées de délivrer les cartes de légitimation ainsi que des dispositions auxquelles les voyageurs doivent se conformer dans l'exercice de leur commerce.

A l'exception des marchandises prohibées à l'importation, les objets passibles d'un droit de douane ou de toute autre taxe assimilée, qui seront importés comme échantillons ou modèles par les voyageurs de commerce, jouiront, de part et d'autre, de la franchise du droit d'entrée ou de sortie, à la condition que ces objets soient réexportés dans le délai prévu à l'article 5 et que l'identité des objets importés et réexportés soit bien établie, quel que soit le bureau de douane par lequel ils passent à leur sortie.

La réexportation des échantillons ou modèles devra être garantie au bureau de douane d'entrée, soit par un dépôt en espèces, soit par une caution valable.

En ce qui concerne les formalités auxquelles les négociants et les industriels (voyageurs de commerce) sont soumis dans les territoires des parties contractantes, les deux pays se garantissent réciproquement le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.



ARTICLE 4.

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes se rendant aux foires et marchés à l'effet d'y exercer leur commerce, ne seront pas, sur le territoire de l'autre, traités d'une manière moins favorable que les nationaux, en tant qu'ils pourront présenter une carte d'identité d'après le modèle annexé à la présente convention (Annexe (B) ), délivrée par les autorités du pays dont ils sont ressortissants.

Les parties contractantes se donneront réciproquement connaissance des autorités chargées de délivrer les cartes d'identité prévues à l'alinéa précédent.

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne sont pas applicables aux industriels ambulants, non plus qu'aux colporteurs ni à ceux qui recherchent des commandes chez des personnes n'exerçant ni industrie ni commerce, chacune des parties contractantes se réservant à cet égard l'entière liberté de sa législation.

ARTICLE 5.

Sous l'obligation de réexpédition et de réimportation dans le délai d'un an et de la preuve d'identité et, éventuellement, sous réserve de dépôt, de cautionnement ou de consignation des droits de douane, et, d'une manière générale, à charge d'observer les règlements en vigueur dans la matière, la franchise de tous droits d'entrée et de sortie est stipulée réciproquement :

1. Pour les échantillons passibles d'un droit de douane, y compris ceux des voyageurs de commerce ;
2. Pour les objets destinés aux expositions et aux concours.

ARTICLE 6.

Les navires et bateaux portant le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes qui entreront sur lest ou chargés dans les eaux et ports dépendant de l'autre partie, ou qui en sortiront, quel que soit le lieu de leur départ ou celui de leur destination, ne seront assujettis, tant à l'entrée qu'à la sortie et au passage, à aucun droit ou taxe, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, perçus au nom et au profit de l'État, des provinces, des communes ou d'un organisme quelconque, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont actuellement ou pourront par la suite être imposés aux bâtiments nationaux. Leurs cargaisons, quelle qu'en soit la provenance, n'acquitteront d'autres ni de plus forts droits d'entrée et ne seront assujettis à d'autres charges que si elles étaient importées sous pavillon national. Leurs passagers et les bagages de ceux-ci seront pareillement traités comme s'ils voyageaient sous pavillon national.

En ce qui concerne le placement des navires, leur chargement et leur déchargement dans les ports, rades, havres et bassins, il ne sera accordé par l'une des parties contractantes aux navires nationaux aucun privilège ni aucune facilité qui ne soient également accordés en pareil cas aux navires de l'autre partie.

Les dispositions qui précèdent ne font pas obstacle à ce que chacune des parties contractantes réserve au seul pavillon national la pêche, le cabotage maritime, ainsi que les services de ports, c'est-à-dire le remorquage, le pilotage et tous services intérieurs de quelque nature que ce soit.

Les navires et bateaux naviguant sous le pavillon de l'une des parties contractantes et porteurs de papiers de bord et documents exigés par les lois du pays de ce pavillon, seront reconnus de plein droit comme ayant la nationalité dudit pays dans les eaux territoriales, eaux intérieures et ports de l'autre partie contractante, sans qu'ils aient à fournir d'autres justifications.

Les certificats de jaugeage des navires de l'une des deux parties contractantes seront acceptés dans les ports de l'autre et assimilés aux certificats de l'autre partie, notamment pour le paiement des droits et taxes, à condition que les règles et procédés de jaugeage du pays où le certificat a été délivré soient reconnus identiques ou équivalant aux règles et procédés de jaugeage servant à l'établissement des certificats dans l'autre pays.

Il est toutefois entendu que, si par suite de la diversité des procédés et règles en vigueur dans les deux pays, une différence apparaissait entre la jauge turque et la jauge autrichienne, les autorités des deux parties seront libres d'accepter ou non l'évaluation de jaugeage d'un navire et auront la faculté de la rectifier en se basant sur les procédés et règles en vigueur chez les principales Puissances maritimes.

### Article 7.

Tous les produits du sol ou de l'industrie originaires et en provenance du territoire douanier de l'une des parties contractantes qui sont importés sur le territoire douanier de l'autre, et qui sont destinés soit à la consommation, soit à la réexpédition, soit au transit, seront soumis pendant la durée de la présente convention au traitement accordé à la nation la plus favorisée. Notamment, ils ne pourront, en aucun cas, être soumis à des droits autres ni plus élevés que ceux qui frappent les produits ou les marchandises de la nation la plus favorisée.

Les exportations à destination d'une des parties contractantes ne seront pas grevées, par l'autre, de droits ou taxes autres ni plus élevés que ceux perçus à l'exportation des mêmes objets dans le pays le plus favorisé à cet égard.

### Article 8.

Chacune des parties contractantes pourra exiger, pour établir le pays d'origine des produits importés, la présentation par l'importateur d'un certificat d'origine constatant que l'article importé est de production et de fabrication nationale dudit pays, ou qu'il doit être considéré comme tel, étant donné la transformation qu'il y a subie.

Les certificats d'origine, établis d'après le modèle que les parties contractantes se communiqueront ultérieurement, seront délivrés soit par les Ministères compétents en cette matière, soit par la Chambre de Commerce dont relève l'expéditeur, soit par tout autre organe ou groupement que le pays destinataire aura agréé. Le Gouvernement du pays destinataire aura le droit d'exiger la légalisation des certificats d'origine par son représentant diplomatique ou consulaire.

Les colis postaux seront dispensés du certificat d'origine quand le pays destinataire reconnaîtra qu'il ne s'agit pas d'envoi revêtant un caractère commercial.

### Article 9.

Les dispositions de l'article 7 ne s'appliquent pas :

1. Aux privilèges accordés ou qui pourraient être accordés ultérieurement par une des parties contractantes dans le trafic frontière avec les pays limitrophes ;
2. Aux avantages et faveurs spéciaux existants ou à établir dans l'avenir, en matière de tarifs douaniers et, généralement, en toute autre matière commerciale, entre la Turquie et les pays qui se sont détachés de l'Empire ottoman en 1923 ;
3. Aux faveurs spéciales que l'Autriche accorderait à la Hongrie ou à la République tchécoslovaque en application de l'article 222 du Traité de Saint-Germain, à condition que cette disposition soit appliquée dans le délai prévu audit article à toute autre Puissance.

### Article 10.

Les parties contractantes se garantissent réciproquement sur leurs territoires, en tout ce qui concerne les diverses formalités administratives ou autres, rendues nécessaires par l'application des dispositions contenues dans la présente convention, le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

### Article 11.

Les droits et les taxes intérieurs perçus pour le compte de l'Etat, des provinces, des communes ou d'un organisme quelconque, qui grèvent ou qui grèveront la production, la fabrication des marchandises ou la consommation d'un article sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes, ne pourront pas frapper les produits, marchandises ou articles de l'autre, d'une manière plus forte ou plus gênante que les produits, marchandises ou articles indigènes de même espèce.

La présente disposition n'empêchera pas la Turquie de continuer à percevoir, dans les mêmes conditions d'égalité entre ses ressortissants et les ressortissants de l'Autriche, les droits de consommation indiqués dans le tableau annexé à la présente convention (Annexe (C)), pour les produits et marchandises qui y sont énumérés.

### Article 12.

Le trafic des marchandises par chemins de fer entre les parties contractantes s'effectuera sous le régime de la Convention internationale sur le Trafic par Chemins de Fer



du 14 octobre 1890 avec toutes les conditions et suppléments introduits d'un commun accord par tous les États faisant partie de cette convention.

Les parties contractantes auront soin, en tant que le change le permettra, d'établir le plus tôt possible des taxes directes, tout au moins pour le trafic des voyageurs et pour celui des marchandises les plus importantes dans les relations les plus usitées.

Les administrations de chemins de fer des parties contractantes devront prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour garantir l'exécution rapide et sûre du trafic des chemins de fer entre les deux pays.

Les wagons, voitures et les autres moyens servant pour le transport des marchandises, utilisés dans la communication entre les parties contractantes et dans le transit, sont soumis aux dispositions de la Convention internationale sur l'Utilisation réciproque des Wagons et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires ; cependant, les voitures sont soumises aux prescriptions techniques de la Convention sur l'Utilisation réciproque des Voitures et Wagons dans la communication internationale et à ses prescriptions et conventions supplémentaires.

Il est entendu que toutes les dispositions prévues à l'alinéa précédent ne seront appliquées au trafic avec un État tiers qu'au cas où un accord concernant la communication directe par chemins de fer aurait été conclu avec cet État.

### Article 13.

Les personnes, bagages et marchandises, remis au transport sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et devant être expédiés pour ou à travers le territoire de l'autre à destination du territoire d'une tierce Puissance, ne seront pas traités sur les chemins de fer de l'autre partie contractante moins favorablement, ni sous le rapport de l'expédition, ni sous celui des prix de transport et des impôts publics grevant les envois par chemins de fer, que les personnes, bagages et marchandises du pays, ou d'un autre pays quelconque, transportés dans les mêmes conditions, sur le même parcours et pour la même direction.

### Article 14.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée d'une année. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période d'une année, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée, cette dénonciation ne devant produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

### Article 15.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé la présente convention et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

## Annexe (A).

*Carte de Légitimation.*

POUR VOYAGEURS DE COMMERCE.

Pour l'année .....  No. de la carte .....

(Armoiries.)

Valable pour des voyages à l'étranger.

Porteur (prénom et nom de famille) .....

Fait à ....., le (jour, mois, année) .....

(Sceau.)

(Autorité compétente).
(Signature.)

Il est certifié que le porteur de la présente carte possède un ..... (désignation de la fabrique ou du commerce) ..... à ..... sous la raison ..... ..... est employé, comme voyageur de commerce, dans la maison ..... à ....., qui y possède un ..... (désignation de la fabrique ou du commerce) .....

Le porteur de la présente carte désirant rechercher des commandes et de faire des achats pour le compte de sa maison, ainsi que $\frac{\text{de la maison suivante}}{\text{des maisons suivantes}}$ (désignation de la fabrique ou du commerce) à ..... ....., il est certifié, en outre, que $\frac{\text{ladite maison est tenue}}{\text{lesdites maisons sont tenues}}$ d'acquitter dans ce pays-ci les impôts légaux pour l'exercice de $\frac{\text{son}}{\text{leur}}$ commerce (industrie).

*Signalement du Porteur.*

Âge : ..... .....
Taille : .....
Cheveux : .....
Signes particuliers : .....

(Signature) .....

*Avis.*

Le porteur de la présente carte ne pourra rechercher des commandes ou faire des achats autrement qu'en voyageant et pour le compte $\frac{\text{de la maison susmentionnée}}{\text{des maisons susmentionnées}}$. Il pourra avoir avec lui des échantillons, mais point de marchandises. Il se conformera, d'ailleurs, aux dispositions en vigueur dans chaque État.

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## Annexe (B).

Il est certifié que M. ....., porteur de la présente carte, désirant se rendre avec ses marchandises aux foires et marchés en ..... ..... ..... (pour les ressortissants autrichiens : en Turquie, pour les ressortissants turcs : en Autriche), est domicilié à ..... ....., et qu'il est tenu d'acquitter les taxes et impôts légaux pour l'exercice de son commerce ou industrie.

Le présent certificat est valable pour un délai de ..... mois.

(Lieu, date, signature, sceau de l'autorité qui a établi le certificat.)

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## Annexe (C).

*Taxes de Consommation.*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Thé ... ... ... ... ... | 40 piastres par kilog. | |
| Café ... ... ... ... ... | 20 „ | „ |
| Pétrole ... ... ... ... ... | 6 „ | „ |
| Riz ... ... ... ... ... | 10 „ | „ |
| Margarine, oléomargarine et autres graisses animales | 80 „ | „ |
| Bougies de stéarine ... ... ... ... | 30 „ | „ |
| Savon ordinaire ... ... ... ... | 5 „ | „ |
| Sacs neufs et usagés ... ... ... ... | 5 „ | „ |
| Épices ... ... ... ... ... | 30 „ | „ |
| Allumettes ... ... ... ... | ½ „ | la boîte de 60 allumettes. |
| Allumettes-bougies ... ... .. ... | 1 „ | la boîte de 60 allumettes. |
| Papier à cigarettes ... ... ... ... | 1 „ | 50 feuilles. |
| Briquets ... ... ... ... ... | 25 „ | par briquet. |
| Sucre ... ... ... ... ... | 15 „ | par kilog. |
| Chocolats ... ... ... ... ... | Soumis à une taxe de consommation d'après le pourcentage du sucre contenu. | |
| Biscuits ... ... ... ... ... | | |
| Lait condensé ... ... ... ... | | |
| Confiserie et glucose ... ... ... ... | | |
| Boissons non alcooliques, gazeuses et limonades ... | | |
| Tous autres produits sucrés ... ... ... | | |
| Tombac ... ... ... ... ... | 40 piastres par kilog. | |

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*Procès-verbal* 1.

Au moment de procéder à la signature de la Convention de Commerce entre la Turquie et l'Autriche, les plénipotentiaires soussignés sont tombés d'accord pour faire les précisions suivantes :

Il est entendu que les dispositions de l'article 1er (4) et de l'article 2 (c) sont applicables aussi bien aux monopoles existant actuellement qu'à ceux à créer dans l'avenir.

Vu que l'article 7 de ladite Convention de Commerce accorde aux produits du sol et de l'industrie des parties contractantes le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée, les parties contractantes constatent que l'établissement, pour cause de dépréciation du change, des surtaxes ou des coefficients de majoration des droits d'entrée, frappant les produits du sol et de l'industrie de l'autre partie et qui ne s'appliqueraient pas à tous les autres pays, seraient contraires à l'esprit de la présente convention.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

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*Procès-verbal* 2.

Au cours de la discussion de l'article 7, la délégation turque ayant demandé des faveurs spéciales pour certains articles d'exportation turcs, le plénipotentiaire d'Autriche a confirmé que l'écume de mer et la vallonée figurant parmi ces articles sont actuellement exempts du droit d'entrée en Autriche et que d'après toute probabilité il n'y aura pas de changement dans cet état de choses.

Fait en double à Constantinople, le 28 janvier 1924.

(L.S.) Dr. ADNAN.
(L.S.) KRAL.

[E 2126/1752/44] No. 52.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 188.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 5, 1924.

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 166 of the 27th February, the question of the Caliphate and, in a lesser degree, the proposed measures for asserting the lay character of the Turkish Republic and for dissociating the army from politics—in fact, the whole plan for "completing the revolution" to use a phrase now much in vogue—have absorbed public attention in this country. In my telegram No. 43 of the 4th March I reported briefly the final decisions taken at Angora on the preceding day. I have now the honour to relate in greater detail the course of events during the past week and the steps taken in Constantinople to give effect to the decision to depose and expel the Caliph.

2. Rumours of impending crisis and anti-Caliphal propaganda continued to abound in the Constantinople press during the last days of February. It was more than ever evident that a strong hint had been given to prepare the public mind for great changes. Among the straws in the wind was an announcement that the Palace band had been summoned to Angora. It was universally anticipated that Mustafa Kemal's speech in the Assembly would mark the inauguration of a new era. Telegrams flowed in from Angora foreshadowing the liquidation of what had survived from the old Ottoman Empire. "Radical reforms" were to be the order of the day. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Ismet Pasha held long conferences, on the 26th February, with Mustafa Fevzi Effendi, the Minister of Religious Affairs. A meeting of the People's party was announced for the forenoon of the 28th February, at which, it was stated, grave questions would be discussed, such as the excision from the budget of the credits for the Caliphate, the expulsion of the Imperial family, the exclusion from the Cabinet of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the abolition of religious courts and the adoption of a uniform system of public instruction in place of the dual system of religious and lay schools. The way for this meeting was paved at a budget debate in the Assembly itself on the 27th February, when Vassif Bey, lately Public Prosecutor of the Constantinople Court of Independence, and others made fiery speeches.

3. On the 28th February, however, no final decisions were taken on the graver issues. The party meeting was adjourned to the 2nd March. In the Assembly itself Fethi Bey, the President, whose re-election had been decided on by the party, delivered his speech on the occasion of the end of the financial year, and an interim budget for the month of March was adopted. For the rest, it was left for Mustafa Kemal to announce his programme on the 1st March, although fairly accurate forecasts of the "radical reforms" were published broadcast. On the 29th February a midnight conference was held at the President's private house near Angora.

4. Mustafa Kemal's speech, when actually delivered, was somewhat of an anti-climax as regards its outward form, but it has to be read in the light of what was already known to be in the mind of himself and his associates. In contrast with many of his previous utterances, it had somewhat the character of a Presidential Message, almost of a Speech from the Throne. It contained allusions of unmistakable significance, but it left the Assembly to evolve the actual measures to be taken. Thus there was no mention whatsoever of the Caliphate. What the Pasha said was: "The nation asks that the republic should now and in the future be protected from all attacks absolutely and for ever." I enclose a report of the speech as published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 2nd March,* and, though they are not relevant to the subject of the present despatch, I would direct particular attention to the concluding passages dealing with foreign relations, the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne and the attitude of Turkey towards the League of Nations.

5. On the 2nd March the People's party again met. Four draft laws had been prepared, dealing respectively with the abolition of the Caliphate, the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the unification of public instruction and the abolition of the Ministerial post of Chief of the General Staff, to be replaced by a new Chief of the General Staff outside the Cabinet. Article 1 of the first of these Bills as originally drafted ran: "The Caliph is deposed and the office of Caliph is abolished" Article 2 forbade "eternally" the residence in Turkey of the deposed Caliph, all princes and princesses of the blood and the wives and husbands of living princes and princesses. All, except the children of princesses who were not to be considered members of the

* Not printed.



dynasty, were to leave Turkey within ten days and to lose their Turkish nationality. They were to liquidate their affairs and property in Turkey within a year. Imperial as opposed to personal property was to pass to the nation. Travelling expenses were to be paid, but the Bill made no provision for maintenance in exile.

6. The Bill for the Abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs proposed the creation of a "Presidency of Religious Affairs," the incumbent of which was to be appointed by the President of the Republic on the nomination of the Prime Minister, and was to exercise stated functions in connection with appointments to mosques, &c. The Bill made no mention of religious tribunals, the suppression of which is perhaps either implied or left to be dealt with in the new Constitution. The third Bill provided that all educational establishments should be placed under the Ministry of Public Instruction, that a theological faculty should be instituted in the university and that minor schools should be created for the training of subordinate persons exercising religious functions. The fourth laid down that the new Chief of the General Staff should in time of peace exercise supreme command in the army, as substitute for the President of the Republic, that he should be independent in his functions, that he should be appointed by the President on the nomination of the Prime Minister, and that the Minister of National Defence should be responsible to the Assembly for the military budget.

7. The party meeting debated these Bills at intervals throughout the whole of the 2nd March. They were finally adopted without considerable modification, except that the saving clause in the Caliphate Law in favour of the children of princesses was rejected (the number of persons to be expelled being thus greatly increased), and the clause providing for the abolition pure and simple of the office of Caliph was amplified to the phrase "the function of Caliph being essentially included in the meaning and connotation of government and republic, the office of Caliph is abolished."

8. This formula was a compromise between the original proposal and a suggestion that the office of Caliph should be vested in the Grand National Assembly or in the Presidency of the Republic. Its precise meaning is obscure, and to some it presents the appearance of a contradiction in terms. It must, I think, be interpreted in the light of the discussions on the subject. The parties to these discussions were much concerned with the original conception of the Caliphal office in and after the time of the Prophet. They were equally concerned with modern conceptions of popular government in an extreme democratic form. Faced with two abstract theories which involve in reality an irreconcilable conflict between theocracy and democracy, they resorted to a formula which for them means, not that *the* Caliphate is merged, much less vested, in *the* republic, but that the Caliphate, or the function of Caliph in the abstract, as conceived in the early days of Islam, merges in government and republic, *i.e.*, popular government, again in the abstract, as conceived to-day. While hazarding this theoretical explanation, I need hardly say that the formula lends itself to more practical subsequent interpretations, and may easily be used at some future time to justify a revival of the Caliphate in some form suitable to the convenience of the Turks, as the situation in Turkey and the Moslem world develops.

9. It only remained for the laws to be passed by the Grand National Assembly. This was done on the 3rd March. Their adoption was a foregone conclusion after the party meeting, but the debates were nevertheless heated. One Deputy had the courage to oppose the Caliphate law as a whole, and was howled down. Another reverted to the proposal to maintain in some form the office of Caliph, while depriving the House of Osman. He dwelt upon the political importance of the institution, the announcements made during the national struggle that the Caliphate was to be saved, the prevalence of the belief that if there were no Caliphate there could be no Friday prayer, the danger of unfavourable repercussions at home, the impression created by indifference to the pilgrimage and mistaken policy in Arabia. Ismet Pasha and others contested these arguments, and the law was adopted, apparently by a crushing majority. The chauvinism of the Assembly is best illustrated by the fact that when Mustafa Kemal himself proposed, at a meeting of the party held in an interval in the debate, that princesses should be exempted from the expulsion order, his supporters refused to accept the proposal.

10. The law allows ten days for the departure of the dynasty which has reigned in Turkey for six centuries and a quarter. The Caliph is so powerless and unsupported that this modest delay might have been accorded to a prince for whose person even extreme Nationalists profess respect and esteem. To the Angora Government it seemed otherwise. The Director of Public Security had been sent to Constantinople. He, with the Vali and the Director of Police, waited up on the evening of the

3rd March for official orders from Angora. Having received them, they went late at night to the palace and informed the Caliph of his deposition. A few hours only were allowed him to make his preparations for departure. In the early hours of the morning of the 4th March (it happened by an ironic coincidence to be the Feast of the Ascension of the Prophet) he with his son and other members of his immediate family were hurried off by motor-car to the station of Chatalja on the railway between Constantinople and the Bulgarian frontier. Up to the evening of the 4th March it was not certainly known what had become of them. It is believed that they were placed in the Simplon express train in the evening and were to proceed to Berne, but nothing is publicly known as to the arrangements made.

11. It is too soon to judge of the effect of this bold stroke of the Angora Government. There is undoubtedly much disquiet in men's minds. There must be many who think in their hearts with a poor madman who on the 3rd March snatched a green coverlet from a shrine in Stamboul and ran through the streets, crying "O Caliph, whither art thou going?" There are, however, no signs of overt opposition to the decrees of Angora. Should saner people think to follow the madman's example, they have had their warning in unofficial intimations from the capital that an addition is to be made to the Law of Treason making it an offence against that law to criticise the reforms, and that independence courts, with power to inflict the death penalty without reference to the Assembly, are to be set up in various places, including Constantinople. It is a proof of the despair of the Conservatives that on the 2nd March Velid Bey, the editor of the one strongly Islamic daily paper in Constantinople, left unexpectedly for abroad.

12. The question of the maintenance of the Caliph and his numerous relatives promises to be a serious problem. Before the recent decisions take final shape it was anticipated that certain lump sums would be granted to them. The law, however, speaks only of travelling expenses, and, unless this term is widely construed, it will fare hard with many of the family, for, while some have means of their own, there are believed to be a great number who are practically without any personal fortune.

I have, &c.

N. HENDERSON.

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[E 2180/448/44] No. 53.

*Italian Ambassador to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 10.)*

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to inform him that the Italian Government have transmitted to the Italian Embassy at Paris the requisite documents to enable them to proceed to draw up the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of the ratifications of the treaty and conventions of Lausanne as soon as two other Great Powers shall also have decided to do so.

*Italian Embassy, London,*
*March 9, 1924.*

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[E 2230/1752/44] No. 54.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.)

*Cairo, March 11, 1924.*

THERE is general disapproval in vernacular press and in Egyptian circles of proclamation of King Hussein as Caliph; his pretensions are characterised as arrogant and absurd, and are attributed in some quarters to British instigation.

Prayers were offered for Abdel Megid last Friday in most of the mosques, including Azhar. In one important mosque omission of prayer caused protests among congregation.



General tendency is to express sympathy with Abdel Megid and resentment against Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Government, and a proposal by ulama to refuse to recognise latter's action pending convocation of a Moslem congress in Cairo has received marked popular support.

There is also some talk of restoration of Caliphate to Egypt, in which connection King Fuad has been mentioned.

(Repeated to Beirout, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Bagdad.)

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[E 2298/1752/44] No. 55.

*Great Britain, King Hussein of the Hedjaz and the Caliphate: Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein.*

ON the 31st October, 1914, Lord Kitchener, in his second message to Shereef Abdulla, wrote:—

> "It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come, by the help of God, out of all the evil that is now occurring."

On the strength of this message, Abdulla, on the occasion of King Hussein's coronation in November 1916 and His Majesty's Government's message of congratulation on that event, telegraphed, in Hussein's name, to Colonel Wilson at Jeddah, conveying thanks to His Majesty's Government, "which once addressed him as Caliph." When pressed on the point by Colonel Wilson, Abdulla admitted, over the telephone, that no letter was ever addressed to Shereef Hussein as Caliph, and quoted the text of Lord Kitchener's message with sufficient accuracy.

That message did not, of course, commit His Majesty's Government to more than the pious hope that the question of the Caliphate would be dealt with in a certain manner by the Moslems themselves. But the incident mentioned above shows how dangerous even the most guarded reference to the Caliphate by His Majesty's Government may be, and it is a danger that will increase as we approach the peace settlement.

Any possible ambiguity in Lord Kitchener's message was removed by His Majesty's Government's more detailed declaration in the same sense, conveyed in the Foreign Office telegram No. 173 of the 14th April, 1915, to Sir H. McMahon:—

> "His Majesty's Government consider that the question of Caliphate is one which must be decided by Mahommedans themselves, without interference of non-Mahommedan Powers. Should the former decide for an Arab Caliphate, that decision would therefore naturally be respected by His Majesty's Government, but the decision is one for Mahommedans to make" (p. 30).

This declaration evoked an important memorandum, dated the 6th May, 1915, from Sir Ali Morghani, Grand Kadi of the Soudan, in which he argued that Shereef Hussein was the most suitable candidate for the Caliphate, and that, if he received unobtrusive support from His Majesty's Government, he had good prospects of obtaining recognition from a majority of Islam (pp. 32 *seqq.*).

In July 1915, in his first letter to Sir H. McMahon, Shereef Hussein demanded that "England should approve of the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate of Islam" (p. 40). In this he was no doubt encouraged by Lord Kitchener's message and stimulated by his own ambition for the office, but it appears that he was also prompted, as he was on the boundary question, by the Nationalist Committee at Damascus. Faroki, in his statement at Cairo in October 1915, mentioned that, when he was stationed at Damascus (apparently early in the winter of 1914–15, before the first Turkish attack on the Canal), he found that the civilian committee there "had already paid allegiance to the Shereef of Mecca as Caliph and renounced allegiance to Reshad, the Sultan of Turkey. Our first action, therefore, after joining that society was that we sent an officer to the Shereef of Mecca, and he paid him allegiance on behalf of all the officers in our party and renounced our allegiance to Reshad."

He further stated that one of the formal aims of the Arab party was that "Shereef Hussein of Mecca should be Caliph and Sultan of the new empire."

In conversation with General Clayton he added that—

> "The members of the society have taken a solemn oath on the Koran that they will enforce their object and establish an Arab Caliphate in Arabia, Syria and Mesopotamia at all costs and under any circumstances, sacrificing for this object all their efforts and property and, if need be, their lives."

The fact, which thus seems established, that Shereef Hussein, before opening negotiations with us, was offered the Caliphate by an organisation which might reasonably claim, at that time, to represent the Arab nation in the Ottoman provinces, at any rate in Syria, may be of some importance when the question comes up for settlement.

On the 30th August, 1915, Sir H. McMahon, in his first letter to the Shereef, answered the latter's demand regarding the Caliphate by repeating Lord Kitchener's message to Abdulla. He interpreted this "as approval of the Arab Caliphate when it should be proclaimed," and added: "We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Caliphate by an Arab of true race" (p. 43).

On the 2nd November, 1915, the Agha Khan called on Sir E Grey, and protested against the idea of an Arab Caliphate in the name of the Indian Moslems, and Sir E. Grey gave him an assurance in the following terms:—

> "I said that we were prepared to favour an independent or autonomous Arabia in the country inhabited by the Arabs; but anything that we promised to the Arabs, or any action that we took to support them, would be of a political and secular character. We regarded the Caliphate as a thing which should be settled by Moslems for themselves, and in which neither we nor any non-Moslem Power should interfere."

The Agha Khan expressed himself quite satisfied, but asked that, in all communications with the Arabs, His Majesty's Government's attitude should be made very clear. A record of this conversation was transmitted to Sir H. McMahon and Sir R. Wingate.

On the 17th November, 1915, after receiving from Sir H. McMahon a revised summary of the Shereef's third letter of the 5th November, 1915, the Foreign Office telegraphed to the former (No. 887):—

> "You will, of course, bear carefully in mind the necessity of avoiding all possibility of being involved in any questions concerning the Caliphate."

The subject was accordingly ignored by Sir H. McMahon in the subsequent negotiations.

Shereef Hussein, however, gave a clearer indication of his policy on the question in his letter of the 28th December, 1915, to Sir Ali Morghani:—

> "I had not claimed before to be the qualified chief of the emirs (the Caliph), but I explained to them more than once that I was ready to extend my hand to any man who would come forward and take the reins of authority. I was, however, chosen in every quarter, and even forced to take up the question of their future prospects; and therefore I can see no ground for making (further) conditions, such as the universal agreement of the emirs and tribes which were mentioned, especially the Shias—*i.e.*, the Persians—who lack the necessary qualifications and every other right (to decide the question of the chosen Caliph of Islam)" (p. 118).

The above passage lends significance to the declaration contained in the address presented to Shereef Hussein on the 29th October, 1916, by the "Ministers, notables, inhabitants and ulama of Mecca," to the effect that, "We take the oath of obedience, loyalty and sincerity to Hussein-bin-Ali, and consider him also to be our religious leader until all the Moslem world be of one opinion concerning the Islamic Caliphate." And Shereef Abdulla emphasised this declaration in his short telegram of the 29th October, 1916, to Colonel Wilson, announcing the proclamation of his father as King.

In conversation over the telephone with Colonel Wilson on the 1st November, 1916, Abdulla explained that—

> "His Majesty the Shereef has left the question of the Caliphate to the opinion of the Moslem world, and, therefore, he declared that there was no pre-suggested Caliphate, but that the whole question is left to the public opinion of Islam, and the ulama of the Kibla decided not to accept the Turkish Caliphate, and the whole question will come back later on to its origin."

In a similar conversation on the following day, King Hussein himself declared:—

> "I have denied the Caliphate entirely and officially, leaving it to the opinion of those who know all about its regulations, until all Moslems choose one person to be their Caliph . . . .



> "I repeat that our not declaring the Caliphate will not put us in any suspicion, until all Moslems are of one opinion. It is a question of dissociating the Moslems from the Turks."

On the 6th November, 1916, the Foreign Office telgraphed instructions to Sir R. Wingate for a reply to Abdulla's communication; and in this telegram His Majesty's Government's policy regarding the Caliphate was once more laid down, as follows:—

> "That it should be strongly impressed on the Shereef that his own interests require that the question of the Caliphate should be left open until the end of the war; that it would be quite impossible for Christian Powers, numbering among their subjects many millions of Moslems, to expose themselves to the charge of taking sides in the affairs of Islam and forcibly supporting one Caliph against another, and that his claims could only be weakened by such support in the eyes of the Moslem world."

A reply in this sense was eventually conveyed to King Hussein by Colonel Wilson.

In his conversation with Colonel Wilson on the 2nd November, 1916, quoted above, the Shereef twice spoke of the Caliphate as being is abeyance, and mentioned that he possessed a book by a Wahabi authority in which this was demonstrated, and which he would publish if necessary.

He developed this thesis further in a conversation with Captain Lawrence on the 28th July, 1917, and the latter received the impression that he was genuinely averse from the idea of reviving the office in his own person. For the "false Caliphate" of the Osmanlis he would prefer, it seems, to substitute a spiritual leadership of Islam in his own family, with some such title as Emir-el-Muminin, if this were genuinely offered to him. His view appears to be that the spiritual leader of Islam should not aim at being the political sovereign of the whole Moslem world, but that the office should be combined with a small temporal sovereignty—for instance, over the Hedjaz and its Holy Cities—in order to secure the holder of it the independence necessary to his position.

In fact, according to this conversation, Shereef Hussein aims at a position very like that of the Papacy when it possessed the temporal power over the estates of the Church.

If this is the Shereef's real view, it is remarkably divergent from the chauvinistic trend of opinion concerning the Caliphate which seems to be more common among Moslems at present. And it remains to be seen how he would regard the title of Caliph if it were actually placed within his grasp.

*Relation of Commitments under (viii) to British Desiderata.*

His Majesty's Government have succeeded so far in making it clear that they regard the question of the Caliphate as a purely Moslem affair, without causing Shereef Hussein to doubt their goodwill towards his aspirations in the matter.

We have two purely negative desiderata—avoidance of offence, on the one hand, to Moslem opinion, and on the other hand to the Shereef—which have to be reconciled with one another, and hitherto we have avoided committing ourselves in either direction in a way that would compromise us in the other.

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In amplification of the foregoing paper the following additional facts on the subject of His Majesty's Government's attitude towards an Arab Caliphate, have been gleaned from the four files of the Arab Bureau (64 A, B, C, D), the contents of which refer to the assumption of kingship by the Shereef of Mecca, and, incidentally, to his aspirations to the Caliphate.

The purpose of the search was to discover whether His Majesty's Government, after the encouragement given to the Shereef's Caliphate ambitions by Lord Kitchener and Sir H. McMahon in 1914–15 had taken any measures, other than those related in the above papers, to negative that encouragement, or to dissuade the Shereef from pursuing his ambitions.

On the 31st October, 1916, Sir H. McMahon telegraphed to the Sirdar, Sir R. Wingate, the draft of a telegram he proposed to send Colonel Wilson. The draft telegram directed Colonel Wilson to inform the Shereef that Sir H. McMahon deprecated

the Shereef's announcement (regarding his assumption of kingship and "religious chiefship.") The draft telegram also said that—

> "Religious supremacy in Islam is a question which His Majesty's Government have repeatedly declared to be one which Moslems alone must decide . . . . I will not, therefore, comment upon it beyond expressing opinion that I consider publication outside the Hedjaz of the announcement of the Mecca ulama to be premature and liable to give rise to undesirable criticism. . . . ."

Sir H. McMahon asked for the Sirdar's concurrence with this telegram, but the file does not give his reply.

On the 1st November, 1916, Sir H. McMahon informed the Foreign Office that a telegram had been received by the Shereef's agent at Cairo from the Emir Abdulla, Foreign Secretary for the Hedjaz, announcing that Shereef Hussein's assumption of the title "King of the Arabs" had been communicated to the foreign Ministries of the Allied Powers and neutral Powers; and that . . . . "As to the Caliphate they (the people of the Hedjaz) will follow whatever decision the Moslems agree upon."

It should he noted that in these telegraphic notifications only the title of King was mentioned; no mention was made of "religious chiefship."

On the 1st April, 1917, Colonel Wilson reported that Friday prayers in the mosques at Mecca and Jeddah contained no allusion to the Caliph. The Sultan of Turkey was prayed for by name. King Hussein was prayed for separately, as "Shereef and Emir of Mecca, and King of the Arab Countries."

On or about the 2nd January, 1918, Major K. Cornwallis, of the Arab Bureau, being then in the neighbourhood of Medina, was visited by the Emir Abdulla. The Emir charged Major Cornwallis to inform the High Commissioner confidentially that the main object of his (the Emir's) proposed visit to Cairo was to discuss the question of proclaiming King Hussein as Caliph. Major Cornwallis having remarked that the King had told Colonel Wilson that he had no wish to become Caliph, Abdulla replied that the King would have no choice in the matter. Custom decreed that the decision would be made for him by others, and that he would have no knowledge of the project until the day on which he was publicly proclaimed.

Colonel Cornwallis then reminded the Emir that although it was the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government not to interfere in religious matters, such a step (as King Hussein being proclaimed Caliph) was bound to have an effect on the millions of British Mahommedan subjects, and therefore would not leave His Majesty's Government unconcerned. He therefore "expressed the hoped that Abdulla had no intention of taking any action without the full knowledge and approval of His Majesty's Government."

The Emir Abdulla fully reassured Major Cornwallis on this point, and admitted that little could be done without British sympathy and help, and that precipitate action would merely defeat its own end. He spoke of waiting till two or three pilgrimages had passed.

In August 1919 when King Hussein was being prayed as Caliph in mosques in Syria, the practice was promptly forbidden in Beirout by the French. Commenting on this news in a letter to the Chief Political Officer at the Residency, Cairo, the Arab Bureau wrote on the 13th August, 1919 :—

> "As you are aware, our policy has always been to discourage King Hussein's aspirations to the Caliphate, and he has always pretended that he was well aware it is a question for the Moslem world to decide, and that he has no desire to usurp this high office . . . There is little doubt, however, that he and his family secretly desire to transfer the Caliphate from Constantinople to Mecca. . . . We have recently submitted to the King that the Mecca newspaper 'Al Kibla' was injuring the Shereefian cause by reproducing extracts from other Arabic newspapers in which Hussein's name was connected with the Caliphate."

Indeed, on the 8th August, the British agent, Jeddah, wrote to King Hussein urging that it was an error of judgment that the title "Emir-el-Muminin" should be applied to him by "Al Kibla."

In the correspondence which passed between the British agent, Jeddad, and the King on this matter, the latter, on the 11th August, 1919, referred to the—

> ". . . . High Commissioner's exalted letters at the beginning of our negotiations (in 1915) regarding the clause in which he remarks that Great Britain's intention is to restore the Arab Caliphate; and your Excellency (the British agent, Jeddah) now says: 'Do not write Emir-el-Muminin!'"



However, as the result of this correspondence, King Hussein caused the proclamation, of which the following is a translation, to be published in "Al Kibla" on the 17th August, 1919 :—

> "*A Second Proclamation from the Office of the Director of the King's Bureau.*
>
> "Desiring to express their goodwill, many prominent personages have been addressing My Lord and Master, our Illustrious King, by the title of Emir-el-Muminin. As this title is synonymous with that of the Caliphate (the bestowal of which is the prerogative of the Moslem world), we request all our brethren not to use any title other than that given to the King by the country, as stated in 'Al Kibla,' No. 237, 5th Rabil-el-Awal 1337."

W. J. CHILDS.

*Foreign Office, March* 12, 1924.

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[**E 2341/1752/44**] No. 56.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 8, 1924.

ADNAN BEY called on me to-day to apprise me of a telegraphic correspondence which had just taken place between Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the one hand, and Shaukat Ali, in India, and one Abdul Hamid, in Egypt, on the other, regarding the abolition of the Caliphate. Abdul Hamid, he thought, was a member of the Hizb-el-Watani.

2. These two gentlemen had sent telegrams to Mustafa Kemal, the nature of which Adnan Bey did not repeat to me. They were, however, clearly critical of the action taken here. Mustafa Kemal had answered in order to clear up the misconceptions under which Shaukat Ali and Abdul Hamid were labouring. From the somewhat confused account given me by Adnan Bey I gathered that the pasha had answered that the action taken this week was a purely domestic concern of the Turkish people, for whom the Caliphate had been a cause of embarrassment and trouble in both internal affairs and foreign relations. In the days of the Prophet, when the Caliphate was founded, the institution was intended to connote precisely the same thing as Government, it being at that time contemplated that Islam would spread its influence over the whole world. The lapse of time had proved that this consummation was impossible, and the original idea of the Caliphate thus fell to the ground. There was therefore nothing contrary to Islam in the action taken in these last days in regard to the institution.

3. Adnan Bey said that this exchange of telegrams might come to the knowledge of the British authorities, and give rise in their minds to exaggerated or erroneous impressions; he therefore desired me to know their contents. He impressed on me that his communication was quite unofficial, but I have no doubt whatever that it was made to me on direct instructions from Angora. This sudden desire for correctitude towards His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Turkish Government may therefore confirm the report mentioned in my despatch No. 166 of the 27th February, paragraph 6, that, with especial regard to the Mosul negotiations, they intend to exploit the abolition of the Caliphate as proving that pan-Islamism is dead, and that Great Britain henceforth has no reason to fear in the future the troubles in her Mahommedan dependencies which it has caused in the past.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 2343/32/44**] No. 57.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 43 of the 4th March, I have the honour to report that on the 5th March Ismet Pasha presented the resignation of his Cabinet, and was immediately requested by the President of the Republic to form a new Government.

2. It had been anticipated that in order to provide a plausible ground for Ismet Pasha's resignation arrangements would be made for the rejection of the budget by the Assembly, it being evident that the budget would in any case require considerable readjustment in consequence of the decisions regarding the Caliphate, &c., recorded in my despatch No. 188 of the 5th March.

3. In the event, however, the budget discussions were resumed and continued in a normal fashion on the 5th March, and the reason given for Ismet's resignation was simply that he wished, in view of the recent fundamental changes in the distribution of the functions of Departments of State, to afford an opportunity for a Government to be formed on the new basis.

4. The list of the new Ministers was communicated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Assembly on the 6th March, and was agreed to after a discussion in the People's party, the most interesting feature of which was that Ismet Pasha asked the party to agree to his list without having the names formally submitted, and submitted the names only under pressure. When he had yielded thus far, the list was agreed to in the party by 103 votes against 60, eight Deputies abstaining. It was afterwards passed by the Assembly without difficulty.

5. The new Government, which does not greatly differ from the old, is constituted as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Ismet Pasha (no change).
Minister of Religious Affairs (suppressed).
Minister of Interior: Ferid Bey (no change).
Minister of National Defence: Kiazim Pasha (no change).
Minister of Finance: Abdul Halik Bey (no change).
Minister of Justice: Nedjati Bey (transferred from Ministry of Reconstruction to replace Seid Bey).
Minister of Commerce: Hassan Bey (previously head of Ministry of Economic Affairs, now divided into separate Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture).
Minister of Agriculture: Zekiai Bey (new).
Minister of Public Instruction: Vassif Bey (new in place of Sefa Bey).
Minister of Public Works: Suleiman Sirri Bey (no change).
Minister of Public Health: Refik Bey (no change).
Minister of Reconstruction: Jelal Bey (new).

6. On balance, three Ministers leave the Government, namely, Mustafa Fevzi, head of the now suppressed Ministry of Religious Affairs, Seid Bey and Sefa Bey; while three new Ministers are brought in, namely, Zekiai Bey, Vassif Bey and Jelal Bey.

7. None of the outgoing Ministers has played a prominent political rôle, but Mustafa Fevzi played an important part in the final discussions regarding the Caliphate and the question of religious tribunals and schools, and Seid Bey, who is usually reported to have Union and Progress associations, has been much involved in the controversies over the family law. It was at first thought that Mustafa Fevzi would receive the Ministry of Justice by way of compensation for the suppression of his previous post, but this idea seems to have been dropped.

8. Of the new Ministers Zekiai Bey is well known from his having played an important part as an economic expert at the Lausanne Conference. He is intelligent, but difficult to deal with. Vassif Bey was Public Prosecutor of the Court of Independence sent to Constantinople, and has been one of the loudest promoters of the expulsion of the Osman dynasty. It will be remembered that in one of his *réquisitoires* in the Court of Independence he accused Great Britain of seeking to make the Caliphate a tool. I know little of Jelal Bey, except that he is probably the same Jelal Bey who was for a short time previously Minister of Economic Affairs and who in December 1921 launched an abortive scheme for destroying the position of Constantinople as a transit centre by encouraging direct trade between Anatolia and foreign markets. That, however, was at a time when there were political reasons for endeavouring to starve out Constantinople.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2344/32/44] No. 58.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 204.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1924.

A FEW days ago the local press reported that Adnan Bey was to be replaced as delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by one Ibrahim Tali Bey, lately Turkish consul at Batoum, now a counsellor in the Ministry at Angora, and at the present moment engaged on a mission of inspection into the affairs of the Turkish consulate-general at Salonica. As no *démenti* followed this announcement, I asked Adnan Bey yesterday if there was any truth in the story.

2. Adnan Bey answered that he had no official information. As the matter concerned him personally, he had felt diffident about enquiring, but he had enquired, and had not yet received an answer. He knew, however, that the Budget Committee at Angora was always talking about cutting down the expenses of the Constantinople delegation, and he implied that it would not be consonant with his personal dignity to remain in the delegation on a lower salary and in a lower status than he had hitherto enjoyed. Ibrahim Tali he knew slightly as a decent sort of fellow with some education—he was a doctor of medicine like himself—he did not praise him over much and he clearly considered that the immediate object of the appointment, if made, would be to diminish the status of the Constantinople delegation. He admitted that the measure was regarded at Angora as a means of pressing the foreign representatives at Constantinople to move up to the capital, and he ended somewhat sadly by saying that we should have to face it sooner or later and that we had better make up our minds to it at once.

3. I protested warmly against this conclusion. No one could expect that foreign representatives would expose themselves to the discomforts of Angora if they could possibly avoid them, or that their Governments would wish them to reside in a place where the most elementary conditions of dignity were so completely lacking. But quite apart from these considerations of external form, the action contemplated was a direct blow at relations between Angora and Europe. The essence of diplomacy was verbal discussion; in the few interviews that had already passed between us since my arrival we had said things to each other which we could not put in writing, but the communication of which was to the equal benefit of both Governments. Such relations between himself and myself, which I had hoped might be fruitful, it was now desired by Angora to abolish. At the moment when the Treaty of Lausanne was about to be ratified, when we hoped that suspicion might be dispelled and cordiality renewed between Turkey and Great Britain, Angora proposes a measure to make relations almost impossible.

4. I think this was a new point of view to Adnan Bey, and he seemed to welcome it as giving him a pretext for writing once more to Angora; so that the conversation ended, as all conversations with Adnan Bey always end, by his undertaking to refer once more to his Government and to let me know the result.

5. Though I have done what I can to keep Adnan Bey in his present position, I must confess that the present situation is highly unsatisfactory. If Angora is out of touch with Constantinople, certainly foreign missions here are completely out of touch with the Turkish Government and all business suffers. A review of the cases we are treating with the Turkish Government shows that in almost every one the question has been referred to Angora and no answer received, and all this mission can do to hasten matters is to see Adnan or Madjid Bey, who never fail to refer once more to their Ministry. Bad as things must be under Adnan's régime they will be worse under Ibrahim Tali. Adnan Bey, though he has to conform himself very closely to the instructions he receives, has occupied a high post at Angora, and he has dealt on a footing of equality with men who are now Ministers, though I fancy he has lately been losing influence with them. Ibrahim Tali is a person of lower standing. My French colleague tells me that he is an affable nullity, and at the Constantinople delegation he will clearly be no more than a transmitter of messages.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2356/1333/44] No. 59

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 221.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 12, 1924.

IN my despatch No. 189 of the 5th March, relative to relations between the Russian and Turkish Governments, I omitted to state that on the 27th February Comrade Souritch presented his credentials as Ambassador to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This event attracted little notice among the more considerable developments which were at that moment being prepared at Angora. It was nevertheless the subject of a lengthy telegram issued by the semi-official Anatolian agency. My attention having been recalled to the subject by reading in print a "Note on the 'Head of the State' in Russia," prepared in the Foreign Office on the 31st January, I think it may be of interest to summarise the telegram with special reference to the points raised in the Foreign Office paper.

2. Mustafa Kemal received Comrade Souritch with all the usual ceremonial. He was attended by Ismet Pasha as Minister for Foreign Affairs. A high official of the Ministry fetched Comrade Souritch and his staff from the Embassy in motor-cars provided by the Turkish Government. The Ambassador was received with a military salute, and a band played the "International March." The President received Comrade Souritch standing.

3. The telegram gives no particulars of the letters of credence, but reproduces textually the speeches exchanged. The following is a literal translation of the opening portion of the Ambassador's speech :—

> "Your Excellency the President of the Republic, I have the honour to present to you the letters of credence containing my appointment to you ('auprès de vous' gives the sense of the Turkish better) by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Russian Soviet Republics ('Soviets Republic' is still more literal) in the quality of plenipotentiary bearing the title of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary."

After a reference to the friendship between the two countries and the Turkish national struggle ending in a great victory and the institution of the Turkish Republic, the speech goes on—

> "Almost all the republics have in the course of time concluded treaties and conventions with Turkey. The Union of Soviet Republics will as a whole devote attention to the execution of those engagements (or 'will devote attention to the execution of those engagements as a whole') and to the development and strengthening of the fraternal sentiments which are their foundation."

This is followed by references to the Peace Treaty which, after a victorious struggle for independence, has opened up new highroads of development for Turkey, to the common ideals of the two countries and to the sympathy shown in Turkey on the occasion of the death of Lenin, whose 'point of view will always remain the basis of the Presidency of the Union of Soviet Republics."

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied in a shorter, but not less cordial, speech, at the outset of which he reproduced exactly the terms used by Souritch in the opening passage quoted above. It is noteworthy that in these, the most formal portions of the two speeches, the accreditor is described as the "Central Executive Committee of the Union of Russian Soviet Republics," although the word "Russian" is omitted in some other passages. The authority to whom the Ambassador is accredited is unmistakably the President of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, it is clear, from the unfortunate experience of the Persian Ambassador when he went to Angora, that Mustafa Kemal would have tolerated no other form.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2358/1752/44] No. 60.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 12, 1924.

SINCE the events recorded in my despatch No. 188 of the 5th March, the Turkish authorities here have been busy deporting the various members of the Imperial Family. Reports appear daily that none of them any longer remain on Turkish soil, and as a matter of fact all those of any importance appear to have been already expelled.

2. Having been approached privately on the 1st March on behalf of the Caliph's brother, Prince Seifuddin, who has connections in Egypt, and who wished to proceed to to that country, I enquired by telegraph of Lord Allenby on the 2nd March whether he could be allowed to do so. Later in the day I enquired more generally what would be the attitude of the Egyptian Government regarding other members of the Turkish Imperial Family, as I had seen reports in the papers that several of them, including the Caliph himself, were anxious to go to Egypt.

3. In the event all the deportees were sent to various destinations in Europe and Syria. The Turkish authorities, who themselves made all the passport arrangements, did not ask for facilities for Egypt except in the case of one husband of a princess and some eunuchs. This was put forward on the 4th March in the form of a request that they should be allowed to leave by a ship sailing that afternoon, and I could naturally only reply that time did not admit of arrangements being made.

4. On the 6th March I received a telegram from Lord Allenby to the effect that the Egyptian Government could not allow members of the Caliphal family to land in Egypt. Having had no applications from Adnan Bey other than that mentioned in the previous paragraph, which had lapsed, I did not communicate this decision to him officially, but a member of my staff mentioned it in conversation to his assistant, with the result that considerable publicity was given in the press to the fact that Egypt would not receive members of the family. One newspaper represented this as a decision of the British authorities.

5. In one case—that of Prince Sherif Abdul Mejid, son of Sherif Ali Haidar, and husband of Princess Rukie (a grand-daughter of Sultan Murad)—I issued a paper recommending him to the good offices of British authorities. I did this in virtue of his position as a member of the Shereefian family, and having regard to the difficulty which he will have in establishing a definite national status. I was careful not to give the paper the form of a passport or pass.

6. As I anticipated, the departure of the Caliph and his relatives has been unattended by any form of demonstration. The Turkish authorities have managed the whole business with great efficiency, whatever may be thought of their harshness and the pains taken to belittle the victims in every way, *e.g.*, by issuing to the Caliph a passport as M. Abdul Mejid *fils* d'Abdul Aziz, and informing the Italian Embassy that it was not a case for a diplomatic visa. A sum of money was given to each of the deportees for travelling expenses. It is understood that this will be supplemented, but there is no talk of any permanent provision being made for the maintenance of the princes and princesses.

7. The authorities took special measures to ensure that all mention of the Caliph should be omitted from the Friday prayer in the mosques on the 7th March. Prayers for the nation and the republic were substituted.

8. Various rumours are current as to the disposal of the Imperial palaces. It seems probable that the old Seraglio will be converted into a museum, but no decision appears to have been taken regarding the two other principle palaces—Yildiz and Dolma Bagtche, where the late Caliph resided. It has been suggested that Dolma Bagtche will be assigned to the use of the President of the Republic.

9. Little has been heard of the more interesting question of the relics of the Prophet, the possession of which has come to be regarded in popular estimation as one of the titles to the Caliphate. They will certainly not be allowed to leave Turkey, nor is there any present prospect of the restoration to Medina of the treasures removed from the Prophet's tomb in 1917. The latter objects are in a different category from the more sacred relics; but it will be remembered that the Turkish delegation contended at Lausanne that the treasures from the tomb were in the Caliph's disposal. In this connection I may mention that the local press has given full publicity to reports of the assumption of the Caliphate by King Hussein. There has been some little attempt to

represent him and his sons as British instruments and to discredit King Hussein's pretensions to regard, but on the whole there has been very little comment. There are, however, indications of some official anxiety over the manner in which the abolition of the Caliphate is being regarded in non-Turkish Moslem countries.

10. Reports have been current in the last few days that in order to complete the "purification" of the country a large number of persons connected with the old régime and their families, together with the families of persons already in exile, will be expelled. The authorities here have been at some pains to discredit these reports, but it is still widely believed that some such action will be taken in the near future, and that it may apply to such personages as the ex-Grand Viziers Tewfik, Izzet and Salih Pashas, besides other former Ministers and the families of persons associated with the ex-Sultan Vahiduddin. These reports merit attention, as it is stated that such expulsions would be independent of the proscription of the 150 persons mentioned in the protocol attached to the Lausanne Amnesty Declaration, in which case they would constitute, at least in many instances, a flagrant violation of that declaration.

11. There is also a strong campaign in the press, conducted with a certain appearance of official countenance, in favour of abolishing the Patriarchates and the Grand Rabbinate on a supposed analogy between these institutions and the Caliphate. Suggestions are similarly being put forward, but in this case without the same appearance of official backing, that non-Moslem schools have no longer any *raison d'être*. I do not for the moment attach an exaggerated importance to these suggestions, but they are of evident interest from the point of view of the minorities clauses of the treaty.

12. As the excitement over the deposition of the Caliph and other laicising legislation has subsided, renewed attention has been directed to foreign affairs. The press just now abounds in more or less inaccurate statements regarding the Mosul question and the prospects regarding Allied, more especially British, ratification of the Peace Treaty. The only really novel feature, however, is a definite attempt to connect the settlement of the question of the interest on the Public Debt with the execution of the article in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement providing for the establishment of a special régime for Antioch and Alexandretta. It has been alleged that the Angora Government will refuse to discuss the former question until the special régime in these places has been set up. A telegram from Angora in certain morning papers of the 12th March, which purports to give the result of enquiries in official circles there, lends some colour to these reports, but is couched in more guarded terms.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2334/448/44] No. 61.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 16, 1924.

ISMET PASHA sent Adnan to me to-day to ask if I had any news of ratification and to express his concern at delay. I said you were fully convinced of urgency, and that only congestion of business had prevented House of Commons from acting.

I fear, however, this reply carries little conviction here and none in Angora, and matter is becoming increasingly urgent.

Without ratification it is impossible to begin winning Turkish confidence or to overcome suspiciousnesss and recalcitrance which are so injuring every foreign interest here.

Delay not only increases embarrassment arising from anomalous character of present relations (of which both Turks and Allies are equally impatient), but will react injuriously on our position when normal relations are established.

Italians have not won much prestige by ratifying first, but it would be a very serious matter for us if we were to be the last, as we have been expected to give other Powers the lead. I earnestly hope treaty may be taken up very soon. Any information about progress from time to time will be valuable.

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[E 2327/186/44] No. 62.

*Lord D'Abernon to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, March* 16, 1924.

MY despatch No. 12 of 5th January.

Treaty between Turkey and Germany will be ratified here next week. The Turks are pressing German Government to appoint an Ambassador to Constantinople. German Government will gain time by appointing a diplomatic representative without definite title, but they are anxious to meet Turkish wishes and make their representative an Ambassador as soon as possible. Their only reason for delay is the fear that appointment of an Ambassador might arouse criticism in England.

I should be glad to have instructions as to what line to take regarding this.

The person selected for Constantinople post is Herr Nadolny. Dr. Rosenberg, the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was to have been sent to Constantinople, will be probably appointed to Stockholm.

German Government understand that Italy will also appoint an Ambassador to Constantinople, but this statement requires confirmation.

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[E 2461/222/44] No. 63.

*Consul Vaughan-Russell to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 19.)

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Aleppo, March* 4, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 34 of the 20th February, and to state that the deportations of Christians from Anatolia and Turkish Kurdistan are confirmed by reports from reliable sources.

Alarmist reports of massacres of Christians in Mardin and Urfa have reached here, but are considered to be much exaggerated. The only authentic report which confirms the above news of massacres concerns the killing of five Armenians in Urfa, but no general slaughter of Christians is being carried out as far as can be seen. A feature of the present expulsion of these Christians is that it applies not only to Armenians and Greeks of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, against whom the Turks have hitherto been most savage and severe, but also to the Christians belonging to the Syrian Catholic Church and to the Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) Church, who have up to recently been left comparatively in peace. Jews, so far as I can gather, continue to be tolerated in Turkey; however, with the continued and growing xenophobia displayed by the Turks against all persons in Turkey not of Turkish race (even Moslems who are of Arab race are being slowly but surely compelled indirectly to leave Anatolia), it is not certain how long the Jews, so long treated with consideration in Turkey, will be permitted to remain there without molestation.

The present action on the part of the Turks is being carried out with characteristic studied cruelty. The means adopted by them are too well known to require repetition; but it suffices to remark that the majority of the country between Diarbekir, Mardin, Urfa and Marash, whence the Christians are being compelled to leave by force of circumstances, though not by definite orders, is in many places snow- or ice-bound. As these people are prohibited from taking with them anything except the clothes they stand in (and even these are liable to be robbed from them on the way to the frontier) the conditions under which they are being driven out of Turkey can be imagined.

About 300 refugees from Anatolia have drifted into Aleppo during the past month, but it is strongly rumoured that about 10,000 Christians at and near Urfa are awaiting a favourable moment to leave *en masse* for Syria. The local authorities in Aleppo are understood to be strongly opposed to accepting these several thousand Christian refugees within their confines, partly on fanatical religious grounds and partly from the potential danger their presence would cause to public health here.

At the same time, it is inconceivable that if and when these refugees arrive at the Syrian frontier any serious difficulties as regards their admission should be raised, and they will, no doubt, be allowed to enter Syria under severe conditions of quarantine.

I have, &c.
J. F. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

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[E 2334/448/44] No. 64.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 57 of 16th March: Ratification of Lausanne settlement.

You may inform Turkish Government that I have taken the very first day after the necessary financial votes have been finished, *i.e.*, 28th March, for the debate on the Lausanne Settlement Bill. I hope that nothing will arise to interfere with this arrangement. Our ratification will take place the moment the Bill is passed and the dominions have signified their consent. Everything possible is being done to expedite their decision.

Cannot the fact that a day has now been fixed for discussion in House of Commons, and that arrangements for early ratification are so far advanced, be taken as ground for proceeding with Irak frontier conference (see your telegram No. 32) without further delay?

Please do what you can to reassure Turks regarding our intentions, and to explain that only difficult parliamentary situation has prevented me from taking earlier action.

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[E 1432/634/44] No. 65.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Peterson (Prague).*

(No. 123.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to Sir George Clerk's despatch No. 32 of the 31st January, relative to the question of the supply of arms and munitions to Turkey, and in particular to the establishment of munition factories in that country, I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government have for some time been endeavouring to secure an agreement among the various Powers concerned with a view to joint action being taken to prohibit the export of arms and munitions to Turkey. Unfortunately they have been unsuccessful in obtaining unanimity in regard to this question, and they have, therefore, been reluctantly obliged to postpone any further efforts to carry out this policy.

2. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that it would not be fair to subject British or Czechoslovak firms to any disabilities not applicable to the firms of other nationalities. They accordingly propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions to Turkey from this country which has hitherto been in force, and to withdraw their objections to the acquisition by British firms of concessions for the establishment of munition firms in Turkish territory. I therefore request that you will address a communication in the above sense to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that His Majesty's Government, while much appreciating his action in falling in with their policy in this matter hitherto, feel that they can no longer hold him to his undertaking to discourage Czechoslovak firms from engaging in this trade or in negotiating for concessions of this nature.

I am, &c.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

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[E 1432/634/44] No. 66.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 307.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. Oliphant's private letter to Mr. Henderson of the 21st January, relative to the negotiations of the Nobel Industries (Limited) with the Turkish Government for a concession for the establishment of a powder factory in Turkish territory, and to the general question of the prohibition of the export of arms to Turkey, I transmit to you herewith copies of despatches which have been addressed



to His Majesty's diplomatic representatives at Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels and Prague, together with a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Board of Trade on this question.*

2. You will observe that His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly obliged to abandon their efforts to obtain an agreed policy in this matter, and that they, therefore, propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms to Turkey from this country which has hitherto been in force, and consequently to withdraw their objections to the Nobel Industries' negotiations for the concession referred to above.

I am, &c.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

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[E 1432/634/44] No. 67.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (Paris), No. 902, and to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 402; Sir E. Howard (Washington), No. 483; Sir G. Grahame (Brussels), No. 405; and Sir C. Eliot (Tokyo), No. 129, mutatis mutandis.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to Lord Crewe's despatch No. 161 of the 22nd January, relative to the question of the proposed prohibition of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey, I request that you will inform the French Government that His Majesty's Government, while necessarily endorsing the various arguments urged in the French note of the 21st January, nevertheless find themselves obliged, in view of their failure to obtain unanimity on this question among the various Governments concerned, to postpone any further attempt to secure a provisional application to Asia Minor of the arrangements contemplated in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919; and that they, therefore, propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions from this country to Turkey which has hitherto been in force.

I am, &c.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

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[E 1432/634/44] No. 68.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1924.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letters of the 17th January, and to your letters of the 31st January and 6th February, relative to certain applications for licences to export arms and munitions to Turkey, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, the accompanying copies of despatches which have been addressed to His Majesty's representatives at Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels, at Constantinople and at Prague, on the general question of the proposal which was recently put forward by His Majesty's Government for joint action for the prohibition of the export of arms to Turkey.†

2. The Board will observe that His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly obliged to reconsider their policy in regard to this question, and that there is now no objection to the various licences dealt with in the correspondence under reference being granted to the firms concerned.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

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* Nos. 65, 67 and 68.

† Nos. 65, 66 and 67.

[E 2545/634/44] No. 69.

*Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 22.)

(No. 650.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the intention of His Majesty's Government to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions to Asia Minor.

*Paris, March* 21, 1924.

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Enclosure in No. 69.

*Mr. Phipps to M. Poincaré.*

*Paris, March* 21, 1924.

M. le Président du Conseil,

ON the 21st January your Excellency was so good as to address a note to His Majesty's Ambassador regarding the question of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey.

I now have the honour to inform your Excellency, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government, while necessarily endorsing the various arguments put forward in your Excellency's note under reference, nevertheless find themselves obliged, in view of their failure to obtain unanimity on this question amongst the various Governments concerned, to postpone any further attempt to secure a provisional application to Asia Minor of the arrangement contemplated in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919. His Majesty's Government therefore propose to remove the embargo on the export of arms and munitions from the United Kingdom to Turkey which has hitherto been in force.

I have the honour to add that His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Washington, Brussels, Tokyo and Prague have been instructed to convey similar information to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I have, &c.

ERIC PHIPPS.

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[E 2586/210/44] No. 70.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 244.)

*Constantinople, March* 19, 1924.

Sir,

NO foreign diplomatist in this country, in conversation with a Turk, is ever spared the very embarrassing question, "Are you going to Angora, and when?"

2. At frequent intervals the Turkish press publishes inspired paragraphs to the effect that the Government have no intention of returning to Constantinople. Mustafa Kemal himself said so categorically a short while ago, and only this week the Assembly passed the article of the new Constitution decreeing once more that Angora is the capital. Yet few Turks imbued with the Constantinople atmosphere would maintain even to a European that this decision is irrevocable or indeed likely to prevail for more than a few years.

3. Opinion in favour of maintaining the capital at Angora is principally held at Angora itself, and is therefore difficult to analyse with confidence from here, but first of all comes the view that Constantinople is the sink of iniquity from which emanate all those corrupting and enervating influences which have ruined the Turkish State. This is really the present-day expression of a latent feeling which existed even before the revolution—that Turks are an Asiatic tribe, and to Asia they ought to return. For 300 years increasingly closer contact between Turkey and Europe has coincided with a persistent decline in the strength of the Turkish Empire, and it is natural that many Turks should regard European thought and culture, as distinguished from European institutions and inventiveness, as purely deleterious and entirely to be avoided; from their mountain-top the Deputies of Angora clamour for railways, electricity and all the material benefits of European civilisation, but they propose to bring their plans



to execution in Angora and within the framework of a Turkish—not a European—culture; the principles of an advanced democracy, which they do not understand but have accepted from a small band of leaders, can likewise come to fruition only in a Turkish atmosphere; their fundamental mentality remains unchanged, and finds its principal expression in a passionate attachment to Angora.

4. From this state of mind emerge, partly at any rate, arguments of a more practical character. In Constantinople the Government must always be under the possible threat of European military pressure, and only in Angora would it be free to develop the future of the new State along the lines it may regard as most suitable. Again, it was Anatolia and not Constantinople that, unaided, lifted Turkey from the prostration of 1919; both justice and expediency require that in the new Turkey a more even balance shall be held between the interests of Anatolia and those of Constantinople, between town and country, and between the small peasant and the small official. This can only be done by maintaining the capital at Angora.

5. These views are held by the leaders who now govern Turkey in degrees that vary with each individual, but their importance lies in the fact that they are held whole-heartedly by many of the rank and file of the Assembly, who have a purely Anatolian outlook. Whatever the true opinions of the leaders may be, this heavy mass of ignorance and obscurantism limits their capacity for action. I should infer that, if anything untoward happened to the Assembly, a considerable step would have been taken from Angora in the direction of the Bosphorus.

6. To turn now to the considerations which make for a return to Constantinople, too much weight must not be attached to the personal ambition of Mustafa Kemal or to the social ambition of Latife Hanum. Both decidedly exist, and the disappearance of the Caliph has cleared the way for the entry of new actors on the Constantinople stage; but the Ghazi moves prudently, and it is unlikely that ambition will come into play until all danger has been eliminated of its receiving a check. Still less importance is to be attached to the undoubted desire of many people at Angora to return to the fleshpots of Constantinople and the comforts of modern life. The impulse to return to the shores of the Bosphorus comes from more important than merely personal motives. There is acute economic distress throughout Turkey and an ever-increasing desire for better administration than the present Government has hitherto been able to provide. The pressure on the Government comes mainly indeed from Constantinople, but also from Anatolia. The more intelligent leaders cannot but have asked themselves whether they can ever hope to meet this demand, when their decisions must for ever be governed by an Assembly whose members have a largely Anatolian outlook. If the pressure from Constantinople increases, they may well come to the conclusion that it is easier to govern Angora from Constantinople than to govern Constantinople from Angora.

7. The foregoing paragraphs give an imperfect view of Turkish thought in which almost every sentence requires qualification and no account is taken of the highly complicated cross-currents of opinion. The point which it is desired to make is that the question of Angora *versus* Constantinople is not a simple one to be decided on superficial grounds—it is really part of a conflict between various schools of thought, in which even the schools may be divided against themselves and the individual politicians may be inspired by self-contradictory ideals The conflict involves issues of the deepest importance to the future of the Turkish State, and the question of the capital is only one of them, though an important one. The inference to be drawn is that in the conflict matters of personal consideration, and even questions of national *amour-propre*, will count for little in the decision, and it will be less than useless for European Governments to endeavour to influence the decision by suggesting that they can accredit Ambassadors to Turkey only if the capital remains at Constantinople or by putting forward other conditions of this character. As to what the outcome of the conflict will be, so far as the immediate issue is concerned—viz., that of the capital—I have a dislike, which you will understand, of uttering prophecies in this place, and the utmost I dare say now is that some day Constantinople will almost certainly again be the capital of Turkey, but not for several months at the very soonest. Unfortunately His Majesty's Government have to decide what they wish their representative to do within a very few days.

8. In a previous despatch I have briefly touched on the disadvantages under which we at present labour in the transaction of business with the Turkish Government. Adnan Bey, head of the Constantinople delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is an agreeable, gentlemanly person, with decent education, fairly intelligent, capable of seeing another person's point of view, and, I think, anxious to avoid difficulties. He is our only means of communicating with the Government at Angora. What we

communicate to him in writing I have no doubt he faithfully transmits to the Ministry, and such written answers as we receive from him are, I am sure, textually what Angora has instructed him to send; but I have the gravest doubt as to whether the fair verbal arguments with which every diplomatist loves to accompany his written exhortations ever find any echo outside the four walls of his room, and he himself is never able to add anything verbally to the answers, almost always terse and unsatisfactory, which he passes on to us. Bad as this is, the situation is likely to be even worse if and when, as is now threatened, Adnan Bey is replaced by an official of even lower standing. There is now no real contact between the Government of Turkey and those of the Great Powers of Europe and America, and no efficient means by which the latter can make their views known to the former, or apply any methods of pressure or persuasion. It will be all the more important to remedy this state of affairs when the Treaty of Lausanne comes into force and the application of its stipulations has to be insisted on. Nor can any serious attempt be made to wean Turkey from her violent xenophobia until some more efficient contact has been established.

9. The conversations I have had with my French and Italian colleagues show that they are just as alive to the difficulties of the situation as I am. M. Jessé Curély has the tactical advantage of being able to answer, when he is asked if he is going to Angora, that he has only acting rank, and that no decision can be taken till his chief returns to Constantinople. He himself is the last person who would go to such a place without absolute orders to do so; but his Government has so far committed itself to the Angora principle as to earmark 3,000 square metres of ground there for the future Embassy or Legation house. Signor Montagna, on the other hand, my Italian colleague, is a realist, and all out to win striking successes. I have not the slightest doubt that he is longing to get off to Angora, but, like the cat in the adage, he is torn in two directions; he has instructions and is personally anxious to work in with this mission so that though he would dearly love the fish of success, he is unwilling to wet his paws by stealing a march on me. Still, I should not be surprised to learn any morning that he was on his way to the Turkish capital.

10. In these circumstances, I have the honour to recommend that I be generally authorised to pay a visit to Angora. You will not require to be persuaded that nothing but a stern sense of duty would induce me to put this recommendation forward.

11. If you approve of this recommendation, then one or two subsidiary points require to be dealt with:—

(1.) I should not propose to go to Angora for more than a few days at a time at more or less prolonged intervals. While ready to pay a homage to the new Turkey by visiting its capital, I do not wish to curry favour by planting myself permanently there. This may not be the best way of doing business, but it would be an improvement on the present. I hope no question will arise yet awhile of any sort of a house; I should rough it in a hotel or railway carriage.

(2.) I should not go to Angora unless I were assured beforehand that I should be received by Mustafa Kemal, whether the treaty is ratified or not. This I should have to arrange beforehand.

(3.) I prefer not to deal now with the question of a liaison officer at Angora. I should like to look round first and the necessity may be avoided. Meanwhile, perhaps members of my staff may wish to volunteer for occasional visits.

(4.) The French and Italian Governments ought to be notified of the decision, and enabled to take similar action simultaneously. This could either be done by communication from yourself to Paris and Rome, or by myself to my colleagues here. I should prefer the latter, but it is not very important. I should tell them what was about to happen, and give them time to telegraph to their Governments and receive an answer, keeping the matter secret, meanwhile, from the Turks.

(5.) As Signor Montagna may at any moment take the bit between his teeth, I should be grateful if you would communicate your decision to me by telegraph; stating also whether you will yourself make it known at Paris and Rome, or whether I should apprise my colleagues here.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2588/32/44] No. 71.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 247.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, I have the honour to state that the Grand National Assembly has set aside one day a week, Sunday, for the consideration of the new draft Constitution of the Turkish Republic. It was not submitted to the People's party as such before being laid before the Assembly.

2. The debates opened on the 9th March with a general discussion. The *rapporteur*, Jelal Nouri Bey, claimed, in a short introductory statement, that his committee had shown the fullest respect for the principle of national sovereignty and the "unification of the Powers." The Cabinet system they had evolved was based not on the separation of the Powers but on the "distribution of functions." The President of the Republic came out of their own midst, and was not like an hereditary sovereign ruling without regard to his qualifications. The committee had consulted other Constitutions, among which he named those of the United States of America and Switzerland as models which had not been followed.

3. Certain Deputies objected to the draft on various grounds, and some of them proposed that it should be sent back to the committee. The principal objections referred to the proposals to give executive power to a body, namely, the Cabinet, distinct from the Assembly, to give the President of the Republic the rights of dissolution and veto, and to vest in the President the supreme command of the army. This last proposal does not appear in the draft as published in Constantinople, but it would appear to be included in the final draft. The question of the desirability of a second chamber was also broached.

4. After these and other points had been made, a discussion ensued as to what majority should be required for decisions on the draft. It was eventually decided that a majority of two-thirds of the Deputies present in the House should suffice. The question of how many constitute a quorum was not apparently raised. I am not very clear how this stands at present. I believe the rule to be that, on first discussion, one more than half the total membership of the Assembly must be present, but that a second division on the same question is valid regardless of the number of those present.

5. The general discussion was resumed on the 16th March but was brought to an early end by the adoption of a closure motion after further attacks had been made on the committee's proposals regarding the President's right of dissolution and veto. The Assembly then proceeded to consider the individual articles and disposed of the first seventeen at a rate which might be thought to indicate levity in dealing with the fundamental law of a republic intended to last for all time. A juster inference would perhaps be that the leaders have carefully thought the matter out themselves, and that they have on the whole now got the Assembly very well in hand, notwithstanding the necessity for allowing a certain amount of freedom of discussion. Docility rather than levity would, in fact, appear to account for the rapidity with which this important business was transacted in a fairly full House. At one moment there were as many as 181 Deputies present.

6. The Assembly passed articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 15 either as they stood in the draft, or with unimportant, for the most part merely verbal, alterations. A proposal to establish a second chamber was withdrawn by the movers in order to be put forward later in connection with article 25. A suggestion that Turkey should be defined in article 1 as a People's Republic instead of a Republic simply was rejected. It might have been expected that after the recent changes regarding the Caliphate, &c., the affirmation in article 2 that Islam is the religion of the State would have been contested. It seems, however, to have been passed without much discussion, a proposal to declare Islam to be the official religion having been rejected. A proposal that article 13, which fixes the duration of the Grand National Assembly at four years should not apply to the present Assembly was rejected by 98 to 69 votes. The fact that the rejection of this motion, whereby the life the present Assembly is prolonged by two years beyond the period for which it was elected, was not carried by a majority of two-thirds appears to have given no trouble. The provision in article 14 for a six months' recess aroused some criticism, but the article was eventually passed as in the draft. Otherwise few points of interest arose on the articles enumerated above.

7. The position regarding article 3 is not entirely clear. In the version of the draft enclosed in my despatch under reference it consisted of two parts. Only the first, which states that sovereignty belongs unrestrictedly to the nation, appears to have survived. The article is, nevertheless, stated in the reports to have been passed in the form in which it was submitted, after a Deputy had suggested that other articles conflicted with the principle laid down in it. There would appear to be some ground for this criticism, but no Turkish statesman or politician could at the present time afford to admit that he was tampering with the principle of unrestricted national sovereignty.

8. Article 11, which as drafted provided that every Turk over 30 years of age was eligible to the office of Deputy, was modified by restricting it to males. The Deputies appear to have thought that they were discussing the question of women's rights in connection with both this article and article 10 which relates to the right of voting. A good deal of uncertainty now prevails as to whether the Assembly, by retaining article 10 in its original form and modifying article 11, has more or less accidentally enfranchised the whole adult female population. This point will have to be cleared up later. For the moment it looks as though women had secured the vote, but there is nothing to show what is the preponderating view in the Assembly as between one member who held that nothing could prevent women from coming into her own in ten years, whatever might be decided now, and an old-fashioned Deputy who exclaimed that when that happened the men would become women.

9. The clause in article 12 disqualifying the Caliph and members of his family for the office of Deputy was omitted for obvious reasons. An addition to the effect that persons unable to read and write should be ineligible was accepted.

10. The form of oath in article 16 was slightly modified, the only change of importance being the insertion of a phrase expressly binding Deputies to pursue no aim at variance with the unrestricted sovereignty of the nation.

11. Article 17 was somewhat modified so as to obviate on the one hand abuse outside the Assembly of parliamentary immunity and to fortify the immunity in other respects. The importance of the first change will appear from a comparison of the first sentence of the article, as given in my despatch under reference, and the new form which runs as follows:—

> "No Deputy shall be held responsible for opinions expressed or statements made within the Assembly or for the expression outside the Assembly of opinions expressed or statements made inside it."

12. Although the debates summarised in this despatch cover a great deal of important ground, the real test of the feelings of the Assembly, or rather of the readiness of the members to give expression to them, will be afforded only when the articles relative to dissolution, the right of veto, and the supreme command of the army come up for discussion.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 2590/448/44**] No. 72.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 24).

(No. 251.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1924.

ON the 12th March my Italian colleague notified Dr. Adnan Bey that Italy had ratified the Treaty of Lausanne by a Royal decree. The news was made public in Constantinople the same afternoon. It was quite unexpected, largely because Great Britain and France loom so large in the public mind here that little attention has been paid to the question of what Italy intended to do about ratification.

2. As I intimated in my telegram No. 58 of the 16th March, the Italian "scoop," as it was undoubtedly intended to be, has had only a very moderate success. Satisfaction has of course been expressed, and M. Montagna, who obviously arranged the matter after his arrival here, receives deservedly a good deal of personal credit for having induced his Government to show the way to other Great Powers. The occasion has been taken to express appreciation of his attitude at the Lausanne Conference. There have also been a small number of articles in the press discussing Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* of Italy in a friendly spirit, and recalling the sympathetic attitude of that country during the national struggle.



3. Apart from the comparatively little importance attached by the Turks to Italian ratification, while that of Great Britain and France still hangs in the balance, there is another reason for the absence of any genuine enthusiasm, namely, the suspicion felt regarding Italian ambitions in respect of Adalia. This suspicion has been stimulated by a recent utterance of M. Mussolini, to which the Italian ratification has directed more Turkish attention than it might otherwise have received, to the effect that Italy had no longer anything to look for in the West and must turn her eyes towards the East. M. Mussolini's statement was merely incidental to a defence of the Italian agreement with Jugoslavia, and when it was made public here on the 28th–29th February local attention was absorbed in the Caliphate question.

4. The news of the ratification gave rise to rumours that M. Montagna would very shortly proceed to Angora to present letters of credence. In my despatch No. 244 of the 19th instant I have had occasion to mention how eager M. Montagna is to pay an early visit to Angora for practical reasons which incline me in the same direction. He has, however, given no countenance to the suggestion that he might present letters of credence before the peace treaty comes into force. The "Wakt" newspaper of the 15th March published an interview with an Italian personage, who was obviously M. Montagna himself or some one speaking with his full authority, and who emphasised at the outset the fact that ratification by Italy did not mean that the treaty had come into force. It was, however, a mark of goodwill, for which it was hoped that there would be some return. There was no subject of difference, the speaker observed, between Italy and Turkey, as "the Dodecanese question had been settled by the Lausanne Treaty and the islands had been left to Italy."

5. The personage who gave the interview went on to explain that Italian policy in the East was directed solely to economic objectives. Except for a reference to Italy's need of outlets for her surplus population, his statement under this head was calculated to disarm Turkish suspicion. The Italian Embassy, he continued, would not move to Angora, but M. Montagna was anxious to go and see the statesmen there, especially Ismet Pasha, whom he knew intimately. It was necessary, however, to wait a little longer. Everything would be settled when the other Powers had ratified the treaty.

6. The "Wakt" article ends with a statement, which is not clearly part of the interview, and which, if it were, would rather contradict the last remark quoted above, to the effect that if M. Montagna should go to Angora in the near future it would not be to present letters of credence to the President of the Republic, but to hand his letter of representation to Ismet Pasha, "just as M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, will proceed next week to Angora to present to Ismet Pasha a special letter announcing his appointment as representative."

7. With regard to the last passage, I have no information regarding the Roumanian Minister's intention, but in his case, also, rumours have been current since Roumania ratified the treaty that he would shortly be going to the Turkish capital.

8. I take this opportunity of mentioning some further points connected with ratification. The same issue of the "Wakt" of the 15th March contained also an interview with Mr. Kasama, the Japanese representative, foreshadowing very early ratification by Japan. It had only been delayed, he said, hitherto by the great disaster and the change of Government. The "Ileri" of the 14th had an interview with the French representative, in which he stated that France desired to ratify the treaty as soon as possible, but once more hinted that it would be easier if Turkey satisfied French desiderata. Lastly, I have to record that on the 12th March Shukri Kaya Bey left Constantinople for Berne and Paris in order to deposit in those capitals the ratifications of the Turco-Polish Treaty and the Treaty of Lausanne respectively. I see by the press that he has already accomplished the first part of this mission.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 2591/1752/44**] No. 73.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 24.)

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 224 of the 12th March, I have the honour to state that there are still no signs of the decision of the Grand National Assembly to abolish the Caliphate producing any reflex action among the Turkish population.

The general attitude in Constantinople and, so far as I know, elsewhere is one of outward indifference or subdued resignation, bred of lassitude and fear of a triumphant minority.

2. It is more interesting for the moment to consider the effect on that minority of the events and commentaries to which the decision of the Assembly has given rise abroad. The Angora Government are in a somewhat difficult position. I happen to know that they are very anxious to reduce to a minimum the amount of news from outside on the subject of the Caliphate. On the other hand, they wish to avoid any appearance of curtailing the liberty of a very sensitive press. The result is that direct reports from abroad are apt not to appear in the papers when they arrive here by telegraph, but are published a few days later, in a medley of European comment, when the foreign newspapers reach Constantinople by post.

3. One effect of this is that irresponsible comments in the press of European countries with Moslem dependencies create the impression that the Governments of those countries are severally seeking to exploit the new situation regarding the Caliphate in their own interest. It is natural enough that Turks should suppose the British Government to be behind the candidature of King Hussein. It is rather more absurd that an article by Claude Farrère, suggesting that hospitality should be offered to Abdul Mejid Effendi in Tunis, or a rumour that he has been invited to Rome, should be taken as an indication that the French or Italian Governments are disposed to espouse his cause for political reasons of their own.

4. Turkish extremists would be happy enough if all they had to fear were a contest of several rival Caliphs, each enjoying recognition only in a limited area. What would really worry the responsible leaders would be to see a candidate like King Hussein accepted by Moslems outside the Arab countries, or to see Abdul Mejid Effendi receive any wide measure of sympathy or support. Any such development would, apart from its placing Turkey in an awkward position *vis-à-vis* of the world of Islam generally, tend to stimulate criticism at home. Certain Opposition newspapers here, which do not venture themselves to attack the Government, have been saying of late that it should answer foreign critics of what it has done.

5. Little or no news of how the change has been received in other Moslem countries has yet become public property here. This increases the preoccupation of the Turks over the attitude, or supposed attitude, of European Governments and over reports regarding such personages as King Hussein, Abdul Mejid Effendi and, in a less degree, the ex-Sultan Vahid Uddin. For the last few days Abdul Mejid Effendi has held the centre of the stage. A Havas telegram reporting that he had issued a manifesto denying the validity of his deposition, and appealing to the decision of a Moslem congress, was successfully kept out of the papers. Even now the text of it has not been published, but it has received much indirect publicity, owing to the reproduction of an article in the "Temps" commenting on it. His action has evoked a storm of indignation. He is accused of having violated his declared intention of bowing to the will of the Grand National Assembly. He is threatened with the stoppage of any further supplies of money and with the confiscation of his property here. He is decried in some extreme papers as being no better than Vahid Uddin, and one paper has, with unconscious humour, accused him of ingratitude. Fuel has been added to the fire by the reproduction of an interview with the ex-Caliph in the Paris "Journal" of a few days ago.

6. It would be useful to me if I could be furnished with any authentic information regarding the proceedings of the various personages mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and other candidates for the Caliphate, as and when they appear on the scene. I receive, and trust I may continue to receive, from the capitals directly concerned, information regarding developments connected with King Hussein's bid for recognition. I am, however, unable to control in any way reports like that which appeared in the "Times" of the 13th March, to the effect that Vahid Uddin had telegraphed to King Hussein supporting the claim of the latter. I should be glad to receive, also, early information of any developments in India, and, in particular, the circumstances in which the Red Crescent Mission has decided to leave that country immediately on its arrival.

7. I need hardly say that I desire such information only for my general guidance. I have scrupulously refrained from any action or language here which might suggest that His Majesty's Government are concerning themselves with the question of the Caliphate. Your statement on the subject in the House of Commons was reproduced in the local papers of the 15th and 16th March. I shall not fail to refer back to it when pressed, by journalists or others, for an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government.



8. The general situation here has been extremely quiet during the past week. The report that members of former Constantinople Governments and other persons were to be expelled has been officially denied. There is no longer any talk of constituting new Courts of Independence or of reinforcing the law on treason. The reports that such measures were in contemplation were no doubt deliberately sent out from Angora during the critical days in order to discourage any manifestation of discontent while the Caliphal family was being got rid of. Having served that object, they have not been followed by action, but they can, of course, be revived as occasion requires.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 2719/180/44**] No. 74.

*Mr. Erskine to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 26.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sofia, March* 26, 1924.

TREATY of Lausanne, including Thracian Frontier Convention, has been approved by Sobranje. Publication in "Gazette" is expected shortly.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

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[**E 2722/1752/44**] No. 75.

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 447.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1924.

THE Secretary of the Italian Embassy called at the Foreign Office on the 24th instant and stated that M. Mussolini had received from the Hashimite representative in Rome an announcement of King Hussein's assumption of the Caliphate, and would be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government had received a similar communication and what action they had taken.

2. M. Taliani was informed that Dr. Naji-el-Assil had asked to be received by the Prime Minister in order to make a similar announcement, but that his request had been refused on the grounds of our policy of disinterestedness in the Caliphate question, as formulated by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. His Majesty's Government had also received, but not answered, a telegram on the subject from the Hashimite Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
J. RAMSAY MacDONALD.

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[**E 2840/32/44**] No. 76.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 269.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 26, 1924.

IN the last paragraph of my despatch No. 247 of the 19th March relative to the new Turkish Constitution, I observed that the real test of the position in the Grand National Assembly would be the attitude taken up by the Deputies when the articles in the draft Constitution regarding the rights of dissolution and veto and the supreme command of the army came up for discussion. This test has now been applied with results which show that I overrated the docility of the rank and file of the Assembly or of the People's party, which has hitherto come to very much the same thing. Ismet Pasha, who has so far been able to secure a substantial majority in favour of all measures regarded by the Government as being of first-class importance, is in a minority on the right of dissolution question.

2. The first overt sign of serious trouble was the failure of Ismet Pasha and his supporters at two meetings of the People's party on the 17th and 18th March, to secure the election of their candidates for the vice-presidencies and committee of the party. Ismet himself was elected President, but the vice-presidencies and most, if not all, the

posts on the committee were filled from a list prepared by an Opposition group. Feizi Bey of Diarbekr was elected senior vice-president, a fact the more significant as he has not hitherto been publicly identified with the Opposition.

3. It was known that the Opposition group responsible for this successful *coup* held strong views regarding both the veto and the proposal to give the President of the Republic a practically unlimited right of dissolving the Assembly as proposed in the draft Constitution. Rumours of a Cabinet crisis began to circulate and a controversy arose as to which was to be held the greater danger, the despotism of a President or the despotism of an Assembly incapable of being dissolved except by its own act. In Government circles the idea of a Cabinet crisis was scouted and strong efforts were made to effect a compromise on the points at issue. Those efforts culminated in an abortive discussion between representatives of both sides on the night of the 21st–22nd March. This discussion appears to have taken place at Mustafa Kemal's residence, but it is not stated whether he or Ismet Pasha took any part in it.

4. On the 23rd March the debate on the draft Constitution was resumed in the Assembly. Articles 19 to 24 gave little trouble. Article 19 of the draft was modified so as to give the President of the Assembly a right of convoking the Assembly during the recess similar to that conferred on the President of the Republic. Some discussion arose on article 23 as to whether Under-Secretaries of State and university professors should be free to combine their functions with membership of the Assembly. The question appears to have been settled in the negative by the omission of the 2nd sentence of the article as originally drafted.

5. Yunus Nadi Bey, President of the Constitutional Committee, attempted vainly to postpone the discussion of article 25 by admitting that it required reconsideration and asking that it should be returned to the committee for that purpose. This proposal was rejected as contrary to the rules of procedure. Reshad Bey, Deputy for Sarouhan, said that he was the latest member to have visited his constituency and that the young men in that part of the country wished to know whether the principles affirmed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself had been forgotten. The nation would keep the Pasha's word and would not part with a jot of its sovereignty. This elicited a challenge from Ismet Pasha, who asked whether these young men had met and declared their intention of resisting the Assembly should it decide contrary to their wishes. Reshad Bey said there had been no meeting. He spoke of personal contacts. If God himself were President they would not give Him the right of dissolution. After other members had spoken for and against the proposal in the draft article compromises were suggested. The principal of these was a formula proposed by a supporter of the Government, who suggested that the President should have power to recommend dissolution to the Assembly for stated reasons of high national interest and that such recommendation should be effective unless rejected by a two-thirds majority. This proposal was rejected on a division by 122 votes against 71, with two abstentions.

6. Upon this, the Ministers and their supporters gradually left the House The draft article was then put the vote in its original form and was rejected by 127 votes against 2, again with two abstentions. The number of members present having thus dropped from 195 to 131, the vote was invalidated for lack of a quorum, and it was decided to take a further division on the 24th March, when, in accordance with the rule explained in my despatch No. 247 of the 19th March the result would hold good regardless of the number of members present. When the Assembly met next day, the Ministers and their supporters again absented themselves. The new division resulted in exactly the same number of votes and abstentions. The article was thus definitely thrown out.

7. The result has been to create an utterly confused political situation at Angora, the real nature and probable outcome of which it is impossible at this distance to determine. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, with habitual caution, has avoided committing himself to any view. Indeed, it was at one time put about that he was himself averse from having the rights of dissolution and veto conferred upon him. Fethi Bey, the President of the Assembly and a possible Prime Minister, has thrown in his lot with the Opposition. In a normally constituted country a Cabinet crisis would probably be inevitable, but in Turkey even this cannot be regarded as certain, for technically it is not the Cabinet but the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly which is responsible for the draft law. The probability of a Cabinet crisis has, however, been a good deal increased since the 25th March, when Ismet Pasha issued a communiqué to the effect that the managing body of the party had informed him that the Government had not the support of a majority of the Assembly. In consequence of this intimation, he said, a general meeting of the party would be held on the 27th March.



8. In the meanwhile, Yunus Nadi Bey, chairman of the Constitutional Committee, and Jelal Nouri, the *rapporteur*, are said to have resigned. The former published on the 23rd March in his newspaper, the "Yeni Gyun," a flaming article accusing the Assembly of having dealt a blow at national sovereignty at the bidding of self-seekers. He hinted at a possibility of the Assembly being "replaced" without defining what he meant by that expression. This outburst has led to a proposal that he should be expelled from the party.

9. Apart from the question of a Cabinet crisis, there is much talk of other possibilities, such as a change of Cabinet, a dissolution of the Assembly by its own decision, or a break-up of the People's party. There are some who do not put it past Mustafa Kemal and Ismet to make an end of the Assembly by unconstitutional means, but no one puts so indecent a suggestion into print, for everyone acclaims "national sovereignty," interpreted according to his own ideas, as the one sure foundation.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 2984/448/44] No. 77.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April* 3, 1924.

TREATY discussion took place in House of Commons on 1st April, but, owing to inevitable limitation of debate to four hours and to desire of a number of members to take part, it was necessary to postpone it until 9th April before completing second reading. Thereafter it is hoped that subsequent stages will only be pure formality occupying two or three days, and, as assent of nearly all the dominions to ratification has been received, there should be little further delay.

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[E 3080/32/44] No. 78.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April* 7.)

(No. 285.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 2, 1924.

THE crisis described in my despatch No. 269 of the 26th March relative to the debates in the Grand National Assembly on the new Turkish Constitution has been liquidated in a very singular fashion.

2. From the storm of controversy which followed the rejection on the 24th March of article 25 of the draft Constitution, two facts clearly emerged. They were, firstly, that whatever Ismet Pasha's technical position as regards responsibility for the provisions of the draft, he was entirely in agreement with the Constitutional Committee's proposal to give to the President of the Republic the right of dissolving the Assembly; and, secondly, that the essence of the situation was a conflict, not confined to article 25 nor even mainly concerned with it, between Ismet Pasha and those who had captured in defiance of his wishes all the principal posts in the management of the People's party except the presidency of it.

3. As this conflict developed, which it did rapidly on the 24th and 25th March, the constitutional question dropped for the time being into the background and the malcontents defined their position in a demand for the removal of four Ministers from the Cabinet. Ismet Pasha could probably have compromised by sacrificing two of the four to whom the other side were more particularly hostile. He refused, however, to submit to any dictation as regards the choice of his colleagues and countermoved by issuing his communiqué of the 25th March, in which he summoned a general meeting of the party for the 27th March on the ground that the managing body of it had informed him that the Government had not the support of a majority in the Assembly.

4. Such were the known facts of the situation on the 26th March. It was simple enough in essence, but it was confused by a cloud of rumours of every kind. Ismet Pasha was to resign. The Assembly would decide or be induced to dissolve itself. Fethi Bey was to be brought back into power. The People's party would divide into two sections. The malcontents in the committee of the party had jumped the majority into what amounted to, but was not intended to be, a vote of non-confidence in the Government. All these and

many other surmises filled the air of Angora and were echoed in Constantinople. The tenseness of the situation was increased by the resentment caused by Yunus Nadi Bey's article of the 24th March accusing the opponents of article 25 of having dealt the first blow to national sovereignty.

5. What passed in the inner circles at Angora on the 26th March cannot be known. It is almost certain that Mustafa Kemal brought influence to bear. Anyhow, the party meeting on the 27th March followed a very different course from what anyone had anticipated. Ismet Pasha delivered a vigorous speech, in the course of which he made the point that he had not sought to make article 25 a Government question, despite his own conviction that it contained nothing contrary to the principle of national sovereignty. He defended his four colleagues one by one. He answered a reproach based on Lord Curzon's claim to have scored an unhoped-for success at Lausanne by securing the passage of warships through the Straits. Lord Curzon, he said, had had to represent his performance in the most favourable light; but, supposing that he, Ismet Pasha, had been tricked at Lausanne, what was to be said of those who in Angora itself had been taken in by two American vagabonds and had granted them the Chester concession, which proved so great an embarrassment in the peace negotiations?

6. This hit at Reouf Bey, who was Prime Minister when the Chester concession was granted, and Feizi Bey, then Minister of Public Works, now one of the prime movers in the article 25 agitation, was the culminating point of Ismet Pasha's speech. In his peroration he said that, if he did not deserve the confidence of the Assembly, they need be under no anxiety. He had strengthened the position of the country abroad. Were he to fall from power, he would hand it over to his successor "like a rose." It was too great to be dependent on a single Ismet.

7. Other speakers followed. The principal were Sefa Bey, ex-Minister of Public Instruction, and Feizi Bey. They disclaimed any intention of assailing Ismet Pasha. Feizi Bey repudiated the assertion of another Deputy that he had proposed to Fethi Bey to form a Government. Eventually, the oldest Deputy present proposed the closure and a vote of confidence in the Government. This was passed practically unanimously, 154 for, 1 against and 4 abstentions.

8. This result was sufficiently astonishing, although it left unaccounted for some thirty-four of the 195 Deputies who were present in the Grand National Assembly on the 23rd March. It appeared to indicate the collapse of the formidable *bloc* which the malcontents had collected to oppose the right of dissolution being given to the President of the Republic. The leaders themselves had not stood up to Ismet Pasha, and there was no further question of his being compelled to dismiss Ministers. It looked as though he, with Mustafa Kemal in the background, had won all along the line. It was generally anticipated that when the Assembly next took the draft Constitution a qualified right of dissolution would be given to the President. In the meanwhile, it caused no surprise that at a further meeting of the party on the 29th March the Yunus Nadi incident was disposed of without difficulty. He had published milder articles in the interval, and these, combined with the explanations which he gave to the party, were accepted as so satisfactory that he and the principal signatory of a motion to censure him embraced.

9. The resources of the Angora kaleidoscope were, however, unexhausted. The debate on the Constitution was resumed on the 30th March. Yunus Nadi Bey and Jelal Nuri Bey reappeared as chairman and *rapporteur* of the Constitutional Committee, notwithstanding the reports current after their previous rebuff that they had resigned; but instead of fighting for their draft they allowed the Assembly to do what it pleased with it. The principles of the *bloc* which had opposed the President's right of dissolution triumphed completely. No less than fifteen articles were voted in an atmosphere of harmony. It was laid down *inter alia* that a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the Assembly should be required for its dissolution; that the period of office of the President of the Assembly should be the same as the life of the Assembly and that he must be chosen from among the members; and that, while the President might refer legislation back to the Assembly, he must promulgate laws voted a second time in the ordinary manner. Not only was the proposal to make this conditional on insistence by two-thirds of the Assembly dropped, but modifications of the Constitution and financial laws were excluded from the operation of the clause. The question of the supreme command of the army seems to have been broached, but no decision was taken. It is indeed not clear that it will now be dealt with in the Constitution at all. I enclose a translation published in the French "Tanin" of the 31st March of the fifteen articles as finally passed.* They correspond to articles 25 to 56 of the draft enclosed in my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February, a draft, however, which, from the course of the debates, I now believe to be an earlier version of that actually submitted to the Assembly.

* Not printed.



10. The proceedings described above leave it very doubtful what is the true position at Angora, and still more doubtful what are the intentions of Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha. The Opposition, if incoherent, is undoubtedly capable of further efforts. Mustafa Kemal is, on the other hand, not the man to let the Opposition have its own way if it stands in the path of his personal ambition, and what, to give him his due, is equally important in his eyes, namely, the practical administration of the country. It is generally thought that, whatever else happens, the Assembly will adjourn in the near future for a period of several months. During that period the Government will have no power to legislate, a limitation which will cause it grave inconvenience if it is scrupulous in respecting the Constitution, but it will have a very free hand in current administration. It may be that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, hoist with his own petard of "national sovereignty," finds in this a sufficient compensation for having to submit to restrictions on his legal powers as President; but he is nothing if not bold, and it is equally possible that he has yielded only because he is contemplating some *coup* which will rid him of the control of a turbulent Assembly. Unable to make a forecast, I can only hint at possibilities in the further evolution of a distinctly Napoleonic personality.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 3082/222/44] No. 79.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 289.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 2, 1924.*

PUBLICITY was given here some days ago to a statement given to the "Yeni-Adana" newspaper, appearing in Adana, by Ferid Bey, Turkish Minister of the Interior. I enclose a French version of the statement printed in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 29th March.

2. Ferid Bey's statement is open to two interpretations. On a casual reading it looks as though it were intended not to tolerate the presence of any Armenians in any part of Asia Minor east of a line drawn from Samsoun to Selevke. A more careful perusal suggests however, that the statement means that no Armenians at present outside that area will be allowed to enter it.

3. Although the second of these alternatives is almost as irreconcilable as the first with the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne and the amnesty declaration attached to the treaty, it would obviously involve less hardship, and Ferid Bey's statement may in fact herald a mitigation of the policy hitherto followed by the Turks of not readmitting to any part of Turkey Armenians who have fled from their homes in abnormal circumstances.

4. The probability that the second alternative is what is really in view is increased by an article which appeared on the 30th March in the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," a violently anti-foreign and anti-Christian paper. The writer warmly applauds the utterance of Ferid Bey, and hails it as a proof that there is nothing serious in the proposal in the draft Turkish Constitution (see my despatch No. 162 of the 26th February) that non-Moslem inhabitants of Turkey should rank as Turks. He adds, however, the following note:—

> "An elucidation: In what we wrote yesterday about this prohibited zone there was a lack of precision, and it was said that the connection of the Armenians with our country had been terminated. The Armenians whose connection had been terminated are not the Armenians living in Turkey and engaged in their business there, but the Armenians who run after the national home and have left Turkey."

5. This note does not indeed necessarily imply that fugitive Armenians will be readmitted to places west of the Samsoun–Selevke line, but it suggests that the writer had been warned not to interpret Ferid Bey's statement in an extravagant sense. The Constantinople press of the 2nd April devotes a good deal of attention to the whole subject. The various items of news which they publish tend to show that the Government has taken no general decision, but that certain individual Armenians have already obtained permission to return, and that some more general measure may be anticipated in the near future.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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Enclosure in No. 79.

*Extract from the "Journal d'Orient," Constantinople, of March 29, 1924.*

UNE ZONE INTERDITE AUX ARMÉNIENS EN ANATOLIE.

LE Ministre de l'Intérieur, Férid Bey, a fait les déclarations suivantes au journal "Yeni-Adana" sur la situation de la Cilicie :

"Tant au cours de la rétrocession d'Adana qu'après la dernière grande victoire remportée par nous," avait demandé le journaliste turc, "un tas d'Arméniens avait été expulsés hors des frontières nationales. Le bruit a couru ces jours-ci que ces derniers seraient autorisés à rentrer dans leurs foyers. Quelle est votre opinion personnelle et quelles sont les décisions arrêtées par le Gouvernement à ce sujet ?"

"Nous avons admis comme 'zone interdite' aux Arméniens tout le territoire situé à l'est d'une ligne fictive tirée de Samsoun jusqu'au littoral de Silefké sur la Méditerranée. Le projet que nous avons élaboré à ce sujet sera soumis à l'Assemblée nationale pour être discuté d'urgence. Par conséquent, il ne saurait être question aujourd'hui d'un 'foyer arménien' sur nos terres situées à l'est de cette zone.

"Il ne peut absolument pas être question non plus du retour des Arméniens qui, de leur propre initiative, ont quitté le pays. D'ailleurs, nous sommes sur le point de prendre une décision pour donner leurs biens abandonnés aux musulmans qui ont eu à souffrir de l'invasion. On peut comprendre par là également que tout lien des Arméniens avec notre patrie est à jamais tranché. Les rumeurs d'un autre caractère que l'on fait circuler sont mensongères."

"A-t-on décidé d'exempter de l'échange les Grecs orthodoxes de langue arabe ?"

"Non. Les Grecs dont le culte et l'enseignement se font en langue grecque, mais qui parlent l'arabe, seront soumis à l'échange au même titre que les autres. Nous avons appris que les Grecs de langue arabe qui se trouvent à Mersine se sont adressés dernièrement à la France pour implorer sa protection. Les noms de ceux qui ont fait cette démarche sont connus par le Gouvernement. Je fais procéder à une enquête sévère à leur égard. Vous pouvez être certain qu'elle aboutira prochainement."

"Il y a certains traîtres qui ont servi les visées de l'ennemi au cours de l'occupation de notre pays et qui ont bénéficié, dans la suite, de l'amnistie. Le fait de leur accorder les mêmes droits qu'aux autres compatriotes purs et sans reproche provoque dans le pays une légitime nervosité. Quelle ligne de conduite le Gouvernement se propose-t-il d'adopter à l'égard de cette catégorie de gens ?"

"Vous pouvez annoncer la bonne nouvelle à vos compatriotes que des décisions de nature à les satisfaire sont en train d'être arrêtées en ce qui concerne ceux qui ont travaillé et qui continuent à travailler contre le turquisme dans la région d'Adana."

"Viendrez-vous visiter notre Adana ?"

"Je me propose de faire prochainement une longue tournée d'étude et d'inspection dans tous les vilayets de l'est et du sud. *Inchallah*, je commencerai par Adana pour me rendre ensuite à Marache, Ghazi-Aïntab, Diarbékir, Bitlis, Mouche, puis de là à Erzéroum pour rentrer par Trébizonde."

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[**E 3111/423/44**] No. 80.

*Mr. Hohler to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 150.)

Sir, *Budapest, April 4, 1924.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lindsay's despatch of the 19th ultimo, concerning the ratification of the treaty between Turkey and Hungary, I have the honour to report that I was informed this evening by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Constantinople almost exactly a fortnight ago, and the treaty was to enter into force fourteen days later; M. Daruváry believed that it entered into force to-day.

According to the Hungarian Constitution it is not necessary that a treaty should obtain previous ratification by Parliament, unless it be a treaty of peace; therefore, in the present case, the treaty has not been submitted to the Hungarian Assembly, but was ratified by decree.

I have, &c.
T. B. HOHLER.

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[**E 3139/634/44**] No. 81.

*Sir G. Grahame to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 294.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Brussels presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 4th April respecting prohibition of the export of arms and munitions to Turkey.

*Brussels, April 5, 1924.*

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Enclosure in No. 81.

*M. Hymans to Sir G. Grahame.*

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Bruxelles, le 4 avril 1924.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser sous la date du 22 mars 1924. Je la remercie de cette communication, dont j'ai pris connaissance avec intérêt.

Au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, votre Excellence y propose de lever l'interdiction d'exporter des armes et des munitions de la Grande-Bretagne en Turquie, prohibition qui était en vigueur jusqu'à présent.

Le Gouvernement du Roi ne voit aucun inconvénient à cette mesure. Il prendra une attitude identique en ce qui concerne les exportations belges.

Je saisis, &c.
HYMANS.

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[**E 3189/3189/44**] No. 82.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received April 9.)*

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April 8, 1924.*

ADNAN BEY, speaking unofficially yesterday, said that, as he resided in Constantinople and was nearer to Balkan affairs than Ismet Pasha, he had been studying them lately and was thinking of proposing to Angora to effect a rapprochement with Greece. It would be designed solely as a method of appeasement that would be the more necessary as, whatever was done about exchanges of population, large numbers of Greeks and Turks must inevitably in the future live in each other's territories. He wished to know how such an idea would be viewed in Great Britain. It would appeal more to Ismet if, when he put it forward, he were able to say in some form that it was approved by His Majesty's Government.

I said you would in principle favour any step towards real pacification, but you might ask yourself whether a *détente* in one quarter was being produced at the cost of increased tension in another. I would enquire your views.

I cannot quite make up my mind whether this enquiry proceeds really from Adnan or from higher up. It is quite conceivable that Turkish Government might wish to use a statement from His Majesty's Government in favour of Turco-Greek rapprochement in the obscure and tortuous dealings they are always engaged in with Bulgarian Government.

Would it be possible to suggest a naval holiday between Turkey and Greece, setting off Sultan Selim against Salamis? I do not know enough about Greek navy to judge whether this idea is practical. In any case, it would have to be broached here with tact.

(Copy by bag to Sofia and Athens.)

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[E 3320/43/44] No. 83.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 302.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 9, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 242 of the 17th March, I have the honour to report that, in view of Sir Adam Block's absence on leave in the south of France, M. des Closières, the representative of the French bondholders on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, called on me the other day and left with me the papers, copies of which are enclosed,* regarding the budget of the Debt as recently passed by the Assembly at Angora and regarding the service of Turkey's internal loans.

2. I understood from M. des Closières that the Ministry of Finance have now ordered that all Debt revenues collected hitherto by the council in the Constantinople Vilayet shall be paid direct into the National Exchequer, thus depriving the council of the remnant of their collected funds. In practice this should not, however, modify much the existing situation, as the latter funds did not, I understand, do more than suffice for the payment of salaries, &c., of the council and their officials and the upkeep of their offices. This will now be provided for, though on a much reduced scale, from the national budget.

3. Thus, from the legal point of view, the Turkish Government appear to have completed the process of tearing up the Decree of Moharrem. They have indeed left the council itself the means of existence, but I fear that the reasons for this must not be sought in any intention on Turkey's part to restore to the council later its pre-war debt-collecting functions, but rather in the necessity—of special importance from Turkey's point of view—of enabling the council to fulfil the tasks given to it by the Treaty of Lausanne as regards the repartition among the succession States of the interest on, and capital of, Turkey's pre-war external debt.

4. It remains to be seen whether and when the Turkish Government will seriously tackle with the council or with other representatives of the bondholders the question of the resumption of the payments of interest on the pre-war debt. I may add here that recently Signor Nogara, the Italian representative on the Debt Council, told a member of my staff in confidence that he believed that the Turkish Government might invite the bondholders to a discussion as soon as France had ratified the Treaty of Lausanne. His own personal idea was that the Turkish Government would then suggest the abolition of the Debt Council and the resumption of payments direct to the bondholders or their representatives, presumably through the Imperial Ottoman Bank, beginning with a comparatively small lump sum and rising year by year, these payments to be guaranteed probably on the customs. In no case would the Turkish Government agree that the council or any other agent of the bondholders should collect these sums on the bondholders' behalf independently of the Turkish Ministry of Finance.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 3321/32/44] No. 84.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 14.)

(No. 303.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 9, 1924.

IN the ninth paragraph of my despatch No. 285 of the 2nd April relative to the debates in the Grand National Assembly on the new Turkish Constitution, I suggested the possibility that the question of the supreme command of the army might not be dealt with in the Constitution, as proposed originally. When, however, the debate was resumed on the 6th April, this was the first question taken, and for two days it almost monopolised the attention of the Assembly.

2. I have not seen the draft article prepared by the Constitutional Committee, but it apparently proposed that the President of the Republic should be *ex officio* commander-in-chief of the army. The now powerful opposition in the Assembly demurred very strongly to this. They urged that in principle the supreme command

* Not printed.



must be retained by the Grand National Assembly itself. The discussions were lively, especially on the first day, but the details are not worth recording. On the 7th April a solution was found in the following formula, which was agreed to by a majority of 111 against 42, two members abstaining:—

> "The office of commander-in-chief is vested in the moral personality of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and is exercised in a representative capacity by the President of the Republic. The command of the armed forces is confided in peace time to the Chief of the General Staff in accordance with the relevant law and in war time to the person who shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers."

3. The meaning of the word rendered above by "exercised in a representative capacity" is somewhat difficult to appreciate in this context. It may perhaps be more literally translated "personified." The motion embodying the formula was led up to by a speech of Ismet Pasha's, and was proposed by one of his supporters. Ismet Pasha urged among the arguments that if the commander-in-chief were chosen by the Assembly he would be above the Government, and would be a dictator; and that there could be no objection to the President of the Republic personifying an attribute of the moral personality of the Assembly as he was irresponsible, and he would not exercise the effective command.

4. From the summary given in my despatch No. 188 of the 5th March, 1924, of the recent law on the office of Chief of the General Staff, it will be seen that it was therein laid down that that officer should in time of peace have supreme command of the army as substitute for the President of the Republic, and that he should be appointed by the latter on the nomination of the Prime Minister. The upshot of the whole matter would therefore appear to be that both in peace and war time the choice of the commander-in-chief rests with the executive, not with the Assembly. On the one hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha has sustained a personal rebuff, which has caused his supporters to accuse the Assembly of ingratitude, but, on the other hand, the Assembly has contented itself with the assertion of the abstract principle that a function which it could only exercise by delegation is vested in its moral personality.

5. The formula translated above will be embodied in the new Constitution as article 40. It is sufficiently subtle and elastic to make it doubtful how it will operate in practice. The importance attached to the matter is a measure of the rivalry between the opposition and the two pashas, Mustafa Kemal and Ismet. It is an axiom in this country that no ruler can maintain himself unless he can keep a hold on the army, which is still in the higher ranks a hotbed of politics. Whatever the plans of the two pashas may be, it is of cardinal importance to them to keep this hold. So long as Mustafa Kemal can count on Ismet Pasha and both on the Chief of the General Staff, the President would appear to be in a fairly strong position, though not as strong as if he had himself secured the supreme command.

6. A report was put about some days ago by a Constantinople paper that the Assembly would shortly dissolve itself. The paper asked its readers to wait and see, notwithstanding the contradictions which would be published. The contradictions have duly appeared, but the future of the Assembly must be regarded as quite uncertain. Even though it should not dissolve, or rather order new elections, it is generally assumed that it will adjourn for several months in the near future. It is nearly through with the budget, and the remainder of the Constitution need not occupy many more weekly sittings.

7. The supporters of Mustafa Kemal Pasha display an increasing tendency to accuse the Assembly of seeking to monopolise the authority which really belongs to the people. Thus the "Aksham" of the 7th April had a leading article headed, "Does sovereignty rest with the nation or with the National Assembly?" The last words of it were "Assemblies, like rulers, may be despotic. The despotism of Assemblies is the more terrible." The "Ileri" again, whose special function it is to make the pace for Mustafa Kemal, has had articles hinting at the necessity of his authority being respected. These may be indications that it is the Ghazi's intention to save the national sovereignty from the National Assembly. It was by the Assembly that he saved it from Sultan and Caliph, but he is a very adaptable man.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 3189/3189/44] No. 85.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 14, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 8th April: Græco-Turkish *entente*.

You may assure Adnan that His Majesty's Government could not do otherwise than approve and welcome the principle and prospect of a rapprochement between the two countries. But you should be careful to avoid any suggestion of active advice or intervention which might in any way involve us, and you should therefore not raise the question of a naval holiday. Also, take opportunity to emphasise in general terms the wish of His Majesty's Government to see established in the Near East a new friendly relationship which will enable assistance to be given to internal development.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 43, and Sofia, No. 24.)

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[E 3462/210/44] No. 86.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April* 17, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I presume that this reply is sufficiently favourable to justify my proceeding for a visit to Angora. Please reply on this point urgently.

I should try to start as soon as His Majesty's Government have ratified and to return here before Bairam begins.

I understand that neither my American nor Italian colleagues have been received by President of the Republic, and it may therefore be difficult for me to get audience In this case I should probably defer visit till I present letters of credence. Please, therefore, allow nothing about proposed visit to transpire in the press.

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[E 3462/210/44] No. 87.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).*

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April* 21, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 76 of 17th April: Journey to Angora.

Ratification is still dependent on necessary action by Canada and Irish Free State, and, while every effort is being made to expedite it, date cannot yet be given.

It does not seem advisable that you should go to Angora and not be received there by President of Republic.

In all the circumstances, it would appear preferable to defer idea of immediate visit.

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[E 3474/222/44] No. 88.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 316.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 16, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 289 of the 2nd April, relative to the reported intention of the Turkish Government to establish a prohibited zone for Armenians, I have the honour to state that the "Aksham" newspaper of that afternoon, which appeared after my despatch had been drafted, published a telegram from Angora representing the proposal regarding the Armenians as merely one of a series of measures contemplated by the Ministry of the Interior with a view to put an end to racial questions in Turkey. Arabs, according to this telegram, would not be allowed to reside in the areas adjoining Syria and Irak. Greeks would be tolerated only within the municipal boundaries of Constantinople. Georgians would be prohibited in the Rize, Kars and Ardahan provinces. No communities, except the Kurds, would be allowed to form homogeneous villages anywhere in Turkey; nor would the non-Turkish population of any town except Constantinople be allowed to exceed 10 per cent. It was estimated



that these and various ancillary proposals to end vendettas by transferring the families involved in them, to reduce the number of inhabitants of over-populated districts and to settle nomads, would not involve the transplantation of more than 200,000 persons.

2. Although this report was widely reproduced in other papers, it excited little interest among a public even now rather more accustomed to hear heroic measures announced than to see them put into execution. Some little further attention has been directed to it, however, in the last few days, owing to the publication of contradictory reports to the effect, on the one hand, that the Minister of the Interior has denied the existence of any such scheme, and, on the other, that the Ministry of Reconstruction is studying a draft law regarding racial redistribution.

3. Far more excitement has been created by a scandal connected with the return to Constantinople some time ago of two or three rich Armenians who contrived somehow or other to enter Turkey notwithstanding the general prohibition of the return of fugitives. This has been worked up into a scandal of the first magnitude. Allegations and counter-allegations fill the columns of the press. The matter was brought up some days ago at a secret meeting of the People's party at which the Minister of the Interior appears to have been severely heckled, and on the 14th April it gave rise to a discussion in the Assembly. It is now to be the subject of a special administrative enquiry. It is suggested that the Armenians in question, who have been expelled since the matter developed into a scandal, secured permission to return by bribing persons in high places, and public opinion is naturally very shocked that such a thing should be even conceivable in Turkey. I confess that I have not followed the controversy in detail. Its real interest is threefold. Firstly, the position of the Minister of the Interior is menaced. Secondly, no one is bold enough to say openly that the return of Armenians is anything but a monstrous outrage. Thirdly, I fear that the feeling aroused must prejudice the chance of any general measure being adopted in the near future to enable fugitive Armenians to return. At the moment the tendency is to allege that other Armenians and Greeks besides those immediately in question have also managed to get back and to ferret out not only the persons themselves but the members of an alleged secret organisation for enabling fugitives to evade the restrictions.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 3478/186/44] No. 89.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 320.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 16, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 216 of the 12th March, I have the honour to state that the Grand National Assembly adopted unanimously, on the 13th April, a law for the ratification of the Treaty of Friendship signed on the 3rd March between Germany and Turkey.

2. I transmit herewith a text of the treaty,* which was published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 14th April. I believe it to be accurate, but I have not yet been able to procure an official copy from Adnan Bey.

3. As foreshadowed in my despatch under reference, the treaty proves to be on the same lines as those already concluded between Turkey and certain other States. These lines were established in the Turco-Polish negotiations at Lausanne The German treaty more nearly resembles that concluded with Hungary than the treaties of friendship with Poland and Austria for the simple reason that the negotiation of commercial and other conventions has been reserved instead of those subsidiary conventions being signed simultaneously.

4. The only difference of any consequence between the German and the Hungarian treaties is that in the former, article 3, concerning the subsidiary conventions to be concluded later, is rather more cautiously worded, and that express mention is made of the necessity for dealing in them with the question of mutual assistance in judicial matters.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* See Enclosure in No. 91.

[E 3544/324/44] No. 90.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, April* 22, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 58 and your private telegram of yesterday.

When Adnan made communication reported in my telegram No. 75, I confined myself to thanking him. I made no suggestion of any date for negotiations, and shall make none without instructions from you.

Until to-day, I took every opportunity of pressing Turkish Government to agree to earliest possible date for frontier negotiations, assuming that our ratification would take place speedily. I will now go slowly, and perhaps their own hesitations about Indian Government reservation may cover some of the delay which now seems inevitable.

I have allowed no suggestion to transpire here that I have been contemplating a visit to Angora.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 15.)

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[E 3545/186/44] No. 91.

*Lord D'Abernon to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 23.)

(No. 292.)
Sir, *Berlin, April* 17, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of the treaty recently signed between Germany and Turkey.

This was handed to me to-day by Herr von Schubert.

I understand that the treaty has been ratified by Germany, and newspapers state that it has also been ratified by Turkey, but ratifications do not appear to have been exchanged.

I have, &c.
D'ABERNON.

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Enclosure in No. 91.

*Treaty of Friendship between Germany and Turkey, signed at Angora on March* 3, 1924.

L'ALLEMAGNE, d'une part, et la Turquie, d'autre part, animées du désir d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre la République d'Allemagne et la République turque, et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont, à cet effet, nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le Président de la République d'Allemagne : Son Excellence M. H. Freytag, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire d'Allemagne à Bucarest ; et

Le Président de la République turque : Son Excellence Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre la République d'Allemagne et la République turque.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux Etats conformément aux principes du droit des gens. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.



ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour régler les relations consulaires et commerciales entre leurs pays respectifs ainsi que les conditions d'établissement et de séjour, dans le territoire de chacune d'elles, des ressortissants de l'autre partie et le concours que les autorités judiciaires des deux parties auront à se prêter dans certaines matières judiciaires par des conventions qu'elles se réservent de conclure conformément aux règles du droit international public général sur la base d'une parfaite réciprocité.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Angora le 3 mars 1924.

FREYTAG.
TEWFIK KIAMIL.

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[E 3680/3680/44] No. 92.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 329.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 22, 1924.

ISAAK KHAN, Mofakham-ed-Dowleh, Persian Ambassador to Turkey, called on me yesterday in order to say good-bye, his replacement by another incumbent having been announced some time ago. The immediate reason of his departure from Constantinople was not, however, the impending arrival of his successor; Isaak Khan was inclined to doubt whether Sayyid Muhammad Sadik Tabatabai's appointment to this place was yet definite, and, as the selection had been made by Reza Khan and required the covering approval of the Shah, he wondered rather if Sayyid Muhammad Sadik Tabatabai ever would come to Constantinople at all. He would not be sorry if no Persian Ambassador ever materialised here. Though himself an Oriental, he could not understand the mentality of the Angora Government. It had at first been most friendly to Persia and to Afghanistan; when the Ambassador of the latter country and the Persian Special Mission had come to Turkey, Mustafa Kemal had gone out of his way to be specially courteous; all this was now changed; the indignities he had suffered at Angora last August were known, but the Afghans were no less sore. He had recently seen in Constantinople a member of the Afghan Mission, who was half a Persian; this gentleman spoke most bitterly of the neglect and lack of courtesy now shown by Mustafa Kemal towards the mission, and Isaak Khan believed that, whatever might be said to the contrary, the Afghan Government would not send another Ambassador at all to Turkey.

2. The true reason of his leaving Constantinople now was that he believed some rumours current in the press of the last few days to the effect that Mustafa Kemal was coming for a visit to this place early in May, and he himself intended to leave in order to avoid the delicate situation in which he would find himself if he and the Pasha were to be in the same place simultaneously.

3. The Ambassador criticised severely the action of the Turkish Government in abolishing the Caliphate and in expelling Abdul Mejid Khan and the members of his family. This action had thoroughly estranged opinion against Turkey in Egypt and in Afghanistan, and even in Persia, which was unaffected by the substance of the action, the discourtesy and indignity of the forms adopted were most unfavourably regarded. All this, Isaak Khan maintained, tended to the isolation of Turkey, and would greatly facilitate the dealings of His Majesty's Government with Angora, especially as regarded the Irak frontier question. In this negotiation he felt very confident that Turkey would be most anxious to come to terms with His Majesty's Government and would be willing to make sacrifices to that end; she was feeling friendless, she wanted support from behind against Russia, she would seek it from Great Britain, and he considered that it would be to the interest of Great Britain to

afford it and to favour the reconstruction of a strong Turkey against future Russian aggression.

4. Isaak Khan has a high opinion of Mustafa Kemal's personal ability and also of his ambition. He is convinced that the Ghazi does not mean the capital to remain indefinitely at Angora, and that some day—but not for several months—he will transfer the Government to its ancient seat.

5. I have thought it worth while to report this conversation because Isaak Khan is an acute and intelligent observer, with friendly feelings towards His Majesty's Government, and is inclined to express his opinions sincerely. It must of course be recognised that, in his criticism of Angora, he is labouring under prejudice caused by his unfortunate experiences there last year, but, with this due allowance, his remarks are worthy of attention.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 3683/1100/44**] No. 93.

*Mr Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 334.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 23, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 30th January, I have the honour to state that on the 21st April the Grand National Assembly voted a law for the ratification of the treaty and annexed instruments concluded between Turkey and Austria.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Vienna.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 3685/3685/44**] No. 94.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 336.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 23, 1924.

A REPORT began to circulate here several weeks ago that M. Filality, the Roumanian representative, might shortly be expected to proceed to Angora, and that when he did so he would present credentials as Minister to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. From the manner in which this report was ventilated and received it was clear that something of the sort was in the wind, notwithstanding the fact that, although Roumania had ratified the Treaty of Lausanne, she was not and could not be technically at peace with Turkey pending ratification by three of the principal Allied Powers as provided in article 143 of the treaty.

2. The matter hung fire until last week, when M. Filality left somewhat suddenly for Angora. From remarks let fall by Adnan Bey in conversation with me I gather that he knew very little about the matter, and that all preliminary arrangements were made direct between Bucharest and Angora, through the intermediary of the Turkish representative at the former capital. Adnan Bey seemed, indeed, a little disconcerted to find that the Turkish *agrément* to M. Filality's appointment had been given without his being so much as informed.

3. M. Filality was received by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 20th April, and presented his letters. I enclose a translation of the speeches exchanged, based on a Turkish version published in the "Tanin" of the 23rd April.* It will be observed that no reference is made to the conclusion of peace between the two countries, and that the tone is distinctly cordial on both sides.

4. About the same time when the final arrangements were made for M. Filality's visit to Angora, it was announced that M. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, was about to visit Constantinople. His arrival has been fixed for the 24th April. It is said to be his intention to go on to Broussa, and his journey is described as being a mere pleasure excursion.

5. The significance of these two incidents occurring at a time when relations between Roumania and Russia are so strained is obvious. It is not unnatural that

* Not printed.



Roumania should seek to consolidate her position with the Turks as in other directions at this juncture. What is rather more remarkable is that Turkey should have shown equal readiness to receive a Roumanian Minister regardless of the fact that the state of war has not been regularly terminated. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was doubtless flattered by the alacrity displayed by Roumania in ratifying the treaty before any of the Great Powers, and perhaps not unwilling to administer to the latter what might be considered a slight snub; but the principal importance of the matter seems to be that the reception of M. Filality in such circumstances can only be regarded as a deliberate display of indifference towards Russia, possibly even a manifestation of solidarity with a minor Power threatened with Russian aggression.

6. As for M. Bratiano's visit, it is hardly conceivable that that statesman should come here just now with the sole object of seeing the sights of Constantinople and taking the waters at Broussa. Reports that he will go to Angora have been contradicted, but the Turks are quite prepared to make a little fuss over him. It is not impossible that M. Filality, who returned from Angora on the 22nd April, may have arranged for some meeting between his Prime Minister and one or more responsible Turkish statesmen.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

P.S.—I understand that news has just been received that M. Bratiano has cancelled his visit to Constantinople on accountof his wife's illness.

R. C. L.

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[**E 3750/3750/44**] No. 95.

*Sir C. Barclay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 123.)
Sir, *Stockholm, April* 23, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that I heard to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the Swedish Minister in Constantinople has been authorised to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Turkey. This, I was informed, would be on the lines of the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Hungary, signed at Constantinople on the 18th December last, and would be followed by negotiations for a commercial and consular convention and also for a convention regulating the rights of nations in the respective countries.

I have, &c.
COLVILLE BARCLAY.

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[**E 3906/210/44**] No. 96.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 345. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 29, 1924.

WITHIN the last week three of my colleague's have returned to Constantinople after paying visits to Angora.

2. My American colleague informs me that he asked, when he arrived at Angora, to be received by the President, but was informed that his Excellency was ill. Admiral Bristol says he has no reason to suppose that the President was not ill; but I have information to the contrary. The admiral stayed only a couple of days in Angora and had conversations with most of the Ministers. He says he found them moderate men when spoken to, and he considers that they are quite amenable to reason. It had not occurred to him that perhaps Ministers talking privately may take a far more reasonable attitude than in public or in action.

3. Admiral Bristol lived in his railway-car and was fairly comfortable. He recognises, however, the hard conditions of life for a European in the régime which he prescribes for his liaison officer who lives there. This gentleman for every thirty days he spends at Angora is allowed ten days in Constantinople for recuperation.

4. M. Filality, my Roumanian colleague, went to Angora to present his letters of credence. He would have done this before, but that the letters sent to him by his Government were not in proper form. He was officially received by the President, but Ismet Pasha was ill, and M. Filality was therefore unable to see him. At his official audience Mustafa Pasha's demeanour was marked throughout by the utmost aloofness and dignity; he kept the Minister very distinctly at arm's length the whole time, and, while quite gracious, he scarcely allowed a smile to illuminate his features. All proceedings were conducted through an interpreter, both the formal and official speeches and the subsequent conversation, although the President is perfectly familiar with the French language. Nevertheless, the audience lasted altogether for one hour and a half. M. Filality had been told before it began that after a few minutes conversation he should take an opportunity of proposing to the President to introduce his staff to his Excellency. M. Filality attempted to do this, but Mustafa Kemal waived the proposal aside and continued talking. Twenty minutes later a member of the President's staff put his head into the door with the obvious intention of interrupting the audience. The President signed to him to go out again and continued talking. When finally M. Filality did present his staff, Mustafa Kemal was attracted by the handsome appearance of the military attaché's unform and continued talking for another twenty minutes.

5. This confirms the information which I have had from another source to the effect that the President is a tremendous talker. Two or three hours is a common period for one of his political speeches, and on one occasion he spoke for six hours without drawing breath. The audiences which he gives are always so long that his entourage exert themselves to make them as few as possible in number, because no day is long enough to include more than one of them without prejudicing business.

6. M. Filality's visit was very short, and he transacted nothing but his formal and official business of presenting credentials. He admired the courage which had induced the Turks to plant their capital on the barren side of a mountain, and he was filled with horror at the conditions under which Europeans in Angora have to live.

7. Signor Montagna was received by Ismet Pasha the very day he arrived in Angora, but he did not have an interview with the President. He conveys the impression to enquirers that, owing to the unofficial nature of his visit, he did not seek for an audience. He had interviews with practically all the more important Ministers to discuss current business with them, especially as Ismet Pasha was ill for the greater part of his stay in Angora.

8. Signor Montagna was immensely impressed by the remoteness, intellectual even more than physical, of the inhabitants of Angora from the realities of life outside their town. He gave the Ministers specific instances of the enormities committed by their subordinates in Constantinople and the provinces, and he is convinced that the Ministers were genuinely astonished at his revelations. He even succeeded in one or two minor instances in obtaining immediate redress. As a result of his visit, Signor Montagna is more convinced than ever that direct pressure or persuasion applied at Angora is necessary for the achievement of any useful business. At the same time he feels that with the present set of men, in the atmosphere by which they are at present surrounded, it is quite hopeless to expect any real progress to be made in the reform and reconstruction of the Turkish State. He thinks that if the present state of affairs continues some sort of crash must ensue sooner or later.

9. He attended the meeting of the Grand National Assembly which took place on the 20th instant, when the last fifty articles of the Constitution were voted into law. The proceedings were extremely disorderly, but he was greatly struck by the atmosphere of violent opposition to the Government which was displayed by the Chamber as a whole. Deputies were leaping to their feet in twos and threes the whole time, firing off objections to the proposals of the Government and amendments to the law which the Government could not accept. It is all the more surprising in these conditions that such astonishing legislative progress should have been made.

10. Ismet Pasha fell ill the day after Signor Montagna arrived in Angora, and he only saw him again on the day of his departure. Signor Montagna was very painfully impressed by the Pasha's appearance. He saw him daily less than a year ago at Lausanne, and he was greatly struck by the change in his appearance which has since taken place Ismet Pasha appeared to be suffering from some bronchial trouble which gave him a good deal of pain, and, judging from mere external appearances, Signor Montagna regards him as a finished man.

11. Like M. Filality, Signor Montagna was horrified at the conditions of existence in Angora. There is only one hotel there where it is possible to buy any food, and



Signor Montagna took the whole of it, namely, six rooms. There was no kind of attendance, and in the kitchen, which was directly below Signor Montagna's room, the cooks spent the whole day in burning mutton-fat. My Italian colleague went to Angora gaily, not believing all the ill that was spoken of it. He has returned more convinced than ever that he will have to go there again at intervals, but confessing frankly that he will be unable to do so without making a great effort over himself.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 3912/3685/44**] No. 97.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May 5.*)

(No. 352.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 29, 1924.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 336 of the 23rd April regarding Turko-Roumanian relations, I have the honour to report that M. Bratiano did not come to Constantinople after all. On the morning of the 24th when the mail ship arrived from Constanza there were nothing but ordinary tourists on board, and the Turkish press, finding that all its speculations on the visit of the Roumanian Minister had been in vain, filled its columns with peevish comments on the mystifications to which it had been exposed.

2. M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister here, assures me there never was anything political intended at all. M. Bratiano had meant to spend the Orthodox Easter here on an ordinary holiday; he himself had suggested a trip to Broussa, which is at its best at this season; the visit had been cancelled for reasons unconnected with political affairs, and the Turks had been making an undue fuss about nothing.

3. However this may be, the result has been something of a revulsion of Turkish feeling as expressed in the press, where it is explained that the possible differences that may arise between Roumania and Russia are of no concern to this country. My Italian colleague, who was in Angora when M Filality was presenting his letters, gathered the impression that his reception was rather chilly and that Turkish circles were feeling sore at having rushed or at having allowed themselves to be precipitated into a rather foolish position.

4. I have sent a copy of my despatch under reference to His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest and am also sending Sir H. Dering a copy of the present despatch.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 3915/32/44**] No. 98.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May 5.*)

(No. 357.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 30, 1924.*

THE Grand National Assembly of Turkey adjourned on the evening of the 22nd April. This, the first adjournment under the new Constitution, is an event of importance in the evolution of the new Turkey. It marks more definitely than any previous suspension of work (although such suspensions have occurred) the abandonment of the theory that the Assembly, as sole repository of the powers inherent in the sovereign people, must exercise continuous control over any authority to which such powers may be partially delegated.

2. The motion for the adjournment was passed only after a somewhat acrimonious discussion. One hundred and one Deputies voted in favour of it, fifty-one against. Although the motion was not introduced until the forenoon of the day itself, it was regarded as certain, once the Assembly had disposed of the new Constitution in the manner described in my despatch No. 335 of the 23rd April, that it would adjourn on the 22nd April. Great efforts were consequently made to finish off outstanding business as quickly as possible. The result was to throw the Assembly in a state of great confusion, especially on the last day of the session. It is impossible from the very

sketchy accounts of the proceedings telegraphed to Constantinople to form any complete idea of what was done and what was left undone.

3. The Finance Law covering the budget for the year 1924–25 had been adopted on the 20th April. The decisions taken on the two following days included the ratification of the Austrian Treaty (separately reported in my despatch No. 334 of the 23rd April), the adoption of the budget of the Evkaf, *i.e.*, pious foundations, the rejection, or rather reference back to the Government, of the proposed agreement with the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the shelving of a proposal to create a Ministry of Marine, the adoption of a law relative to sanitary dues on shipping, and the acceptance with slight modications of the list prepared by the Government of the 150 persons to be excepted from the general amnesty agreed to at Lausanne. They appear to have included also, although the position in these two cases is not quite so clear, the adoption of a law on the future administration of railways, providing, *inter alia*, for an expenditure of £T. 15,000,000 spread over five years on reconditioning the Anatolian Railway, and a law increasing the duty on wheat imported into Constantinople to twelve times the tariff rate.

4. Such of these matters as are of special interest to His Majesty's Government will form the subject of separate despatches as and when further information becomes available. For the moment I am merely attempting to give a general idea of the position at Angora at the close of the session. In order to do this it is necessary to mention four particular points which have a special bearing on the general situation. The final budget estimates for the year beginning the 1st March, 1924, show an admitted deficit of over £T. 11,000,000 as between an expenditure of £T. 140,433,369 and an estimated revenue of £T. 129,214,692. The Finance Law expressly states that provision for the foreign debt is postponed until Turkey's liability in this respect shall have been assessed. The Assembly seems to have regarded the repurchase of the Anatolian Railway concession as having been definitely decided. And lastly, the Government appear to have committed themselves to an assurance that they would in no circumstances give the exploitation of that railway to a company.

5. The adjournment of the Assembly for so long a period as six months creates a peculiar situation. If the President and the Prime Minister adhere strictly to the Constitution they must expect to find themselves hampered in many ways. They are deprived of the power conferred on the executive by the Constitution of 1876 of dealing with urgent business requiring legislation by promulgating "provisional laws." This power was so greatly abused from 1908 onwards that there has been no question of reviving it as part of the new constitutional system. Its disappearance, however, is bound to entail inconvenience. No supplementary credits and no transfers of credits can be provided for except by legislation. In addition to this, it will be constitutionally impossible for the Government to carry to a conclusion agreements with foreign Powers and with concessionary companies.

6. Other difficulties loom ahead in the less immediate future. Before the adjournment the Assembly had become intractable and incoherent, and was to a large extent discredited in the popular estimation. It may not be a very easy matter to bring it together again in November, and when it does reassemble it is unlikely to be more docile than it has shown itself in the debates on the new Constitution. It is not improbable that if it ever comes together again it will only be to decide upon its own dissolution.

7. Meanwhile, whether by their own fault or that of the Assembly, the Government have become involved in a situation very detrimental to Turkey's credit abroad. Nothing has been decided as to the lines on which the question of the interest on the public debt is to be handled. The Debt Council has been deprived of its last revenues, as reported in my telegram No. 84 of the 27th April. No agreement has been reached with the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The question of the Anatolian Railway has been prejudged without being settled, and prejudged in a manner calculated to indispose the powerful financial interests in Great Britain which might have come to Turkey's assistance.

8. A review of these various factors in the situation at the close of the session suggests to a foreign observer the question whether Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas will be prepared to scramble through the next six months as best they may on a constitutional basis, or whether they will utilise the recess to take matters more completely into their own hands than they have hitherto ventured to do.

9. For the time being, however, the scandal concerning the return of certain rich Armenians (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 316 of the 16th April) continues to excite far more attention than anything else. The Armenians themselves have been got



rid of, though there was nothing to show that their return was irregular or their expulsion legal. Two commissions have been set up to investigate different aspects of the matter at Angora and Constantinople. Officials have been dismissed or suspended, including the director of police at Constantinople and the director of prisons at Angora. These measures have merely concentrated attention on the person of the Minister of the Interior, Ferid Bey. He is making a hard fight for his position, but he has become a great source of weakness to Ismet Pasha's Government, and it is doubtful whether he can remain in office even now that the Assembly has been dispersed. Other scandals are being ferreted out. It has been suggested that a cheque for 1,000*l.* sent by the Agha Khan to Ferid Bey for the benefit of Turkish orphans was not properly accounted for. The Minister is further reproached with having taken office under Ferid Pasha, and he is accused of having at that time deprecated resistance to the British. Practically the whole of the Constantinople press, including the "Ileri," the one purely Kemalist organ here, is clamouring for his removal. In these circumstances, it is perhaps the most singular feature of the whole situation that neither Mustafa Kemal nor Ismet shows any readiness to eliminate Ferid from the Cabinet.

10. The new Constitution has been sanctioned by the President of the Republic, but the complete official text has not yet been published in Constantinople.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 3918/3918/44**] No. 99.

*Mr. Erskine to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 5.)

(No. 92.)

Sir, *Sofia, May* 1, 1924.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to receive him yesterday as he wished to speak to me regarding Bulgarian relations with Turkey. After referring to the conversation which we had had on the subject some months ago, as reported in my despatch No. 23 of the 2nd February, M. Kalfov said that the unsatisfactory state of things to which he had on that occasion called my attention had of late been much accentuated It was impossible to settle the smallest question. M. Radev's letters were left unanswered, the Turkish authorities, who for no apparent reason regarded him with dislike, treated him with deliberate discourtesy on every possible occasion, and his position was becoming intolerable. Hitherto the questions at issue had been for the most part trivial, but now, in view of the closing of French and Italian schools and churches, he was apprehensive of similar action against Bulgarian institutions in Turkey. Veiled threats on the subject had in fact already been made. If they were carried out it might be necessary to resort to reprisals against mosques and Mahommedan schools in Bulgaria, and a serious crisis might arise between the two countries. He had been most anxious not to renew official relations until at least one of the Great Powers had done so; but in view of the situation he had described, he felt he could no longer delay entering into negotiations for the conclusion of the three conventions which the Turkish Government required as a preliminary step from all their ex-allies. For this purpose he proposed to send M. Radev temporarily to Angora, but he had no intention of establishing a permanent Legation at Angora if it could possibly be avoided. He was anxious that his motives should not be misunderstood, and hoped that this step would not cause displeasure to His Majesty's Government.

I replied that I knew you attached great importance to the restoration of normal conditions in the Near East, and that I believed that, so far from objecting to his proposed action, you would welcome the renewal of official and friendly relations between the two countries.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE.

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[E 4101/185/44] No. 100.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 373.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 7, 1924.

IN the 11th paragraph of my despatch No. 244 of the 12th March, I mentioned that one of the consequences of the abolition of the Caliphate had been a press campaign in favour of similar action regarding the patriarchates and the grand rabbinate. This campaign subsequently died down, but the question has again come to the fore in the last few days owing to the publication in the local press of a statement said to have been made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to a correspondent of the "New York Herald." I enclose a copy of this statement as reproduced in the French "Tanin" of the 4th May.* I am not aware whether it has actually appeared in the "New York Herald."

2. The importance of the President's statements is enhanced by the fact that on at least two previous occasions, namely, the proclamation of the republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, he has foreshadowed action by statements to foreign press correspondents. It must further be borne in mind that, while the Turkish authorities have of late treated the Greek and Armenian patriarchates with consideration, they have carefully avoided any formal recognition of them.

3. The Greek patriarchate continues to be an object of great suspicion. A few days ago, for instance, it was reported that the late Patriarch, Mgr. Meletios, had abandoned or postponed a projected voyage to America, and it was suggested that the reason for this was that he had not obtained leave from the patriarchate. This not unnaturally suggested to the Turkish press a question as to why the ex-Patriarch should still be considered dependent on the Phanar.

4. The Greek Patriarch's position has, moreover, been diminished by the action of the authorities in distraining upon property in the patriarchate in execution of a judgment pronounced against him by default at the suit of the notorious Papa Eftim.

5. It will be remembered that when the present Patriarch was elected, Mr. Henderson refrained from entering into relations with him, but reserved the question whether the usual congratulations should be conveyed to him by a member of the Embassy on the occasion of Easter. When the time came I considered that it would be impolitic from our own point of view and damaging to the patriarchate if a member of this mission called there. I confined myself, therefore, to sending cards to the Patriarch and such other ecclesiastical chiefs (one of whom was the acting Armenian Patriarch) as had sent me cards a week before on the occasion of the Latin Easter.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 4332/4332/44] No. 101.

*Sir W. Max Muller to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 245.)

Sir, *Warsaw, May* 13, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. Leeper's despatch No. 530 of the 4th December, 1923, reporting the ratification by the Polish Diet of the Peace Treaty, the Commercial Agreement and the "Settlement" Convention with Turkey, I have the honour to report that the treaties in question were ratified and signed by the President of the Polish Republic on the 18th January.

The texts of the treaties were published in the "Journal of Laws" ("Dziennik Ustaw"), No. 39, of the 10th May.

I have, &c.

W. G. MAX MULLER.

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* Not printed.



[E 4341/448/44] No. 102.

*Sir C. Eliot to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 17.)

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tokyo, May* 17, 1924.

MY telegram No. 125.

Lausanne Treaty was approved by Privy Council on 14th May, and steps will be taken to obtain Imperial sanction and Imperial ratification in the course of the next few days.

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[E 4371/185/44] No. 103.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 391.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 373 of the 7th May relative to a statement said to have been made to a correspondent of the "New York Herald" by Mustafa Kemal Pasha regarding the future of the Patriarchates and the Grand Rabbinate, I have the honour to state that on the 6th May the semi-official Anatolian Agency circulated a very categorical *démenti* to the effect that the alleged interview had never taken place, and that the statement attributed to the pasha was an entire fabrication.

2. On the same day on which the official *démenti* was published in Constantinople, the newly established Turkish paper "Jumhuriet" ("Republic"), a Government organ, published independently a similar denial, with the addition that no decisions had been taken regarding the Patriarchates, &c.

3. Before these denials appeared there had been time for a good deal of comment on the alleged statement. The delay was so short, having regard to the distance between Constantinople and Angora, that it may well have been accidental, but it resulted in the statement itself receiving much more attention than the denial. During the interval one paper, which is in pretty close touch with official circles, threw out in fairly plain language the suggestion that the Patriarchates would do well to forestall drastic action by winding up their affairs of their own initiative.

4. I find that the alleged statement appeared in the "New York Herald Tribune" of the 23rd March and was represented as being based on an interview accorded to a certain Ella Priter. From a foot-note it would appear to have been the property not of the paper itself, but of the "World Wide News Service" of Boston. Ella Priter is unknown to the United States High Commission here.

5. The interview, as published in America, is a good deal longer than the version enclosed in my despatch under reference. Notwithstanding the denial that it took place, it presents very much the appearance of a statement made, if not by Mustafa Kemal himself, by some authorised person well primed with the Turkish point of view regarding the Caliphate and the Patriarchates. It is obvious that, if it really took place, it must have been over two months ago. This suggests the possibility that the President or someone authorised by him did make a statement which it is now considered advisable for political reasons to disavow.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 4372/632/44] No. 104.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 394.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 72 of the 23rd January relative to the budget estimates for the financial year beginning the 1st March, 1924, circulated by Ismet Pasha to the People's party, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of the estimates finally adopted by the Grand National Assembly shortly

before it adjourned on the 22nd April, as published in the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar" newspaper of the 1st May. I have been unable to obtain an official copy of the budget, and am therefore unable to explain the discrepancy between the total shown on the expenditure side, viz., £T. 140,433,369·80, and the actual total of the items, which comes to £T. 140,505,869·80, as shown in brackets underneath. It is clear, however, that the mistake is in the items and not in the total, as the total shown in the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," viz., £T. 140,433,369·80, corresponds to that given in article 1 of the Finance Law covering the budget.

2. I have embodied in table (A), expenditure, the corresponding amounts in Ismet Pasha's estimates of the 14th January. It will be observed that the estimates voted by the Assembly show an increase of about £T. 11,500,000. The most notable increases in particular Departments are under the heads of Finance and Public Works. I am unable to explain the large increase in the estimates for financial services. In the case of the Ministry of Public Works the increase is presumably due to the adoption of further projects for new railways. The estimate does not include the portion to be expended in the year beginning the 1st March, 1924, of the £T. 15,000,000 spread over five years, which was voted on the last day of the session for reconditioning the Anatolian Railway (see paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 357 of the 30th April, 1924).

3. The Assembly also budgeted for a revenue greater by about £T. 8,000,000, than that foreseen by Ismet Pasha in January. I am unable to offer any explanation of this optimism, which may, I fear, prove to be ill-founded.

4. On balance the budget shows an admitted deficit of about £T. 11,000,000, not including such expenditure as may be incurred under the law, referred to in the last paragraph but one, regarding the reconditioning of the Anatolian Railway. If on a moderate estimate one-fifth only of the total expenditure contemplated for that purpose should be incurred during the present financial year the deficit would come to about £T. 14,000,000, notwithstanding the fact that no provision is made for the service of the foreign debt.

5. The covering law has not seemed to me sufficiently interesting to have it translated in full, but it presents the following features, which are worth noting.

6. Article 6 empowers the Council of Ministers, on the advice of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to increase by way of reprisal and to restore when necessary to the normal rate fees charged by that Ministry for services rendered at headquarters or through missions and consulates abroad.

7. Article 8 lays down that, as from March 1924, the manufacture, importation and sale of matches shall be a State monopoly. Discretion is allowed as to whether the Government shall itself work this monopoly, establish a control over individuals and companies engaged in the trade or grant a concession to one or more companies. So far as I have been able to ascertain no definite steps have yet been taken to give effect to this article.

8. Article 9 authorises the Minister of Finance to carry out experiments in connection with the mode of collection of tithes.

9. Article 12 exempts from real property tax up to 1933 residential and farm buildings erected from 1922 onwards in places which have been invaded by the enemy or in towns and villages which have from any cause been destroyed as to more than one half.

10. Article 16 provides that all Government purchases to amounts over £T. 1,000 shall be made by calling for tenders, and prescribes that not less than one month must elapse between the public notice and the definite adjudication in the case of purchases up to £T. 10,000; not less than two months in the case of purchases above that amount; and not less than three months in the case of purchases of foreign goods. Transactions requiring secrecy, or relating to articles to which the tender system cannot be applied owing to their being held by particular individuals, are excepted.

11. Article 18 lays down, as regards certain expenditure contemplated in the vote for Public Works for the construction and exploitation of the Uzun Keupru–Keshan and [?] Arada–Arghana–Diarbekr railways, that the mode of application of the money and the system of management shall be similar to those prescribed in a law dated the 23rd March, 1924, for the Angora–Sivas and Angora–Moussa Keui railways. My information as to what is definitely contemplated in the way of new railway construction is rather confused, but this article is an interesting indication on the subject. It will be possible to form a clearer view if and when the details of the budget are published.

12. Article 19 makes provision for the payment, spread over five years, of arrears of interest and sinking fund of the internal loan; while article 21 states that all



payments in respect of the republic's share in the foreign debt of the Ottoman Empire are deferred until the distribution of the debt shall have been effected.

13. Article 29 lays down somewhat complicated rules regarding the emoluments of officials employed abroad. They are not worth reproducing in detail but it is interesting to note that for several purposes the pound sterling is taken as the basis.

14. Article 35 saddles the budget of the public debt with the allowances of certain categories of persons who formerly drew salaries, but who are not comprised in the regular Departments of State, like employees of the Senate, the Civil List and the Council of State. I am not clear as to the bearing of this arrangement, but I note it as one which may possibly involve an improper charge on money belonging to foreign bondholders.

15. Article 36 authorises the Minister of Finance to advance to the municipality of Angora a sum of £T. 500,000, repayable over ten years with 6 per cent. interest. This is obviously part of the plan for developing Angora as a capital and has therefore a certain political interest.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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Enclosure in No. 104.

(A.)—EXPENDITURE.

| Departments. | Budget adopted by Grand National Assembly. | Ismet Pasha's Proposals of January 14, 1924. |
|---|---|---|
| | £T. | £T. |
| Grand National Assembly .. .. .. | 1,548,596·80 | 1,605,415 |
| Presidency of the Republic .. | 280,770 | 247,320 |
| Audit Department .. .. .. | 212,998 | 77,500 |
| Prime Minister's Department .. .. | 329,248 | 40,000 |
| Ministry of Finance .. .. | 10,886,279 | 5,600,000 |
| Personal allowances (Pensions &c.) .. .. | 10,922,883 | 10,900,000 |
| Public Debt .. .. .. .. | 7,560,537 | 6,388,070 |
| Customs .. .. .. .. | 3,158,080 | 3,200,000 |
| Real Property Department .. .. .. | 718,625 | 680,000 |
| Ministry of Interior .. .. .. | 4,156,763 | 15,000,000 |
| Public Security .. .. .. .. | 3,123,004 | |
| Gendarmerie .. .. .. .. | 10,101,596 | |
| Posts and Telegraphs .. .. .. | 4,780,208 | 4,980,060 |
| Foreign Affairs .. .. .. .. | 1,303,025 | 1,300,000 |
| Press .. .. .. .. .. | 136,390 | 200,000 |
| Public Health .. .. .. .. | 2,968,331 | 4,000,000 |
| Religious Affairs .. .. .. .. | 1,422,650 | 1,200,000 |
| Justice .. .. .. .. | 5,381,097 | 5,000,000 |
| Public Instruction .. .. .. | 6,877,626 | 5,050,000 |
| Public Works .. .. .. | 17,385,888 | 13,000,000 |
| Commerce .. .. .. .. | 1,962,576 | 8,150,000 |
| Agriculture .. .. .. .. | 5,406,682 | |
| National Defence .. .. .. .. | 27,279,386 | 32,400,000 |
| Marine .. .. .. .. .. | 6,582,631 | |
| Exchange of Populations and Reconstruction .. | 6,020,000 | 7,000,000 |
| Caliphate .. .. . .. | .. | 331,695 |
| Internal debt and specialists .. .. | .. | 2,000,000 |
| Assistance to City of Angora .. .. | .. | 500,000 |
| Encouragement of sport .. .. .. | .. | 50,000 |
| | 140,433,369·80 (140,505,869·80) | 128,900,000 |

(B.)—Receipts.

| Part. | Services. | Estimated Revenue. |
|---|---|---|
| | | £T. |
| I | Direct taxes (real property tax, tithe &c.) .. | 43,930,500 |
| II | Stamp duty, fees, registration taxes, fines .. | 3,210,000 |
| III | Indirect taxes, &c. (customs, liquor, &c.) .. | 28,170,000 |
| IV | Monopolies (salt, tobacco, mintage, posts and telegraphs) .. .. .. .. | 16,044,100 |
| V | Establishments (schools, railways, State printing press, &c.) .. .. .. .. | 703,000 |
| VI | State property .. .. .. .. | 4,480,000 |
| VII | Miscellaneous .. .. .. .. | 5,204,296 |
| VIII | Recoveries .. .. .. .. | 219,714 |
| IX | Consumption taxes on cigarette paper, playing cards, games, matches, tinder, &c. .. .. | 14,461,000 |
| X | Extraordinary war taxation, and new revenues | 12,792,000 |
| | | 129,214,610 |
| | Ismet Pasha's estimate of January 14, 1924, was | 121,089,810 |

[E 4374/1333/44] No. 105.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 396.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 221 of the 12th March and earlier reports on Turco-Russian relations, I have the honour to state that the last eight or ten days have witnessed a curious little explosion of animosity against Russia in the Turkish press. The immediate occasion for this has been afforded by two incidents. In the first place, it became known on or about the 7th May that the Russian authorities were holding up the visas of the Turkish consuls appointed to Batoum, Tiflis and Baku. Secondly it was alleged that a certain Tahsin Bey, variously described as first secretary or courier of the Turkish Embassy at Moscow, had been arrested on his way to that place on an accusation of smuggling, and had been treated with a contumely so inconsistent with his diplomatic character that he had attempted to commit suicide.

2. In connection with the first incident, it was stated that the Russians were expelling numbers of Turkish subjects long established in the Caucasus, and it was suggested that they wished to delay the consuls' visas until the process of expulsion was complete. Other less definite allegations were made regarding difficulties placed in the way of Turkish travellers. To complete the tale of grievances, the Angora paper "Hakimiet-i-Millie" published, somewhere about the 9th May, an article bitterly complaining of the unfriendly attitude of Russia towards Turkey, and more particularly of the constant attacks on Turkey in the Russian press.

3. On the 11th May the Russian Embassy at Angora appears to have *visé* the passports of the consuls The Constantinople "Tanin" of the same day announced that the Russian authorities in Baku had apologised for the Tahsin Bey incident, but that the Angora Government were still in communication with Moscow regarding it. No really precise particulars of the incident have been given to the public. From the little which has appeared, it seems not improbable that Tahsin Bey was in fact engaged in smuggling.

4. I do not think that the outburst of hostility in the press need be regarded as more than the result of a hint given to the journalists by the Angora Ministry for Foreign Affairs, primarily anxious to force the hands of the Russians regarding the consuls' visas, and incidentally desirous of making the most of the alleged improper treatment of a diplomatic officer. All the rest is merely part of the recurrent friction between the two Governments over minor matters. I do not therefore attach any great importance to the matter except as a symptom of latent ill-feeling, which has been a feature of the outwardly friendly relations between Russia and Turkey for some time past, and which would assume importance if Russia should become involved in serious difficulties—*e.g.*, with Roumania or Poland. I have reported elsewhere on the relations between Turkey and Roumania, which may now be described as cautious but amicable. Poland appears to be anxious to stand well with the Turks. *Inter alia*



it was announced on the 9th May that a Turkish military mission was shortly to visit that country.

5. It is worth noting that the "Tanin," the organ of the old Union and Progress opposition to the Kemalist Government, has been somewhat cold and reserved in its attitude over the recent quarrel. It published, on the 12th May, an article complaining that the public were left very much in the dark as to the differences between Moscow and Angora, and hinting that, if the Government wanted the support of the press, something more than a *mot d'ordre* should be given to justify conscientious journalists in supporting it.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4411/448/44] No. 106.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May* 19, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 58, paragraph 1.

It is reported in local press that Japanese Government has ratified treaty. If this is true, it will constitute a very great pressure on Turkish Government to come to an immediate decision on question of Indian Government's reservation, because public here would then imagine Turkish hesitation over this trifling point alone was delaying ratification by His Majesty's Government and consequent entry into force of treaty. Existence of our own difficulties with dominions is still unknown here.

In any case, Turkish reply about Indian reservation may now come at any moment, and there is therefore a very special reason why His Majesty's Government should clear away their difficulties with dominions at earliest possible moment, apart from general importance of bringing treaty into force as soon as possible.

[E 4584/32/44] No. 107.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 26.)

(No. 416.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 21, 1924.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 204 of the 11th March, the press of Constantinople within the last few days reported that Adnan Bey, delegate here of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was affected by the law preventing Deputies from keeping their seats in the Assembly while occupying the post of Turkish representative abroad; that he had been asked to opt between his deputyship and his post as delegate, and that he had chosen for the former. The law referred to is that under which, as you already know, Yussuf Kemal Bey has recently resigned his mission to London.

2. Adnan Bey informed me that the statements repeated above were substantially correct; he had been asked to opt, and he had opted for his deputyship; at the ame time, he was not at all convinced that his case was covered by the law, and he had written to Ismet Pasha asking that his arguments in this sense should be taken into consideration.

3. There appears to be a likelihood that even if the law is found to be applicable to Adnan Bey—and on this point I can offer no useful opinion, as it is not clear from what budgetary credit he draws his salary; he certainly is not paid on that provided for the Constantinople delegation—he may not be required to vacate his present office till the Assembly meets again in the autumn. In any case, I shall not fail to report to you any further developments in this matter.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 4585/32/44] No. 108.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May 26.*)

(No. 417.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 21, 1924.*

SINCE I wrote my despatch No. 357 of the 30th April there have been some minor developments in the Turkish political situation which it now seems worth while to record summarily, although their effect, if any, on the main course of events in this country is still quite uncertain.

2. When the Grand National Assembly adjourned on the 22nd April the campaign against the Minister of the Interior, Ferid Bey, was at its height. It turned principally on the scandal regarding the return of certain rich Armenians and others, and on allegations regarding Ferid Bey's attitude towards the national movement in 1919, when he was a member of one of Damad Ferid Pasha's Cabinets.

3. For a short time the second of these grounds of attack seemed to overshadow the other. Two papers published different versions of a telegram addressed at the time by Ferid Bey to Refet Bey (now Refet Pasha), who was in command of the Turkish troops at Samsoun. This brought Refet Pasha into the limelight. He has for some time been in Constantinople, taking no open part in public affairs. When the Ferid Bey telegram was published he at first observed an attitude of reserve, but on the 1st May he suddenly allowed the local "Aksham" to publish a long and sensational interview, in which he confirmed the authenticity of one version of the Ferid Bey telegram, and made various statements which, under an appearance of faint justification of the Minister of the Interior, were in reality very damaging to him. Refet Pasha also made reference to past differences between himself and Mustafa Kemal Pasha; said that "Mustafa Kemal and his friends" (apparently those who had been in the national movement from the start) ought to be in power; but added that he himself was so far from nurturing political ambitions that he was resigning his Deputyship.

4. Refet Pasha's motives in making this statement were and remain obscure. In private conversation with Mr. Ryan a few days later he claimed, half jestingly, to have done the Government a good turn by drawing off attention from Ferid to himself. In view of his association with Reouf Bey's hitherto abortive attempts at opposition, the general impression is that he was attempting to stab the Government in its weakest part.

5. The next episode was the appearance in Constantinople of a new Government organ, the "Jumhuriet," or "Republic," under the auspices of Yunus Nadi Bey, the editor of the Angora "Yeni Gyun." As I mentioned in my above-mentioned despatch, the "Ileri," hitherto the leading Kemalist organ here, had taken a strong line against Ferid Bey. The appearance of the "Jumhuriet" heralded, if it did not cause, a considerable journalistic storm. This might be set down to mere jealousy and personal quarrels, were it not for the fact that the two principal persons connected with the "Ileri," the brothers Jelal and Subhi Nouri have been conspicuous for personal loyalty to Mustafa Kemal, and have at times taken the line that the only cure for the country is that he should take matters completely into his own hands.

6. Within the last few days attention has been redirected to the Armenian scandal by the publication of the first report of the commission sent to Constantinople to investigate it. Beyond the fact that it tends more or less to incriminate the Vali of Constantinople and the director-general of police, who had been already dismissed, the report is of little political interest. It has, however, made the position of the Minister of the Interior even more difficult, and the latest news from Angora is that he tendered his resignation yesterday, and that it has been accepted.

7. The significance of these excursions and alarums will doubtless appear at a later stage. All that can be said at present is that Ismet Pasha's Government has lost ground; and that, while Ismet himself is not criticised, he has increased his difficulties by his somewhat inexplicable loyalty to Ferid Bey. Mustafa Kemal has remained entirely in the background. It is conceivable that he is deliberately allowing the Government to become discredited, just as the Assembly was discredited, in order that a stronger call may be made on him in due course to take a distracted country in hand, suppress the politicians and get on with the much-needed economic revival. This is mere speculation, but, if it should prove to be true, the various episodes recorded above would fall into place in a more or less rational evolution of the confused internal situation.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 4606/3918/44] No. 109.

*Mr. Erskine to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May 26.*)

(No. 102.)

Sir, *Sofia, May 21, 1924.*

THE Serbian Minister informed me yesterday that at the request of Enver Bey, the unofficial Turkish representative here, he had recently consented to receive a visit from a Turkish officer attached to his staff. The latter had begun by speaking with bitterness of the Bulgarian Government. He said it was impossible to deal with them and that relations between Sofia and Angora were most unsatisfactory. He did not mention any specific ground of complaint beyond the appointment of M. Radev, which, in view of his anti-Turkish attitude in the past, was singularly unfortunate, but said that the present frontier between Turkey and Greece was inconvenient and would have to be rectified in the near future, and that this would no doubt cause annoyance to Bulgaria in view of her ambitions in Western Thrace. He had then referred to a statement published in a Bulgarian newspaper some weeks ago as having been made by a member of the Turkish Government to the effect that the latter would not remain indifferent in the event of an armed Serbian intervention in Bulgaria. Enver Bey had, he said, been instructed to convey to M. Rakitch a contradiction of this statement and to inform him that his Government were anxious to cultivate the most friendly relations with Serbia, and were in any case far too deeply engaged in introducing social reforms in Turkey to think of intervening in Balkan affairs. He had explained that, as the Turkish Government were not yet in official relations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, they had chosen this channel for conveying to the latter these assurances.

2. M. Rakitch was puzzled as to the object of this communication and asked me if I had any information as to the existence of strained relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. I said that I believed there was some friction, but that so far as I knew the questions at issue were unimportant, and that the Bulgarian Government believed that the Turkish Government were deliberately making difficulties in order to force them to negotiate a treaty of friendship and renew official relations.

3. Shortly after the conversation on this subject which I had with M. Kalfov as reported in my despatch No. 92 of the 1st May it was stated in the official press that M. Radev was proceeding to Angora at once to open negotiations. It has, however, since been announced that his journey may have to be postponed, as the Swedish Minister at Constantinople is now going to Angora in order to negotiate a similar treaty—a reason for the postponement of M. Radev's visit which is not very convincing.

4. With regard to the message conveyed through Enver Bey to M. Rakitch, it seems to me not impossible that its main object was to sound the Serbian Government as to their attitude towards a further extension of Turkish territory in Thrace and perhaps allay their opposition by representing it as a check to future Bulgarian aggrandisement.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM ERSKINE.

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[E 4630/1333/44] No. 110.

*Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May 27.*)

(No. 480.)

Sir, *Moscow, May 21, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in view of various references in the Soviet press to comments in the Turkish press on Turco-Russian relations, I took an opportunity, on the 19th instant, to ask the Turkish Ambassador as to how matters stood.

2. Moukhtar Bey told me that the outstanding cause of conflict at the present moment is the difficulty placed by the Soviet Government in the way of the appointment by Turkey of consular officers. The formal recognition by Turkey of the Soviet Union brought about, as a natural consequence, the suppression of the Turkish diplomatic representation in the Caucasian States. The Turks imagined that, in place of their diplomatic representatives, they would be allowed to appoint a sufficient number of

consuls to protect the interests of the large numbers of their nationals residing in Russia, and more particularly in the Caucasus. They have so far been prevented from doing so.

3. Pending the conclusion of the commercial treaty (which is still the subject of negotiations, but is held up mainly by the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the subject of the territorial privileges to be accorded in Turkey to the representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade), a temporary arrangement has been discussed, having as its object the removal of the present deadlock in commercial relations. Such arrangement would have as its basis a mutual agreement regarding the duty-free admission of goods habitually imported from the one country into the other; it would also contemplate the settlement of the question of consular representation. It has been found impossible to settle either the one question or the other, for the Russians have insisted on cutting out of the Turkish list various articles of essential importance to Turkish exporters, and cannot be induced to allow Turkey to appoint an adequate number of consulates within the territories of the Soviet Union.

4. Russia has at present eight consular posts in Turkey, whereas the Turks have only six in Russia, of which five are in the Caucasus. Yet Russian interests in Turkey are small, and the number of her nationals resident there is insignificant in comparison with the number of Turks living in the territories of the Soviet Union.

5. Moukhtar Bey maintains that the Russians are using every subterfuge in order to postpone the decision of this question of consular representation. Latterly, in spite of the fact that he is himself receiving his telegrams from Angora perfectly normally, they have gone so far as to charge the Turkish authorities with wilfully obstructing telegraphic communication viâ Trebizond, and thus preventing M. Suritz from keeping in contact with Moscow. They are also, it seems, demanding that the consular officers selected for service in Russia should await the grant of their exequaturs before proceeding to their posts—a formality which can obviously be dragged on indefinitely.

6. Moukhtar Bey again alluded to the difficulties mentioned in my despatch No. 215 of the 7th March, as affecting Turco-Russian relations. Turkish subjects are continually being arrested, imprisoned for long periods, and expelled without any justification. He finds it is quite impossible to get justice for his nationals or to get Moscow to bring effective measures to bear upon local Governments in the Caucasus.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.

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[E 4664/448/44] No. 111.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received May* 27.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May* 27, 1924.

MY telegram No. 97.

A Turkish newspaper announces to-day that a reply will shortly be sent to His Majesty's Government about Government of India's proposed reservation.

This is first mention of the question that has ever appeared in Turkish press.

I earnestly hope that way will be clear for ratification by His Majesty's Government within a few days.

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[E 4664/448/44] No. 112.

*Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay* (*Constantinople*).

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 28, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 103 of 27th May: Ratification.

Canada has agreed to ratification, and now only Irish Free State remains to be dealt with. Matter is being pressed, but definite date cannot even now be given.

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[E 4807/145/44] No. 113.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 2.)

(No. 433.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 28, 1924.

FOR some little time past a certain amount of agitation against France and Italy has been a notable feature of the Turkish press. I do not attach much importance to this, as there are no signs of the Turkish Government adopting anything but a cautious attitude regarding the particular questions which are now being exploited by the journalists, but the press itself is so persistent that I think it well to draw your attention to the matter.

2. The question of the closing of the congregational schools, which is a real cause of quarrel between the Turks and the French, and which also interests the Italians in a lesser degree, has remained in a state of deadlock, and for the moment attracts little public attention. Both the French and the Italian representatives took advantage of a recent visit to Constantinople of the Minister of Public Instruction to visit him, but they obtained no satisfaction. M. Jessé-Curély, having achieved nothing himself even on the minor question of permission for the holding of examinations at the close of the current school year, arranged for the head of one of the principal congregations to see the Minister. This gentleman was ill received and naturally succeeded no better.

3. None of the parties to this dispute are happy except the Turks. The secretary to the Apostolic Visitor here, who went to Angora on behalf of the congregations towards the middle of April, told Mr. Ryan in confidence after his return that the French had spoiled such very small chance of success as he might have had by sending in an official note. The French officials complain equally of the intransigence of the Turks and of their own congregations encouraged by the Vatican. They also accuse the Italians of inaction. The Italians say little and do less.

4. The Public Debt question being also in abeyance, so far as official intervention is concerned, the attention of the press, in regard to France, is concentrated on real or alleged incidents on the Syrian frontier. The papers abound in accounts of fighting in that neighbourhood between French troops and meritorious Moslem warriors. The status of the latter is not very clearly indicated. It appears to be recognised in a general way that they are irregulars operating within Syrian territory, but of late there have been specific accusations of French violation of two Turkish frontier posts.

5. It has been said at short and frequent intervals that the Angora Government are preparing remonstrances regarding the situation on the frontier and the failure of the French to establish the special régime contemplated in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement for the Antioch-Alexandretta region. So far as I can ascertain, these remonstrances have not so far assumed concrete shape. My French colleague tells me that the only action taken here so far has been an oral representation by Adnan Bey on the 27th May regarding one of the alleged French attacks on Turkish frontier posts. When he said that he would like to have the complaint in writing, Adnan Bey said that his instructions were to confine himself to word of mouth.

6. Politically speaking the situation is thus one of *malaise* merely. The Turkish Government does nothing to discourage and perhaps encourages the press to exploit alleged grievances, but they are themselves reserved. The French are full of their own complaints, but they are busily putting it about that the first task of the new French Government will be to bring about the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty when Parliament meets. The French mission here, which at one time favoured delay in ratification, appears now to take the view that nothing is to be gained by postponing it. A senior member of the French mission has twice recently said to one of my staff: "Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire."

7. It is difficult to form any definite view here as to the real extent of the fighting in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Syrian frontier. The French first secretary told Mr. Forbes Adam some days ago that the accounts published here were much exaggerated, although there were fairly frequent raids by irregular bands. He sent to see Mr. Forbes Adam a M. Gentizon, the correspondent here of the "Temps" and other papers, who had just returned from a tour in Syria, had been three weeks in Aleppo, and had been along the frontier by car as far as the Euphrates. There was so little serious tension, he said, that both French officers and Senegalese soldiers were restive for lack of work. There were troublesome raids at Haggilar and at another point on the frontier, but the bands could do nothing in the plain farther south. The French had built good roads parallel to the frontier and policed them with powerful cars. No Turkish officers or men had been identified among these unmounted bands, nor was it

necessary to attribute their activities to high political reasons. They were due rather to the badness of the frontier, uncertainty in some places as to its *tracé*, and to local disputes (cutting of properties by the frontier line and confiscation by the French of land in Syria owned by band leaders in Turkey).

8. M. Gentizon admitted the existence of some political agitation among the educated portion of the Turco-Kurdish population in the part of Northern Syria adjoining the frontier, and particularly in the sanjak of Alexandretta outside the town, where the Turkish population is small. This agitation derived little support from the raids already described, and in any case the French were maintaining order too strictly to admit of any effective Turkish agitation. South of Aleppo there was a great increase in security and order and rapid strides were being made in economic development. There was, however, a general feeling of uncertainty in French civil and military circles, not as to the determination of the French to remain in Syria, but as to future French policy. It was felt that there must be some further development of the mandatory principle either on the lines followed by the British in Palestine or in Irak.

9. I need hardly observe that M. Gentizon's statements were of an *ex parte* nature and must be regarded as being in certain respects unduly optimistic.

10. As regards Italy, the Turkish press can never quite disabuse itself of the idea that M. Mussolini is a wild imperialist. The feeling aroused by the utterance referred to in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 251 of the 19th March has never died down. The most recent example of excitability is the wide acceptance of a report that the Italians are concentrating troops in Sicily and of a deduction from it that these troops are intended for action in Asia Minor. This ridiculous suggestion has been all the more canvassed as a certain publicity has been given to real or alleged negotiations of M. Montagna relative to a concession for a railway from Konia to Adalia and for the settlement of Italian immigrants in Anatolia. Even the Turkish Government attached sufficient importance to the Sicilian rumour to instruct Adnan Bey to question M. Montagna on the subject. M. Montagna assured him that there was nothing in it, and has given interviews to the press in the same sense. On the 27th May he left for Italy, ostensibly to visit relatives, and this has given the journalists fresh food for thought.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 4795/4795/44] No. 114.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 2.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, June* 1, 1924.

MY despatch No. 433.

Telegrams from Angora, dated 30th May, state that Italians are landing troops at Rhodes, that Italian Prince "Imon" has arrived there, and that Italian motor boats, &c., have recently been visiting the coast near Scala Nova, ostensibly for fishing.

Prince is understood to be Aimone, who is a mere child. While story sounds like a mare's nest, unless, indeed, Italians are taking some action in connection with Dodecanese question; but it has created considerable excitement. Memories of Tripoli and Corfu stimulate nervousness of many Turks.

There is tendency in some quarters to suggest that Italians are acting in British interests.

As this theory may be developed when frontier negotiations collapse, I should be glad of any information as to what Italians are really doing, if anything.

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[E 4863/448/44] No. 115.

*Sir C. Eliot to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tokyo, June* 2, 1924.

PRINCE REGENT has signed ratification of Lausanne Treaty, and documents are being sent to Japanese Ambassador at Paris with telegraphic instructions to ask French Government to inform Serbian and Roumanian Governments in order that they may have an opportunity of signing, as provided in protocol 17 and protocol of 23rd November, 1923, respecting reparations.

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[E 4957/4795/44] No. 116.

*Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 5.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, June* 5, 1924.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 107.

Italian Government are much upset at alarmist reports emanating from Turkish sources as to Italian military concentration at Rhodes and Leros and other aggressive measures.

Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs assures me that no reinforcements, either naval or military, which would justify such reports have been sent to Eastern Mediterranean, and he is warning Turkish Ambassador of danger of such misleading statements.

Prince Aimone, son of Duke of Aosta, who is a junior naval officer, is serving on torpedo-boat which happens to be in those waters.

Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople suggests that anti-Italian attitude of Turkish press may be connected with Mosul negotiations.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

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[E 5012/32/44] No. 117.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 447.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 3, 1924.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 416 of the 21st May concerning the delegate in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to report that a few days ago the papers stated that one Fuad Hikmet had been appointed to the post in succession to Adnan Bey. The statement has since been denied and again reaffirmed, and there is now no telling what the truth is. Adnan Bey himself tells me that he has no official information on the subject, but he thinks the news is probably true. As to Hikmet Bey, he says he is an entirely competent person to carry on the work of a liaison officer, and that he will have no misgivings in passing his mantle to him. I am inclined to attach credence to Adnan Bey's assurances on this point, especially when I remember the melancholy frankness with which he spoke about Ibrahim Tali, who was mooted as his successor in March last (see my despatch No. 204 of the 11th March last).

2. Apparently Fuad Hikmet is a diplomatist of pre-war days. He was once employed at St. Petersburg and thence transferred as Minister to Copenhagen; later he was appointed Turkish Ambassador at Rome, but did not proceed. I should be grateful for any record of his personality that may be preserved in the Foreign Office.

3. Unless unfavourable information concerning him transpires, I should not propose to attempt anything against his appointment in Adnan's Bey's place. Apart from the inherent difficulties of any such undertaking, I feel sure that Adnan himself now wishes to relinquish his post as delegate. He is far more enlightened and reasonable than the Government from whom he takes his orders, and in his dealings with foreign diplomats he is tired of having to maintain positions which, in his inner consciousness, he considers ridiculous.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[E 5014/186/44] No. 118.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 452.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 4, 1924.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 583 of the 21st May, I have the honour to state that M. Nadolny, the new German Ambassador (or Minister), arrived in Constantinople on the 3rd June.

2. M. Nadolny, who brought with him a counsellor and a secretary, lost no time in giving an interview to the press. According to the version which appeared in the

"Aksham," he spoke as follows, after making complimentary references to the beauties of Constantinople and expressing his joy at being entrusted with a mission in a country for which Germany and he himself had so high a regard :—

"I shall strive to transform into present friendship our ancient comradeship in arms. I do not doubt that in this we shall receive the help of the rulers of the young Turkey. I shall shortly go to Angora and present my letters of credence to his Excellency the President of the Republic.

"As regards the question of transferring the Embassy, I am a man guided by the work I have to do. I think I shall reside at Angora. When I visit Angora I will discuss this matter also with his Excellency Ismet Pasha. I shall see the sites which, I learn unofficially, the Government has assigned for the building of an Embassy at Angora. I cannot say anything definite at present."

3. Other versions of the interview in this morning's papers add nothing of particular interest. Pending further developments, I do not think that undue importance need be attached to M. Nadolny's statement regarding the transfer of the Embassy to Angora. He evidently intended to leave the question entirely open, while flattering Turkish susceptibilities by representing residence at Angora as not improbable.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 5015/3750/44**] No 119.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 453.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 4, 1924.

ON the 16th May the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, left for Angora, accompanied by Dr. Kolmodin, the chief dragoman of his Legation, in order to negotiate a treaty of friendship between Turkey and Sweden.

2. The treaty was duly signed on the 31st May by M. Wallenberg and Tevfik Kiamil Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The text has not yet been published, but the treaty is understood to be similar to those already concluded with various other Powers.

3. One paper states this morning that M. Wallenberg also concluded a commercial convention. This is certainly incorrect. The Swedish plan was to follow the example of Germany and Hungary by concluding a treaty of friendship only in the first instance and leaving further conventions to be negotiated later.

4. M. Wallenberg returned to Constantinople on the 3rd June.

5. The Swedish negotiations have been given as a reason for the delay in opening the long-expected negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria. Whether this is the real reason, or whether, as some believe, the delay has been due to continued difficulties connected with the position of M. Radev, the Bulgarian delegate, announcements have now begun to appear in the press that the Bulgarian negotiations will be put in hand in the immediate future.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Sofia.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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[**E 5017/4795/44**] No. 120.

*Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 455.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 4, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 107 of the 1st June, I have the honour to state that the excitement created in Constantinople and Angora by the alleged military preparations of the Italians in Rhodes continued at a high pitch on the 1st and 2nd June, but has shown a distinct tendency to subside during the last two days. A reaction in favour of a more moderate view of the situation was noticeable in the local press of the 3rd June, and the public have been still further reassured to-day by news from Angora to the effect that the Turkish representative in Rome reported yesterday afternoon a



satisfactory interview with M. Mussolini. I enclose a cutting from this morning's "Gazette" giving the latest news.

2. The crisis, such as it was, may now be regarded as having lost any serious character. Its principal importance lies in the illustration which it affords of the extreme suspicion with which Italy has come to be regarded. The nervous feeling which I described in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 433 of the 28th May is a very real one, and the Turkish Government, usually so much more sober than the press, seems to have allowed itself to be swept into a state of mind bordering on panic.

3. Although this nervousness is deep-seated and may be expected to persist, various causes combined to work up Turkish fears at the moment when the alleged Italian concentrations were announced.

4. There is in the first place a widespread feeling that somehow or other Turkish foreign policy has gone wrong; that Ismet Pasha's Government has frittered away the strong position which Turkey secured for herself during the period from the Greek collapse in Asia Minor to the end of the Lausanne Conference; and that she is now at loggerheads with most of her neighbours and all the Great Powers of the West. Turks who realise the fundamental weakness of their country regard this state of affairs with misgiving.

5. Secondly, the departure of the Italian representative for Italy on the 27th May fitted in very well with the theory that Italy was contemplating some forward action in regard to Turkey. The explanation that he had gone to see his mother carried no conviction; all the less as it was the talk of the town that M. Montagna, having come here full of hope of what his personal influence could achieve, had left completely disgusted with his recent reception at Angora and with the attitude of the Turks towards all Italian interests.

6. Thirdly, the reports of Italian activity coincided with a definite realisation that the Irak frontier conference had practically broken down and that a Great Power has at last replied to a Turkish aspiration with an emphatic negative. Certain Turkish publicists leaped to the conclusion that Great Britain had with her usual astuteness made Italy her cat's-paw in order to exert pressure on Turkey. The cession of Jubaland, of which few Turks had ever heard until some days ago, was the obvious price of Italian support. Even the announcement of my own impending departure on leave, following a week after that of M. Montagna, has been supposed by some to have a bearing on imagined Anglo-Italian co-operation, planned perhaps during the visit of the Italian Sovereigns to London.

7. I do not think that responsible statesmen at Angora are quite so foolish as to take this last hypothesis seriously; but I have thought it worth while to analyse briefly the various elements in the factitious excitement of the last few days in order to show some of the workings of the Turkish mind at present in relation to questions of foreign policy.

8. It will be observed from the enclosed cutting that attention has now been directed locally to reports of Italian preparations at Leros. These reports may again stimulate Turkish anxiety. Little is known here regarding the present state of the Dodecanese question; and, from their own point of view, Turks can only see in any real or alleged Italian activity in the eastern group of islands a threat to the security of the coast of Asia Minor.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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Enclosure in No. 120.

*Extract from the "Gazette" of June* 4, 1924.

M. MUSSOLINI ASSURE DE SES INTENTIONS PACIFIQUES À L'ÉGARD DE LA TURQUIE.

*Angora, le* 3 *juin.*—Aujourd'hui, à 3 heures et demie de l'après-midi, une réponse est parvenue de Rome. D'après les informations que j'ai pu recueillir à cet effet, notre représentant en cette ville, Souad Bey, a eu une entrevue avec M. Mussolini. Le Premier Ministre italien a longuement parlé de ses sentiments amicaux envers la Turquie. Il a tout d'abord commencé par nier les concentrations de Rhodes, mais il a fini par faire observer que cette île fait partie du territoire italien et que des troupes y avaient été envoyées pour relever celles qui devraient être rapatriées. M. Mussolini a cependant donné toutes les assurances quant à ses intentions pacifiques. Une personnalité

autorisée que j'ai consultée au sujet de la réponse de M. Mussolini que je viens de rapporter ci-haut, m'a déclaré :

"Au cas même où les concentrations en question viseraient à une action militaire, Mussolini ne se serait pas exprimé autrement. Cependant les assurances données par lui sont satisfaisantes quant à la forme."

Après avoir pris connaissance de la missive de Souad Bey, Ismet Pacha a convoqué les Ministres en séance. La réunion a commencé à 6 heures. Au cours de cette séance des décisions seront prises au sujet de la question des concentrations de Rhodes et de la réponse à faire à la proposition de la délégation britannique de confier à la Société des Nations le règlement de la question de Mossoul.

On croit que des instructions seront envoyées cette nuit à Féthi Bey à ce sujet. Il est aussi probable qu'Ismet Pacha fera des déclarations à la presse après la réunion du Cabinet. Les personnes les plus compétentes que j'ai interrogées estiment que l'idée d'une convocation de l'Assemblée nationale ne peut provenir que d'un zèle déplacé. Une autre personnalité que j'avais consultée avant l'arrivée de la réponse de Rome, m'avait dit :

"Les expéditions de troupes à Rhodes sont exactes, mais le motif n'en est pas encore bien précisé. Je ne puis pas concevoir que l'Italie se jette dans une telle aventure militaire."

Le Président de la République, son Excellence Ghazi Moustapha Kémal Pacha, est venu à 7 heures pour prendre part aux délibérations du conseil. Munir Bey, conseiller-légiste du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, assista également au conseil.

On mande d'Angora à l'"Akham," le 3 juin :

"Il résulte de mon enquête que les Italiens ont débarqué à Rhodes depuis le 21 mai, notamment pendant la nuit, des soldats, des canons, des camions et un grand nombre d'hydro-avions. Les concentrations ont continué jusqu'à hier. On ignore le but de ces rassemblements. Les mesures nécessaires ont déjà été prises au cas où ces mouvements seraient dirigés contre la Turquie. On ne dispose pas encore de preuves pouvant faire admettre qu'ils visent un autre but.

"La situation ne tardera pas à se préciser. Si l'on n'envisage pas une action contre la Turquie, il se peut que les Italiens publient un communiqué officiel pour délivrer l'opinion publique du doute et de l'hésitation."

*Léros, Base navale italienne.*

Le "Morning Post" publie d'intéressantes précisions au sujet des installations militaires des Italiens à l'île de Léros, l'une des îles du Dodécanèse et la plus septentrionale du groupe sud des Sporades. L'îlot se trouve à environ 1½ milles de Calymnos et à 12½ milles du point le plus rapproché de la côte de l'Asie Mineure ; il possède trois excellents ports, qui avaient excité l'envie du navigateur russe qui avait visité l'île en 1881.

Le plus vaste de ces ports est celui de Lakki, qui offre des dimensions imposantes ; les deux autres sont celui de Hagia Marina et de Parthéni—ce dernier ainsi nommé du nom de l'ancien autel de la Vierge Arthémis, mentionné par Athenaeus dans la scène de la "Métamorphose en Oiseaux des Sœurs de Méléagre." Le dernier port est protégé par l'île d'Archangelos.

Les occupants italiens note, le "Morning Post," surent tirer parti fort habilement de ces avantages naturels. Toute la chaux de Léros a été mise à contribution et du matériel pour ciment est quotidiennement importé de l'île de Nisyros, tandis que la base de sous-marins de l'île d'Alymnia, près de Rhodes, est reliée à Léros. Environ une douzaine de canons ont été disposés des deux côtés de l'entrée du grand port de Lakki et un magasin de benzine et de pétrole a été créé à Marikia, entre la ville de Lakki et le côté gauche de l'entrée du port.

Un aérodrome, capable de contenir une douzaine d'aéroplanes, a été érigé à Lépida, ou Tsigada Pacha, comme ce lieu est parfois nommé, du nom de la maison d'un pacha. Des jetées sont également érigées le long des quais du port, pour le débarquement du charbon dont il existe en cet endroit un dépôt. Des pose-mines et un certain nombre de navires de guerre stationnent en permanence à Lakki ; une station radiotélégraphique a été installée et l'île entière est soumise à une administration militaire. Le port de Lakki est si vaste que, lors du bombardement, vingt-quatre navires



y avaient été concentrés par les Italiens, tandis que l'entrée avait été minée. Ces préparatifs, continue le journal anglais, semblent témoigner que l'Italie a l'intention bien arrêtée de conserver Léros en son pouvoir ; dans les cas où elle en aurait seulement envisagé la cession éventuelle à la Grèce, elle n'y aurait certainement pas installé une base navale aussi forte à une époque où les impôts constituent une lourde charge pour le pays.

*Rome, le 3 juin.*—Le "Messaggero" dément les nouvelles parues dans la presse d'Athènes et reproduites par certains journaux anglais concernant les travaux de fortification qui auraient lieu à l'île de Léros. Toutefois, ce démenti ne doit pas signifier que l'Italie songe à se désister de l'île de Léros.

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[**E 4993/4795/44**] No. 121.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 358.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, June* 9, 1924.

M. HERBETTE, in yesterday's "Temps," takes Mr. Lloyd George to task for his speech in the House on the 6th instant, for doing his utmost to incite the Italians to invade Turkey, and for suggesting that Smyrna and South-Eastern Anatolia should be taken from the Turks. M. Herbette enquires where England would find the men and the money necessary for such expeditions, and declares that, when Mr. Lloyd George encourages the Italians to risk the same disasters as the Greeks, he speaks like an enemy of peace and of humanity. Nobody, however, can pretend to correct Mr. Lloyd George. He persists in wishing for conquests, just as he did when he took away from the Germans all their colonial possessions, in spite of the objection raised by one of his French colleagues at the conference. M. Herbette concludes by remarking that, if your Government were overthrown on a question touching the inner structure of the British Empire, and if a new Government were formed in order to realise, by the unification of the Empire, the Eastern and other ambitions nurtured by Mr. Lloyd George, the chances of peace in the world would certainly not be increased. Happily, however, British members of Parliament were on their holidays and would have time for reflection before the debate on the 18th instant.

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[**E 5077/1333/44**] No. 122.

*Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 488.)
Sir, *Moscow, May* 23, 1924.

MUCH attention is being paid at the present time to the development of Russian trade with the Near East, in particular with Persia and Turkey. I have the honour to submit the following observations on the subject.

2. A trade delegation of representatives of the departments and undertakings interested, organised by the Russian Eastern Chamber of Commerce, has recently visited Turkey (*vide* my despatch No. 480 of the 21st May). An exhibition was arranged in Constantinople at which samples of products which Russia offered for export were shown. The delegation reported very favourably on the prospects of trade, provided that what appear to be wholly unrealisable conditions are introduced —production costs, rail and sea freights must be reduced and easy long-term credits granted.

3. Trade with Persia is of more practical importance. The third Baku Fair is being held from the 23rd May to the 5th July. The fairs of the last two years were of trifling significance; this year a serious attempt is to be made to capture Persian markets. Exports and imports over the Asiatic frontier are allowed, without special licence and at reduced customs duty rates; discounts of from 15 to 30 per cent. are made on rail and water freights and insurance; transactions are to be exempted from all taxation and excise duty; banks are being called upon to give credits.

4. The chief item of export to Persia is sugar, which constituted 70 per cent. of the sales to Persia at last year's fair. "Centrosoyuz" is making strenuous efforts to oust English sugar. The Sugar Trust and the Commissariat for Foreign Trade are

reported to be forming a mixed company, with head office at Tehran. Textiles come second in importance. The All-Russian Textile Syndicate is catering for the special requirements of the Persian trade and has obtained permission to import 300,000 poods of American cotton for the purpose. The use of Persian cotton in Russia is increasing, Russia having bought the whole of this year's crop. Assistance has been rendered to Persian peasants by supplying them with American cotton seed.

5. Other articles for export from Russia already delivered at Baku include matches, ironmongery, chinaware and earthenware. Persian merchants, on their side, are offering cotton, rice, dried fruits, nuts and wool.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.

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[E 5097/222/44] No. 123.

*Consul Hough to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 86.)

Sir, *Aleppo, June 2, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the telegram from Sir H. Dobbs, enclosed in your despatch No. 63, on the subject of the persecution of Christians in Eastern Anatolia.

2. Generally speaking, it may be said that the statements of Mitran (*i.e.*, Bishop) Israil are in no way exaggerated All evidence available here tends to confirm them. The main source of the following remarks is the Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo, Mgr. Chaya, who has been in correspondence with Mitran Israil, but, in addition, I have taken into account the statements of refugees arriving from Turkey and of missionaries who are in correspondence with colleagues over the border.

3. The fundamental question is whether the Turks, as stated, have decided, in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne, to expel all Christians from the country and confiscate their property. No one here has any doubt whatever that this is so, but the Turks, in accordance with the sinister traditions of their administrative methods, are carrying out their aim not by openly published decrees, but by secret terrorism and victimisation of Christians. The net result is that practically no Christians are left in Eastern Anatolia, except scattered individuals who either feel they would be in a more hopeless position if they left than if they stayed and faced the worst, or hope that by personal prestige or bribery they may succeed in retaining a tolerable *modus vivendi*. Yet an official enquiry would elicit that before leaving Turkey the refugees had all signed a declaration saying that their departure was entirely of their own free will.

4. I turn now to the questions of detail in clauses (1), (3) and (4) of Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram. As regards the seizure of Christian buildings and endowments, apart from the testimony of Bishop Israil, there is every reason to believe that most of the various Christian religious institutions, their churches, schools, hospitals and endowments (*i.e.*, wakoufs) have already been seized. In view of the fact that French, Italian and American school and hospital organisations in Anatolia have already or are shortly about to close down, it would not appear to me surprising that Chaldean, Syrian-Catholic, Jacobite and Armenian Church properties should also have been seized.

Mgr. Israil, when writing to Mgr. Chaya, stated that the Chaldean Episcopal buildings at Diarbekir, Mardin and Urfa had been commandeered, and that he was allowed to occupy only two rooms in them. As regards the religious properties of other communities, there is no doubt but that they have been seized by the Turkish Government, in many cases to serve as barracks. This is also confirmed by French military intelligence summaries.

5. As regards clause (3), Mgr. Israil has written to Mgr. Chaya saying that he has sent one of the three remaining clergy in Mardin to Deir-ez-Zor. He himself is obliged, much against his will, to remain in Mardin to protect as far as he can the few Chaldeans who still remain there, and to save as far as possible the church property from being dispersed or destroyed by the Turkish authorities. Certain plans of an unofficial nature have been made for saving church property, which in the interests of all concerned I refrain from describing in detail.

6. Urfa is very nearly swept clean of all its Christian population. The statements made by Mgr. Israil are corroborated. From various absolutely authentic sources it has been confirmed that all persons leaving their homes and other properties in



Anatolia forfeit them to the Turkish Government. In few cases can they find purchasers for their real property and they incur further losses by being obliged to leave with the minimum amount of luggage. The export of gold from Turkey being prohibited, it is not surprising that Christians should rarely risk taking gold away with them and thus by a breach of the law increasing the dangers which already beset them not only in their homes, but on their way to the Syrian frontier.

The law prohibiting the export of silver coins is not so strictly enforced, as far as can be ascertained.

7. From the foregoing it will be seen that the remarks in the last paragraph of Sir Henry Dobbs's telegram No. 225 to the Colonial Office are abundantly corroborated. If at any time it may be possible to enforce punitive measures against the leading spirits in the recent anti-Christian campaign, the following persons are reported to be among those most deserving of exemplary treatment:—

(1.) Djafar Tayar Pasha, Commander-in-chief at Diarbekir; most bitter against the Christians. Local rumour attributes part of his hatred to the fact that he was once taken prisoner by the Greeks.
(2.) Hadayet Effendi, chief commissioner of police at Diarbekir.
(3.) Khorshid Effendi (Mamour Tesvir), or emigration officer.
(4.) Tahar Direkdji } Informers and instigators against the
(5.) Pirindji Zadé Sedki, of Diarbekir } Christians.
(6.) Sheikh Safwat Bey (Naib), Deputy for Urfa; director of anti-Christian activity at Urfa.
(7.) Hadji Mustafa Kamel, chief of Urfa municipality.

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

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[E 5093/4795/44] No. 124.

*Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 532.)

Sir, *Rome, June 7, 1924.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 130 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that to-day's papers publish an official communiqué, issued by the Volta Agency, in regard to the anti-Italian campaign which has lately been carried on in the Turkish press.

The announcements in the Turkish press on Italian foreign policy and on alleged military preparations directed by Italy against Turkey are, it says, deeply deplored in Italian political circles; unfounded and tendencious as they obviously are, such announcements are clearly intended by their authors to disturb the good relations existing between the two countries. Enquiries made of persons in authority have produced the following information: Signor Mussolini, in consequence of the tendencious reports published by several foreign newspapers, thought it desirable to ask the Turkish representative at Rome to call on him at Palazza Chigi; he then called his Excellency's serious attention to the fantastic information appearing in the Turkish press as regards alleged concentrations of Italian troops and the aggressive designs of Italy, which do not exist, and he emphasised the danger and harm of such news. He added that, although these reports would have collapsed of themselves, since they are entirely destitute of any foundation, it was none the less regrettable that a campaign was being carried on in the Turkish press giving rise to unjustifiable suspicion and mistrust in public opinion and certainly not assisting in the maintenance between the two countries of those relations of cordial friendship of which the Italian Government have given proof on repeated occasions to the Turkish Government.

The communiqué concludes with saying that the Turkish Ambassador, who was most distressed at what had happened, assured Signor Mussolini that he would report the conversation at once to his Government, who, he was convinced, would not fail to take the necessary steps for preventing the propagation of unwarranted information and for dissipating any suspicions aroused in public opinion by the Turkish press campaign.

I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
H. W. KENNARD.

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[E 5112/5112/44] No. 125.

*Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 12.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, June* 11, 1924.

I LEARN from a reliable source that Greek General Staff yesterday received from Governor of Mitylene a message stating that all Turkish merchant ships have been ordered to take refuge in Dardanelles immediately.

I also learn that Turks are preparing to mine Straits and Bay of Ismid.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 6.)

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[E 5113/5112/44] No. 126.

*Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 12.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, June* 11, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Press reports that Turkish steamers in port of Salonica have been ordered to remain until further instructions.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 8.)

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[E 5163/5112/44] No. 127.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 13.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, June* 13, 1924.

REPORTS in Athens telegram No. 162 are, of course, untrue. As only Turkish vessels at Salonica are probably those chartered for exchange of populations (see Athens telegram No. 163), it is possible that they have been held up in connection with arrangements for settlement of emigrants.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 5.)

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[E 5203/186/44] No. 128.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 460.)
Sir *Constantinople, June* 7, 1924.

AS reported in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 452 of the 4th June, the new German representative, M. Nadolny, arrived in Constantinople on the 3rd instant. A few days later the French representative called upon me to inform me that he had been approached by the Swedish Minister, M. Wallenberg, as to whether, in the event of M. Nadolny calling in person on M. Jessé-Curély, the latter would return his visit. M. Jessé-Curély had replied that before giving a definite answer he would like to consult myself and the Belgian Minister.

2. M. Jessé-Curély told me that he had already seen M. Michotte de Welle, who had energetically announced that if M. Nadolny called in person he would say that he was out, and that in no case would he do more than leave a card on the German representative. M. Jessé-Curély said that his own inclination was also to reply to M. Wallenberg that he would prefer a simple exchange of cards.

3. I told the French representative that, though I sympathised with M. Michotte, who had suffered personally as the result of the German invasion of Belgium, where his property had been burnt, I was not prepared to show such an uncompromising attitude in my relations with M. Nadolny. I was indifferent to the course that the latter might adopt, but the position in London and at Berlin did not justify any excessive aloofness, and if he asked to see me I would receive him and would return his visit. I added that I would so inform M. Wallenberg if he came to ascertain my views. M. Jessé-Curély admitted that my attitude was the more logical. Nevertheless, partly in order to support M. Michotte de Welle, but principally, I think, because he felt nervous as to what the French colony here might have to say about it, he said that he would maintain his own solution.

4. M. Wallenberg came to see me the following day, and, after having given me an accurate account of the result of his enquiry at the French Mission, asked me definitely



whether I was willing to receive M. Nadolny and return his visit. I raised no objection, and M. Nadolny called on me by appointment yesterday.

5. M. Nadolny informed me that, both parties having ratified the Treaty of Friendship, he proposed to go as soon as possible to Angora to present his letters of credence as German Minister. Once the representatives of the Allied Powers had been appointed Ambassadors and had presented their letters of credence he would himself receive and present fresh letters as Ambassador. He explained that this course had been rendered necessary and adopted in agreement with the Turkish and British Governments in order to avoid any chance of his becoming dean of the Diplomatic Body here for some time to come, since such a position for the German representative could not fail to provoke difficulties and incidents.

6. The above appears to bear out the explanation of the German Ambassador in London as reported in your despatch No. 1015 of the 29th May. M. Nadolny added that, in spite of his alleged statements in the press, his Government had no intention whatsoever of establishing their mission at Angora. Their idea was to have a liaison officer of some sort there and to bring out a ready-made wooden house from Germany for him to live in. I told him that His Majesty's Government were considering a somewhat similar arrangement.

7. It is interesting in this connection that M. Wallenberg, who returned from Angora a week ago after concluding the Turco-Swedish Treaty of Friendship, told me that not once during his stay there was it suggested to him that he should establish the Swedish Legation at Angora. Such restraint on the part of the Turkish Government might be taken to indicate that they realise that their efforts in this respect are doomed to failure and that they have decided to abandon the attempt.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 5213/3918/44] No. 129.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 476.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 11, 1924.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 641 of the 3rd June requesting my observations on Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 102 of the 21st May, relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I have the honour to state that so far as I am aware there has been little definite change in the situation between Turkey and Bulgaria since the date of Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 349 of the 29th April.

2. There has, however, been one important development in the past few days, namely, that on the 6th June M. Radeff at last proceeded to Angora to negotiate a treaty and conventions between Bulgaria and Turkey. The negotiations began yesterday. I doubt whether they will be easy or rapid, but their outcome will obviously affect the whole situation.

3. I believe Turkey's attitude towards Serbia to be one of extreme reserve. Hints have been given in the press that Turkey is not prepared to make separate treaty arrangements with that country, and that the Angora Government considers that Serbia's proper course is to subscribe to the Treaty of Lausanne. As the time within which this can be done under the special protocol signed at Lausanne (Instrument No. 17 of the Final Act of the conference) will shortly expire, it would be interesting to know from His Majesty's representative at Belgrade what views are held there.

4. I do not think undue importance need be attached to the message conveyed to the Serbian Minister at Sofia on behalf of Enver Bey, having regard to the somewhat strained relations between Turkey and Bulgaria over minor differences at the time when it was delivered, and to the awkwardness of Enver Bey's personal position. I do not believe that Turkey's immediate interest in the relations between Balkan States amounts to more than (*a*) a natural desire not to see these relations assume the character of a combine directed against Turkey, and (*b*) an attitude of watchfulness in regard to any development which might reopen the question of Western Thrace.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Sofia and Belgrade.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[E 5215/3918/44] No. 130.

*Sir A. Young to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 16.)*

(No. 220.)

Sir, *Belgrade, June 12, 1924.*

SHORTLY after the receipt of your despatch No. 261 of the 2nd June requesting my observations on Sofia despatch No. 102 of the 21st May relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I took occasion to ask the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs how matters now stood between this country and Turkey.

2. M. Gavrilovic reminded me of the visit of Djevad Bey in June last, as reported in my despatch No. 216 of 1923. On that occasion the Angora representative was received in a friendly manner. He was told that, for reasons unconnected with politics, this country was unable to sign the Treaty of Lausanne. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government would, however, be very glad, pending the establishment of normal relations, to see a semi-official representative of the Turkish Government take up his residence in Belgrade. He would be assured of enjoying all diplomatic privileges, except that of official recognition. From that day, which was just a year ago, to this, nothing further had been heard from the Turks.

3. When I suggested that our representative in Sofia had understood from M. Radic that some sort of overtures had been made through the Turkish Mission in that capital, M. Gavrilovic put on his blank look and said that, if that had been the case, M. Radic had not reported it. I, of course, gave no corroborative detail for fear of compromising M. Radic, and dropped the subject.

4. M. Gavrilovic appeared to be rather displeased with the Turks at not having taken any notice of the Serbian readiness to enter on unofficial relations, and said he would write to the Serbian agent at Constantinople and ask him to stir up the matter.

5. I should be more likely to obtain from M. Nincic rather than M Gavrilovic frank information respecting any Turkish intrigues either with this country or with Bulgaria, and in my next interview with his Excellency I will bear the subject in mind. He is always ready to expand on Bulgarian relations with Turkey. I think, however, I can safely say that M. Pasic and M. Nincic are dead set against a disturbance of the territorial *status quo* in any region, unless it be under the auspices of the recognised authorities in the matter. I presume no rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier could be countenanced as the result of a private arrangement if it affected the interests of a third party. The Serbs have consistently opposed the extension of Turkish territory on this side of the Straits, and I should not think that they would subordinate this opposition to the fear of Bulgarian aggrandisement. The maintenance of the integrity of existing treaties is their watchword.

6. M. de la Barra (see Sofia despatch No. 107 of the 3rd June) stayed here a few hours on his way from Sofia to Berne, and had an interview with M. Nincic. I can ask the latter what conclusions he drew, and thus open up the subject of Bulgarian aspirations towards the Ægean.

7. I may here mention that, according to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, M. de la Barra considered that the Greek proposal had not been rejected, but the Bulgarian Minister told me that he had received a telegram from his Government to the effect that the Greek proposals in regard to Dedeagatch could not be accepted. No mention was made in the telegram of Cavalla or Salonica.

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

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[E 5409/3918/44] No. 131.

*Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 23.)*

(No. 404.)

Sir, *Athens, June 16, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 343 of the 2nd June asking for my observations on the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia.

2. I should qualify the following remarks by saying that the general information at my disposal, coming chiefly from Greek sources or from diplomatists who are interested in pushing a particular view, cannot be altogether unprejudiced, and that the recent archives of this Legation contain singularly little reference to Balkan affairs.



3. The Serbian Minister in Athens, M. Markovitch, who apparently speaks with great frankness, said at a recent interview which I had with him that his Government were in full relations with Turkey, a statement which seems to clash with the facts as exposed by the Serbian representative in Sofia to Mr. Erskine. M. Markovitch further characterised Serbian relations with Turkey as good, but with the reservation that the Angora Government had in no way relinquished the hope of recovering a further portion of Thrace.

4. My Bulgarian colleague, M. Dobrev, has always represented his country to me as anxious to be on good terms with the Turks. I think he said that the only point of friction between the two Governments was the situation of some Bulgarians near Adrianople, whose treatment by the Turkish authorities were considered oppressive. In any case the message conveyed to the Serbian Government through Enver Bey seems particularly interesting, and, so far as I understand the position, I should certainly agree with the conclusions drawn in the last paragraph of Mr. Erskine's despatch No. 102. Some understanding with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would be a necessary preliminary to any further Turkish adventure in Thrace, as such a movement must at once antagonise both Bulgaria and Greece.

5. I gather, however, from conversations with my Serbian colleague that he does not regard any complications in the Balkans as at all likely in the immediate future. He contends that the Macedonian situation is much quieter; that Greece and Serbia have a working agreement which enables them to deal with the komitajis; that Bulgaria and Greece are militarily too weak to cause trouble, and that Turkey is fully occupied outside the Balkans. There is, therefore, he concludes (leaving Albanian dissensions aside) every prospect of peace for the present.

6. I find however that, in spite of these assurances, M. Markovitch is extremely anxious, and represents his Government as equally so, regarding Russian policy. He anticipates that the danger to Balkan stability will come from that quarter, since the Soviet Government are bound to assume a strong national attitude in their conduct of foreign relations, and will be driven by internal considerations, if by no other, to renew Russian claims to Constantinople. M. Markovitch asserts that large numbers of officers of the old Russian army have returned to their country and are now enrolled in the Soviet forces for service, with which many German officers have also been recruited. He believes that the Russian armies are more formidable than is generally supposed, and that Russian threats of intervention in Bessarabia are the first symptoms of a revival of Russian interest in the Balkans, the ultimate object of which is the possession of Constantinople.

7. M. Markovitch stated his opinion that, if Soviet ambitions take this direction, Bulgaria must inevitably cast in her lot with the Russian advance, and that she bases her hopes of future aggrandisement on Russian support. In present conditions M. Markovitch thinks that Bulgaria may be trusted to remain quiet, and that she will avoid committing herself to any understanding or alliance in the Balkans which would hamper her future action.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

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[E 5410/3918/44] No. 132.

*Sir A. Young to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received June 23.)*

(No. 228.)

Sir, *Belgrade, June 19, 1924.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 220 of the 12th June relative to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria and Serbia, I have received a copy of Constantinople despatch No. 476 of the 11th June.

2. With reference to paragraph 3 of Mr. Henderson's despatch, I have no reason to suppose that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have modified their intention not to sign the Treaty of Lausanne so long as it contains the obnoxious provisions relating to the partition of the Ottoman Debt. As you will remember from the earliest days of the Treaty of Sèvres, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have persistently announced their refusal to engage themselves in the desired manner. A month or two ago the French Minister, at the request of the Council of the Ottoman Debt, enquired of this Government what were the exact cazas which they had inherited from the Ottoman Empire. He was told that, for fear of appearing to be yielding on the main point, his enquiry would receive no answer. I was at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday,

and I asked unofficially two of the higher officials whether, in view of the fact that the delay afforded by the protocol was fast expiring, there was any prospect of this Government rallying to the side of all the other Allies in regard to the Treaty of Lausanne, and they neither of them thought that there was any probability of a change in the attitude of Serbia. The French Minister does not propose to broach this subject without instructions, and I presume that I should not do so either, especially since I see from Tokyo telegram No. 143 of the 2nd June that the Japanese Government are calling attention at Paris to the propriety of informing the Serbian Government of their ratification and its relation with protocol 17 of the treaty.

3. One of the two officials above mentioned was M. Lazarović, the head of the Albanian and Bulgarian sections. As regards Bulgaria, he was watching the Bulgarian negotiations at Angora, and presumed that there would be attempts to define spheres of influence in Western Thrace to the detriment of Greece and therefore indirectly of this country. This Government looked with aversion on the return of Turkey to Europe; on the other hand, it had always supported such Bulgarian aspirations for an outlet to the Ægean Sea as were consistent with the Treaty of Neuilly liberally interpreted.

4. M. Lazarović knew nothing about the offers made by Greece to Bulgaria through M. de la Barra. It was only M. Nincić who had seen the latter.

5. M. Nincić is at present at Bled, where he has gone to spend a few days with the King.

6. I forgot, when commenting in my above-mentioned despatch on Sofia despatch No. 107, to refer to the passage in which it is stated that the official "Bulgaria" had quoted with approval an article in the Belgrade "Trgovinski Glasnik" advocating Serbian and Bulgarian outlets on the Ægean Sea. The "Trgovinski Glasnik" has always had an obsession for the common extension of Serbia and Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea. It is a newspaper which had considerably deteriorated of late, and its political articles have little significance.

I have, &c.
ALBAN YOUNG.

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[**E 5602/186/44**] No. 133.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 496.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 23, 1924.

WITH reference to previous correspondence ending with your despatch No. 689 of the 16th June, I have the honour to state that the German representative, M. Nadolny, presented his letters of credence to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on the 16th June. The speeches exchanged have been published, but they present no special features of interest. The Turkish version of M. Nadolny's speech does not clearly define his status, but in Mustafa Kemal's reply it is definitely described as being that of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister.

2. M. Nadolny returned to Constantinople on the 20th June. Conflicting statements continue to be published regarding his future residence, but it is evident that he has no immediate intention of establishing himself at Angora. The German Embassy buildings both in Pera and Therapia are at present being repaired.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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[**E 5608/32/44**] No. 134.

*Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.*—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 505.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 24, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to your despatch No. 694 of the 16th instant, that I asked Adnan Bey yesterday what the present position was as regards the appointment of Fuad Hikmet Bey as representative in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Adnan Bey replied that he was sorry to say that his Government had decided not to proceed further with the idea of nominating Hikmet Bey to Constantinople, as he had been found to be too antiquated in his ideas



("trop vieux jeu"). He added that Angora had now another candidate in view, a legal counsellor, but that he was unable at present to give his name, as no definite decision had yet been reached.

2. It was perfectly obvious from the manner in which Adnan Bey spoke that he was himself not satisfied as to the suitability of the new candidate. I accordingly reminded him of the conversations which I had had with him when Ibrahim Tali's appointment was first mooted last January, and of the similar attitude adopted by Mr. Lindsay, as reported in his despatch No. 204 of the 11th March, when rumour was again busy with Ibrahim Tali's name. I also mentioned that I had, while on leave last March, taken the opportunity of a visit to Yussuf Kemal Bey in London to represent to him the serious mistake which the Turkish Government would make if they selected as their delegate in Constantinople anyone of inferior calibre.

3. Adnan Bey replied that he was already aware through Yussuf Kemal Bey that I had done so. His Government, however, was in a quandary. All the more important Nationalists were Deputies, and as such could not hold diplomatic appointments. Yussuf Kemal's resignation on that account made it extremely difficult for them even to find a successor to him in London. There were many Turks of the old régime who would make admirable Turkish representatives abroad, but the time had not yet come when use could be made of them. The attitude of the Grand National Assembly in this respect was very regrettable, as such Turks were no less patriots than the Nationalists of Angora, but for the moment that attitude was uncompromising. He said that he entirely agreed as to the necessity of having a delegate of Ambassadorial standing at Constantinople, but he added that he could not bring himself to represent the matter in that light either officially or unofficially in writing to his Government, lest he be regarded as attempting to exaggerate his own importance or to ensure his own retention here. He had, however, recently found someone who was going to Angora to convey his views privately to Ismet Pasha in that sense, and he had also suggested to the latter the desirability of his coming in person to Constantinople for a little while to judge of the position here for himself. He said that he personally saw no objection to Ismet Pasha taking this advice, as it would be easy to represent his visit as a perfectly natural and well-earned holiday.

4. I told Adnan that I found the suggestion an excellent one. Ismet Pasha's visit, if it materialised, would at least afford a chance of settling some of the more important outstanding questions, such as the Eastern Telegraph Company and the reference to the League of Nations of the Irak frontier dispute.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

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